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INTRODUCTION
Behavioral Economics introduced the psychological basis of economic 
behavior. And has been very successful. It has produced five Nobel Priz-
es. It has influence many governmental policies through the Nudges. And 
has had influence in several economics and business areas such as: Or-
ganizational Behavior, Marketing, Behavioral Macroeconomics and Be-
havioral Finance. However, despite its undeniable success, we will argue 
that it is to broad to become a new paradigm in economics and it is too 
narrow to provide an adequate integration of economics with other social 
sciences. To integrate economics with other social sciences we need to go 
beyond Behavioral Economics; and in doing so, we will be able to better 
evaluate the contributions of both traditional economics and Behavioral 
Economics. This is the purpose of this book.
In 2017, Richard Thaler obtained the Nobel Prize, due to his contribu-
tions to Behavioral Economics. Thaler, forcefully argues that we are humans 
and not econs. Behavioral Economics describe the psychological behavior 
of the economic man and argues that he is not rational. Through several 
game theory experiments Kahneman (Nobel 2002), Tversky1  and Thaler 
have proved that economic agents do not behave rational, as assumed by 
the contemporary Neoclassical School. This was a great contribution, and 
they deserve the honor of the Nobel Prize. But, many other economists that 
defended the rationality of the economic man, also won the Nobel prize. 
Just to name few of them: Samuelson,1970; Arrow 1972; Hayeck,1974; 
Friedman,1976; Solow,1987; Becker,1992; Lucas,1995; Phelps,2006; Sar-
gent,2011. The Nobel Prize suppose to be given for a concrete discovery 
that benefits human kind; then How is it possible to get Nobel Prize win-
ners that have an opposite view of the nature of man? And in some cases, 
they even were winners in the same year; like Kahneman versus Smith, 
2002; and Fama versus Shiller, 2013. Is the economic man rational or not?
The story gets even more complicated. Because, even assuming for a 
moment that the rational economic man was a wrong description of the nature of 
man, and that the humans of Behavioral Economics are the right one, we soon 
1 Who did not get the Nobel Prize only because he dies before.
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faced another even more difficult dilemma. Sen also obtained a Nobel Prize 
in 1998. Sen´s share with Behavioral Economics the conception that man is 
not rational, in the neoclassical sense, and that economic man is a social being 
capable of altruism and social cooperation. But in contradiction to the Behav-
ioral Economics´ humans, for Sen man is guided by his reason and not by his 
emotions. For him, man is rational in a much broader sense than with the 
contemporary Neoclassical School. Because, even though he acknowledges 
that man´s social preferences are not necessarily transitive (Arrow´s Theo-
rem); he argues that man through his reason has access to universal values, 
which provide order to the economic world. It is to be noted that both in 
Sen and in the contemporary Neoclassical School there is order in the social 
world, while for Behavioral Economics this is not necessarily the case. The 
irrational economic man of Behavioral Economics guided by his emotions is ex-
actly the opposite to Sen´s rational man, guided by universal ethical values. 
We will argue that science develops through explaining particular phe-
nomena of the real world. Scientific paradigms, while maintaining some 
degree of consistency and internal communication, often contain theories 
of reality which are not necessarily compatible. In Physics for example no-
body knows how to put together Quantum Physics and General Relativity. 
While both theories explain significant real events, they do not fully talk 
to each other. In fact, we may even have diverse theories explaining the 
same real phenomena in different ways - and both can be correct, meaning 
that both explain reality in a satisfactory way. For example, even though 
Newtonian Physics and General Relativity have a common theoretical 
language, their notion of time is very different. Time for Newton is abso-
lute and more related to the usual ordinary definition, while for General 
Relativity it is a geometrical dimension of reality. What is time? Nobody 
knows, but what we do know is that both Newtonian Physics and General 
relativity explain the physical macro-cosmos rather well. 
The discussion should not be about Who is the real economic man? 
Because as scientist we will never know the answer. The best science can 
do, is to have some workable definitions that shed light in real economic 
phenomena. The reason why Neoclassical Economists, Behavioral Econ-
omists and Sen got the Nobel Prize with different versions of the nature 
of the economic man, is because their different proposals do illuminate 
and explain distinct aspects of economic reality. 
The question Who is the economic man? Does not really refer to the 
nature of man, but to the relation between the individual and the soci-
ety, which happens in diverse dimensions. Kenneth E Boulding identified 
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three dimensions. The first is the Integrative System, which refers to the 
set of values  that allow a society to remain unified. The second dimen-
sion is the Power System. The third dimension is the Economic System. 
The economic man is an abstraction which refers to the relationship of 
the individual with the society only in those matters of economic order, 
that is related to the production and distribution of economic goods.
To Answer the question Who is the economic man? As we will show, 
is paramount to perform a detailed analysis of the contributions of eco-
nomics as a science. None of whom we can call great economists in his-
tory, ever thought that there was a true economic man in reality. The conception 
of an economic man was always a theoretical abstract construct aiming at 
understanding the social institutional characteristics that made a society 
highly productive. They all recognize that human behavior was complex, 
defined by many factors, emotive and heavily influence by the immediate 
social group and the society as a whole to which the individual belongs. 
The description of the economic man never had the purpose, as it is fre-
quently argued today, of reducing human nature to a rational man. 
The first author that ever described the economic man in a proper 
way, although it was subject of discussion of previous writers, was Adam 
Smith in the Wealth of Nations. And how could Smith conceive man as 
rational, if he was a follower of Hume and if Smith´s previous book was 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith was a philosopher and a profes-
sor of ethics. For him it was clear that emotions are key in explaining 
human behavior, that man is heavily influenced by the group and the 
society to which he belongs and that he has an ethical relation with others 
which transcends any economic relationship. 
But then Why was Smith so anxious to define an economic man in the 
Wealth of Nations? The answer is given in the full title of his great book: An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Smith aimed 
to explain Why England economic development had been significantly 
higher than Spain´s of Portugal´s? To do that, he created the first abstraction 
of what latter on would be known as the economic man. Smith´s proposal 
is very simple. Society must allow individuals to exercise their economic 
freedom because, of the very simple reason that, each individual seeking his 
own economic benefit generates economic progress for the whole society. 
This was historically, the main institutional distinction between England on 
one side, and Spain and Portugal in the other. But Smith never thought that 
the economic man – the liberated individual in certain societies in particular 
economic activities – was actually a good representation of the full blown 
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nature of man. The full relationship of the individual with the society is 
described in Smith´s previous work The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith was 
a moral philosopher; ethics was his field – he had a view of the full blown 
nature of man that went well beyond the restricted vision of the economic 
man presented in The Wealth of Nations. Smith clearly understood, as did 
most of the old neoclassical economists, that the individual relationship with 
the society goes well beyond economic issues.
The question is not whether man is rational or irrational. Man has an 
evolutionary animal heritage and as such his behavior, as contemporary 
psychology and neurobiology have shown, is highly influenced by his 
emotions. Whatever we want to call rational, is clearly sitting in an old 
evolutionary brain which main roots are not rational. But, that does not 
mean that man does not have a unique reason. What distinguish man for 
other animals is that it has the notion of an extended time, due to a syntac-
tic language that allows for a more abstract representation of reality. This 
is what man´s unique reason is. Reason is nothing else than an extension 
of irrationality. Animals do have abstract thinking, they have a notion 
of time and they are capable of planning. Their brain is similar to man´s. 
They capture reality, like man, through images. They have memory and 
imagination. But the difference is, that Man has a more complex abstract 
imagination, due to a more sophisticated language - consequence of his 
own social historical evolution, and therefore an extended notion of time.
Thus, it is true that man´s behavior is not just rational. But, in fact 
rationality is to a large extent an empty term. Reason is part of a more 
complex unified brain that works together like one system; which also 
contains the emotions. Therefore, rationality and irrationality can not be 
really distinguished in man´s behavior.
But if this is true, then Why there has been such strong effort by many 
contemporary neoclassical economists to define economic rationality? Is it 
because they were ignorant of the enormous importance of man´s emotions 
or because they were looking for something else? Clearly the answer is: 
that they were looking for something else. They were trying to formalize 
mathematically, how the economic decisions of individual man relate to the 
economic welfare of the whole society. And to do this, they had to under-
stand How to explain, forecast and aggregate such individual decisions? The 
assumption of individual maximizers, introduced by Samuelson2, was the 
2 Samuelson´s revealed preferences argue that if the choices that we observe in the market 
are rational, i.e. they are transitive and that they maintain today´s transitivity through time, 
then they do imply that the economic agent is maximizing a utility function.
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logical consequence of the desire to use the enormous descriptive potential 
of mathematics – particularly differential calculus. The intellectual adventure 
was only a partial success. The theoretical frame developed is extremely use-
ful as a reference, and it is very helpful in understanding and solving a wide 
range of economic problems. But it did not achieve the desire results. Op-
timal social welfare equilibrium requires more than individual maximizers. 
Today it is well known that the individual´s behavior is influence by the 
collective group and by specific social situations. Two classic experiments in 
psychology are the Robbers Cave experiment by Sherif, Harvey and oth-
ers3 and the Stanford Prison experiment by Zimbardo4. The individual is 
link to the group by evolutionary survival traits as the psychology of attach-
ment has shown. There is a fundamental belonging to the group, without 
which the individual is unable to survive. And this fundamental belonging 
link is based in evolutionary emotions; therefore, there is nothing that we 
can call individual rationality that it is not group dependent. But, given spe-
cific social historical institutions, and under the influence of emotions, there 
is no doubt that the individual uses his reason and his abstract capacities to 
foresee and plan in an extended time. Rationality is institutionally and emo-
tionally bounded, but that does not mean that it does not exist or that the 
individuals are not using it. Reason was evolutionarily developed in man 
to enhance his survival possibilities. In evolutionary terms, it just does not 
make sense to provide reason to a man who is not going to use it. Econom-
ics, can then be seen as the effort to describe the social consequences of indi-
vidual economic choices, which are based both in reason and in emotions, 
under a specific Institutional Arrangement – the large markets. 
There is no question that in any human decision emotions are cen-
tral. They nor only contribute directly to our decisions, but in addition 
they guide us in the recollection of information from the environment. 
Emotions are related both to selfish and to belonging instincts. Thus, 
to some extent it is not surprising that Behavioral Economics is able to 
show in many experiments the key role that emotions play in any human 
decision. But the human brain is an integrated brain, it nor only uses 
emotions - but also reason. Therefore, coupled with emotions, in human 
decisions we always find the usage of reason.  
A key question to elucidate is: In which decisions reason plays a key 
role? Babies learn to control and guide their emotions; this is the main 
goal of maternal education. Therefore, the process of socialization is 
3 Sherif, M. et al., 1961. 
4 Zimbardo, P., 1971. 
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nothing else than learning to control one´s selfish emotions to be able to 
socialize with others. Such socialization further develop the evolutionarily 
inherited emotions related to belonging. Social institutions are needed to 
guide the individual´s selfishness and belonging instincts into adequate 
social behavior. The process is possible because belonging instincts 
guide and redirect selfish ones. Social institutions are therefore needed 
to produce reasonable individual behavior. The adequate use of reason 
is the consequence of social living in a proper Institutional Arrangement. 
Therefore, the individual´s capacity to reason properly, social institutions 
and social life are intertwining. 
But the use of reason, even if properly guided by social institutions, 
do not exclude emotions. The brain is just one and it integrates emo-
tions and reason. In fact, emotional development is required to exercise 
properly reason in any decision. Whenever any individual acts, whether 
in an economic sense in the markets or in any other social way, he uses 
at the same time emotions and reason. The key to individual freedom, is 
to learn to develop our emotions and to express and enjoy them, while at 
the same time use them for proper reasonable decisions.
The difference between the economic system and the political system 
is not that the first one uses reason and the second one does not; they 
both use emotions and reason. The difference is, as Albert O Hirschman 
expresses very well, that economics communicates mainly through ac-
tions – exit - and the political system mainly through voice. When an 
individual act in the market he may do it pushed by emotions and/or by 
careful rational considerations - but the important thing is that it express-
es a concrete preference through actions that can be communicated in a 
very efficient way in a very large social system. The dynamic preferences 
of the middle class are the basis of a large dynamic market, that fosters 
technological development and rapid capitalist economic growth5.
Markets do not optimize. As Arrow´s Theorem has clearly shown, in-
dividuals do not necessarily show a linear order in their preferences, and 
therefore social human preferences are not necessarily transitive; thus, it 
is not possible to build a social welfare function. And, as a consequence, 
it can not be shown that markets maximize social welfare. We do need 
to explore careful What are the implications of the failure of the contem-
porary Neoclassical School to show optimality? In the next paragraph 
we will briefly mention some of the new routes that have been taken. 
But, before, several points must be raised. 1) These critical new routes 
5 Obregón, 2008a.
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are only possible thanks to the mathematical formalization initiated by 
Samuelson. Thus, even though a Pareto optimum equilibrium is not the 
necessary consequence of market behavior, it does provide a parameter 
against which understand reality. 2) For a wide range of economic prob-
lems the frame provided by the contemporary neoclassical theory is very 
useful. 3) That we are not econs, in the contemporary neoclassical sense 
of the word, does not mean that the abstraction of the economic man is 
not useful. In fact, we will argue that the economic man is an institutional 
reality in the contemporary Western culture, that has been shown as 
the critical characteristic that explains the rapid growth of the capitalist 
economies. To explain this fast growth was Adam Smith´s main goal, 
when he introduced the abstraction of an economic man. An economic 
man for him is the one who acts freely according to his own interests in 
the market. This freedom did explain the fast economic growth of Britain 
versus Spain or Portugal; Smith was right. And his result does not have 
anything to do with whether man in his decisions uses more his emotions 
or his reason. For Smith is clear that he uses both. 4) Behavioral Econom-
ics has been successful in showing that it is important to understand how 
emotions play a key role in certain economic decisions. 5) But Behavioral 
Economics is just one of the several new routes that have been taken as 
a consequence of the failure of contemporary Neoclassical Economics to 
show that markets maximize – i.e. they achieve a Pareto optimum. 
The other new routes are: a) Sen´s Moral Economy; b) Nash multi-
equilibriums based in Game Theory; c) Stiglitz´s information multi-equi-
libriums, d) North and others Neo-Institutional Economics, and e) The 
uncertainty of Knight and Keynes. In Sen´s Moral Economy humans 
are rational but they are not econs, they guide themselves by values to 
which they gain access through reason. In Nash humans are econs, but 
without full information about what others will do, therefore they play 
games among them, and there are multi-equilibriums which are not Pa-
reto optimum. Nash results and Game Theory in general, have provided 
the basis for the laboratory experiments in Behavioral Economics, this 
shows again the benefits of having a formal frame of reference. In Stiglitz, 
humans are econs, but without full information, and therefore multiple 
equilibriums can be shown. In Neo-Institutional economics, humans may 
or not be econs; but in ant case, institutions provide the frame inside 
which individual´s maximize, and therefore institutions define to a large 
extent the optimality of the social equilibrium. For Knight and Keynes 
the future is unknown – even in a probabilistic sense; and unless there are 
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social institutions, like the government that provide a frame of certainty 
to individual decisions, markets can produce very inefficient - suboptimal 
- equilibriums. In a strict sense, none of these alternatives new routes is 
fully compatible with any one of the other routes. However, it must be 
pointed out that all of them use, in one way or another, the frame of ref-
erence provided by the contemporary Neoclassical School. This is why, 
among other reasons, Samuelson´s mathematical formalization of the neo-
classical model did deserve the Nobel Prize. 
There are two reasons to go beyond Behavioral Economics. The first 
reason is that humans, as presented by this school, do not explain many 
critical economic problems. Behavioral Economics is not an alternative 
paradigm to traditional economics. It is only one of the New Schools of 
thought, that has risen due to the failure of the contemporary Neoclassical 
School to show that markets have a unique maximum welfare full employ-
ment equilibrium. Therefore, in order to delimit Behavioral Economics´ 
contributions we need to look at the whole paradigm in economics, which 
today includes: the contemporary neoclassical paradigm plus all the New 
Schools of thought. The second reason is that humans, as described by Be-
havioral Economics, are not a good representation of man´s evolutionary 
characteristics. For Behavioral Economics, humans are emotional beings 
which often do not know what is best for them, and need the help of the 
government to make the choices which are truly convenient; and they dis-
play altruistic and social cooperative behavior, even in monetary transac-
tions. But evolutionarily we are neither design to be emotional or rational, 
nor to be selfish or altruistic and socially cooperative. We are design to 
be flexible for survival purposes, and to display a wide range of behav-
iors. Man have two evolutionary instincts, selfishness and belonging. Since 
we are design to be social, in the in-group, belonging guides and redirects 
selfishness. But, in relationship to the out-group, selfishness and aggression 
dominate. When there are belonging failures in the in-group, selfishness and 
aggression also happen to dominate.  Institutions do redefine and modify 
individuals´ behavior. We do not have a uniquely defined human nature. 
The discussion as to whether we are econs or humans is to some extent inap-
propriate; because, whether we behave one way or the other depends upon 
the Institutional Arrangement. 
Behavioral Economics, like the branch of contemporary Neoclassical 
Economics that defends the free market ideology, has the methodological 
problem of explaining social dynamics as a consequence of our uniquely 
fix human nature; and the discussion centers as to which our true human 
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nature is. But evolution did not design us to have a uniquely defined 
human nature, we have evolutionarily inherit traits that define our hu-
manity, but which allow us to display a wide ray of behaviors, that range 
from very selfish and aggressive to very altruistic and social cooperative 
behavior; and, from very emotional to very rational behavior. We can-
not describe human behavior outside of a given historical institutional 
context. In fact, econs main institutional historical characteristic is that they 
display a selfish behavior in large markets; which is empirically true, even 
after the findings of Behavioral Economics6. 
There are really three versions of econs´ rationality: the soft version 
used by Smith, the strong rationality assumed by the contemporary 
Keynesian Neoclassical School and the strong rationality of the contem-
porary Monetarist-Rational Expectations Neoclassical School. The soft 
version only indicates the selfish behavior of econs in large markets, which 
is very compatible with our evolutionary characteristics. The strong ra-
tionality assumed by the contemporary Keynesian Neoclassical School is 
not fully compatible with our evolutionary characteristics, but it does rec-
ognize that institutions do change individual behavior. Finally, the strong 
rationality assumed by the contemporary Monetarist-Rational Expecta-
tions Neoclassical School defends that institutions do not count (in fact 
they may only cause damage), and that social dynamics is defined as a 
consequence of individual decisions. Behavioral Economics is mostly an 
attack in this last version of strong rationality. Like the contemporary 
Keynesian Neoclassical School and like the soft version of the economic 
man, Behavioral Economics argues that institutions do change individual 
behavior. But, maintains the methodological problem of conceiving indi-
viduals as having a fix uniquely defined human nature, a position which 
is contrary to our inherited flexible evolutionary traits. Both the contem-
porary Monetarist-Rational Expectations Neoclassical School and Behav-
ioral Economics conceive individuals as having a fix uniquely defined 
human nature, but of course they disagree as to which that nature is. 
We will argue: 1) That for the understanding of a wide range of 
economic problems the econs as defined by contemporary Neoclassical 
Economics are more useful than the humans as defined by Behavioral 
Economics; which does not deny that for another more restricted but 
still significant range of problems Behavioral Economics is superior. 
Moreover, we point out that the range of problems for which Behavioral 
Economics results useful might increase as research advances. 2) That 
6 See Roth et al., 1991.
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there are other definitions of econs, such as the classical one and the early 
neoclassical, that are different from the one proposed by contemporary 
Neoclassical Economics. And, that these other definitions result very rel-
evant in explaining key economic problems such as economic develop-
ment and growth. 3) That there are several strong limitations of using the 
abstraction of the econs, which have been already pointed out by diverse 
schools of thought in economics. Behavioral Economics is just one of 
these various schools. However, as we will show, the proposals of these 
critical schools are not necessarily compatible among them. 
Behavioral Economics is a successful integration between psychology 
and economics, and as such it is very welcome. But it is not the only pos-
sible integration. Behavioral Economics uses cognitive-behavioral psychol-
ogy and social psychology but leaves out several areas of psychology that, 
as we will show, are of particular interest for the definition of humans. Areas 
such as Freudian Psychology and the Psychology of Attachment. Our evo-
lutionary traits as humans are much more complex than the fix uniquely hu-
man nature proposed by Behavioral Economics. Understanding this com-
plexity is relevant for social and economic problems, and provides further 
highlights as to a further integration between psychology and economics.
The main contribution of Behavioral Economics is highlighting, that due 
to man´ psychological characteristics, in certain decisions market failures can 
be produced. There are certain areas where the contribution of Behavioral 
Economics is undeniable. Like, for example, in programs designed to pro-
mote higher personal savings or organ donation. Behavioral Economics is 
particularly useful for a significant subset of microeconomic problems, but it 
is much less successful in relation to macroeconomic issues. And in some cas-
es, it has been used erroneously to justify untenable conclusions –  example: 
the usage of behavioral finances to explain the 2008 crisis; see chapter three.
The book is organized in the following way. In the first chapter, we dis-
cuss the traditional and contemporary visions of economic man, and how 
each one of them relates to Behavioral Economics. The main conclusions 
of this chapter are that: 1) Behavioral Economics is only one of the New 
Schools of economic thought, which are consequence of the theoretical fail-
ure of contemporary Neoclassical Economics to show a unique maximum 
welfare full employment stable equilibrium. 2) With the exception of Sen´s 
Moral Economy and Behavioral Economics, all the other New Schools 
argue that both the economic equilibrium and the economic growth path 
depend upon the Institutional Arrangement. 3) The rational economic man 
has two versions, the soft one used by Smith and the strong one of the 
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contemporary Neoclassical School. Both are abstractions of the behavior 
of man in a particular institutional setting, the large markets; and there-
fore, neither of them is comparable to the humans in Behavioral Economics 
which are a description of man´s human nature. 4) The soft rational eco-
nomic man is an abstraction that only indicates a particular institutional 
feature of the contemporary Western societies - the large markets, in which 
the individual can express his selfishness. And it is compatible with all the 
empirical findings of Behavioral Economics; which do not deny that indi-
viduals behave selfish in large markets. And it is still today, the best expla-
nation of the fast growth of the capitalist economies 5) the strong rational 
economic man is not compatible with the empirical findings of Behavioral 
Economics, and was not useful for the theoretical purposes for which it was 
designed. But despite its limitations, it is the best explanation that we have 
up to today of the process by which markets allocate resources in a market 
economy through the price system.  5) Behavioral Economics is an impor-
tant contribution, but it is not a new paradigm of the economic science.
The second chapter describes the background and the psychologi-
cal roots of Behavioral Economics. The main conclusion of this chapter 
are that. 1) Organizations are a micro-cosmos for which the neoclassical 
theory of the firm was insufficient; Simon´s views presented an integrated 
view of the relationship between the individual and the organization, that 
was an important contribution. However, while Simon showed that the 
economic man was insufficient to explain organizational behavior, he did 
not show that the economic man was not a useful abstraction for the 
large economic problems for which it was designed. 2) The psychological 
roots of Behavioral Economics, as presented mainly by Kahneman and 
Tversky, without doubt describe a human being which is not compatible 
with the strong rational economic man, particularly in the contemporary 
Monetarist – Rational Expectations version. And, has an important con-
tribution, because it shows that certain psychological characteristics of the 
human beings can produce situations in which the economic individual 
may not take the best economic decision for him, and therefore govern-
ment intervention is required. However, while it is very relevant in spe-
cific circumstances like organ donation or individual saving decisions; the 
view of humans of Behavioral Economics is not the correct view of man´s 
normal market behavior. Behavioral Economics´ experiments have two 
main purposes. The first one is to show that human beings are emotion-
ally dominated and cannot know what is rationally best for them. Many 
of the experiments design to show that man is not rational are explained 
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by a lack of information or knowledge, by the short time to take the deci-
sion or by the fact that the individual is un-aid to take the decision. In 
real markets there are organizations and firms that provide analysis and 
information to the individual. Many economic decisions are repetitive 
and allow for learning. And most of the unique decisions are so relevant 
that the individual always seek expert advice and spends time analyz-
ing rationally the decision. The second purpose of the experiments is to 
show that human beings are not selfish, as assumed by economists; that 
they are altruistic and socially cooperative. The experiments designed 
for this purpose are highly conclusive. However, they are setting depen-
dent. In large markets it is shown that individuals are selfish. And in the 
international arena they are also selfish. To explain why individuals may 
be sometimes selfish/and or aggressive and sometimes altruistic and/or 
social cooperative, we need to have a broader vision of the relationship 
between the individual and the society, which is partially discussed in this 
chapter, but is not fully presented until chapter four. 3) the individual 
does not have too many choices as Schwartz has argued. 4) we are not as 
predictably irrational as Ariely argues, although further discussion in this 
topic is presented in chapter four.
The third chapter presents the Nudge, Behavioral Macroeconomics 
and Behavioral Finance. The main conclusions of this chapter are: 1) 
It is impossible to argue against success; Nudges have shown that they 
are useful for many microeconomic problems. However, many of the so 
called Nudges, are not related to the psychological characteristics shown 
by Behavioral Economics; they are just related to market failures, that 
had been already discussed by many other schools of economic thought. 
2) One problem in the Nudge literature which deserves further discus-
sion is: Who should take the decision of the Nudge? If the government 
is to establish the Nudge, it should require political approval. And if the 
Nudge is to be transparent, it requires to educate and inform the indi-
vidual, in which case the Nudge, in many instances, would not be any 
longer necessary. 3) Behavioral Macroeconomics argues that it follows 
Keynes thought, but it is not true. In Keynes individuals are rational, 
and despite their rationality major economic crisis can occur, due to the 
uncertainty as to the unknown. In Behavioral Macroeconomics individu-
als are irrational, dominated whimsical by animal spirits, which are five: 
Confidence (which is very different from Keynes´ uncertainty), Fairness, 
Corruption, Money Illusion and Stories. It is shown that none of these 
five animal spirits explains the 2008 crisis; and that the explanation of 
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Behavioral Economic of the 2008 crisis is incorrect. The 2008 crisis is 
due to fundamental institutional mistakes which are the reason that the 
confidence went down. 4) The consumption function as described by Be-
havioral Economics is useful for some specific microeconomic problems; 
but it is not a substitute of the main theories of the consumption function, 
which continue being the main explanation for broad macroeconomic 
problems such as: macroeconomic stability, the postwar consumption 
data and bequest data. 5) the efficient market hypothesis, EMH, inscribes 
itself in a broader view of risk as probabilistic, which has been useful for 
many purposes. The vision of probabilistic risk has convinced pension 
funds to invest in index funds, has created the derivatives market and 
is the basis of the Modigliani -Miller Theorem in Corporate Finance. Its 
contributions therefore are undeniable. But it has limitations, mainly it is 
not useful when a market or an economy is not near equilibrium. Risk 
is dual: it is probabilistic near the equilibrium; and it is uncertainty, in 
the Knight –Keynes sense, far from equilibrium. Behavioral Finance has 
shown that many statistics in the stock market do not behave as expected 
with the EMH. But in all the cases they mix ex-ante and ex-post data, 
which is of course a violation of uncertainty, in the Knight- Keynes sense. 
Given uncertainty, we know that ex-ante probabilistic risk, any way it is 
measured, will not explain ex-post results, and that ex-ante prices should 
be more volatile than ex-post dividends. Thus, given uncertainty the 
results of Behavioral Finance are not surprising. Furthermore, they do 
not necessarily invalidate the main proposal of the EMH: which is that 
markets cannot be beaten. Because if the statistical incongruities found 
are due to uncertainty, since uncertainty cannot be known, it continues 
to be true that markets cannot be beaten. There is a contradiction in 
Behavioral Finance, because if we can find ex-ante information that does 
predict future performance, this implies that the markets could be beaten, 
something that given the statistical evidence, nor even Thaler is prepared 
to argue. But, then it follows that if markets cannot be beaten, such ex-
ante information cannot be found. And there are powerful theoretical 
reasons to argue that this such should be the case. Asset prices do reflect 
uncertainty and that creates volatility, which can be increased due to 
herding phenomena; and therefore, there are not stable intrinsic prices as 
the EMH implies; but despite this fact, todays prices are always the best 
possible guess of future prices, and no rule can be found to beat the mar-
ket. Asset prices volatility is significantly higher than the expected with 
the EMH; but it is due uncertainty, and not to irrationality. 
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Finally, the last chapter presents an analysis of the evolutionary traits 
that define human behavior; which is used to understand why we need to 
go beyond Behavioral Economics. The main conclusion is that we do not 
have a defined human nature, but only evolutionary traits which define 
two basic instincts: selfishness and belonging. Since, we are by evolution 
designed to live in a social group, normally the belonging instinct guides 
and redirects the selfish instinct. However, belonging failures will allow 
the selfish instinct to dominate. The belonging instinct only relate to the 
in-group, therefore relations between groups are dominated by selfish ag-
gression. This allow us to understand why social expenditures as GDP 
percentage are very high in developed countries, while international aid 
is so low. Moreover, it explains the Robbers Cave and the Zimbardo 
Stanford Prison experiments; and, also why individuals can be selfish in 
large markets and altruistic and cooperative in other social or laboratory 
settings (as Behavioral Economics finds). The belonging instinct gives 
rise to a Social Conceptual System with its corresponding Institutional 
Arrangement which provide order to social life. This social order estab-
lishes the ways for the individual to satisfy the three belonging routes: 
Love, Social Significance and Existential Significance. Social Significance 
- or social belonging, express itself through three social systems: the In-
tegrative, the Power and the Economic and Exchange System. It is only 
in Western societies that the Economic and Exchange System becomes 
so predominant. And it was the genius of Smith to understand that this 
feature explains capitalistic economic growth. Because, for the first time 
in history there is a free social-institutional expression of the individual 
evolutionary selfish instinct, and that unleashes individual creativity; and 
in particular it is the consumption of the large middle class, the one that 
explains the enlargement of the market and technological development. 
The large evolutionary frame presented in this chapter, allows to see the 
contributions of Behavioral Economics and other schools of economic 
thought with a broad perspective, which may be a guide for a better inte-
gration between economics and other social sciences. 
The book is written so that can be read in several ways. The reader 
well verse in contemporary and historical economic thought may want 
to skip chapter one. The reader which is very familiar with the contri-
butions of Behavioral Economics does not need to read the summaries 
presented in chapter two and three and may go directly to the comments 
made in these chapters, which are clearly mark under this title. Chapter 
four is recommended to all readers.
[21]
WHO IS THE ECONOMIC MAN
Economics starts with Adam Smith´s discovery that countries which in-
stitutionally allow for econs to express their selfish preferences in large 
markets grew much faster. The only rationality assumed by Smith was 
a soft one – that is econs can express their preferences in the market. And 
econs were not assume to behave always selfishly; they were just institutionally 
allowed by the society to act selfishly in large markets. Smith discovery, 
that due to large markets economies grew much faster was based in the 
technological development that mass production allows.
When Ricardo and Marx wrote, Capitalism was already growing fast; 
and capitalist economic growth was taken for granted. Thus, they focus 
in other relevant economic question. How is economic value form in 
the markets? Or put it in another way: What does economic value in 
the markets depends on? This question became the most relevant one 
in the history of economic thought. Ricardo and Marx answers was the 
Labor Value Theory, which as we will discuss ended up in a tautologi-
cal proposition, with relevance from the point of view of social justice 
but, that could not explain markets price formation and the allocation 
of resources. The old neoclassical economists task was to explain such 
phenomena. Their first observation was that economic value comes from 
scarcity in relationship to human needs or desires, thus the value of an 
economic good is related to its cost of production and to the utility it 
generates. The law of supply and demand. This was a solid contribution. 
There was then, a full blown discussion as to: What utility is? And there 
were several unsuccessful attempts trying to prove that markets maxi-
mize social economic welfare7. 
With this background, contemporary neoclassical economists intro-
duced the strong version of the rational man which has been the main fo-
cus of criticism of Behavioral Economics. Introducing strong assumptions 
as to the rationality of the individual agent, contemporary Neoclassical 
Economics launch three main research programs: 1) Welfare Economics 
to prove that markets maximize social economic welfare; 2) General equi-
7 Only economic, nor the whole social welfare. The utility function only had economic mo-
tives (something that changed with Gary Becker and others).
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librium Theory to show that a unique market stable equilibrium exists, 
and 3) Rational Expectations Theory to demonstrate that economies are 
always close to full employment. In 3), there was disagreement between 
the two branches of the contemporary Neoclassical School. It was de-
fended by the Monetarist-Rational Expectations School; and was oppose 
and criticized by the Keynesian School.
The first two research programs had been invaluable, they had helped 
us to understand how the price system works in real markets, and how the 
allocation of resources happens. But despite their important contributions, 
the point we wish to emphasize is: that the they failed to achieve its original pur-
pose. Arrow´s impossibility theorem showed that markets do not maximize 
social economic welfare. Game Theory and Information Theory showed 
that multi-equilibriums exist and that many of them are not Pareto optimal. 
As for the third research program, it was very useful to explain the 
stagflation phenomenon; but, the 2008 financial crisis fully discredit in 
real life the Rational Expectations proposition that economies always re-
main close to full employment. 
The relevance of these failures for our discussion in here is, that the 
strong rationality assumed by these three research projects did not pro-
duced the expected results – it could not explain real market phenomena. 
Thus, there is no longer the absolute requirement to assume such strong 
individual rationality. To some extent, Behavioral Economics efficient 
criticisms of the strong rational economic man, is no longer as relevant 
as it may seem, because economics by itself has recognized that such as-
sumption did not produce the expected results, and that it is not the key 
to understand the dynamics of real economies.
For many of the New Schools the assumption of the strong ratio-
nal economic man is no longer what explains economic social dynam-
ics. Neo-Institutional economics basis his analyses in the Institutional 
Arrangement, and not in the characteristics of the individual economic 
agent; therefore, whether the economic agent displays strong rationality 
or not is not any longer that relevant. Information Economics basis his 
analysis in the socially available information; again a systemic feature 
that does not point out as crucial the rational characteristics of the eco-
nomic agent. Because, whether the economic agents are strongly rational 
or not, the economy given distinct social information sets will produce 
multi-equilibriums anyhow. Game Theory shows that even strong ra-
tional economic agents will produce Nash multi-equilibriums which are 
not Pareto optimal. Keynes´ economics introduces uncertainty as to the 
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unknown future and shows that given this kind of uncertainty, again, 
whether the economic agents are strongly rational or not, the economies 
will end up far away from full employment equilibrium. Therefore, for 
all these schools the main characteristics of the exchanges in the market 
have to do with, exogenous to the individual, institutional characteristics.
There are only two schools of the new economic thinking that base 
their analysis in the characteristics of the economic agent: Behavioral 
Economics and Sen´s economics. They both oppose the strong selfish ra-
tional economic agent. For both of these schools, men display nor only 
selfish behavior but also cooperative and altruistic social behavior. But 
the explanation of such behavior is diametrically oppose. For Behavioral 
Economics man is dominated by his emotions and by social influences and 
may nor always be sure of what his true real preferences or interests 
are. For Sen´s economics man is fully rational in a broader philosophical 
dimension than economics, he can distinguish through his reason good 
and evil and shows concern for others – he is not purely selfish, and he is 
capable to dominate his passions or emotions and to transcend misguided 
social influences. Now we are faced with a dilemma, because even if we 
are willing to drop out the strong rational economic man, we are still left 
with two very distinct and oppose views of man, the one of Behavioral 
Economics and the one of Sen´s economics – and both had produced 
Nobel Prize winners. 
To understand this previous dilemma, it is needed to further discuss 
What is science? And How it develops? As we had argued in the intro-
duction, and as we will argue again in chapter four; different abstractions 
of the nature of man can be useful to solve distinct economic problems. 
Notice that such abstractions may appear as fully opposed, because they 
emphasized distinct characteristics of man and never fully describe our 
evolutionary traits as humans. The fact, that reduced versions of man, which 
abstract only some of his characteristics, are useful for social science; 
however, does not mean that discussing our evolutionary traits is not rel-
evant. It is because, it provides a benchmark of reference for the different 
versions of the nature of economic man. In chapter four, we will discuss 
our evolutionary traits and we will show that even the version of humans 
of Behavioral Economics, despite its empirical support, is only a reduced 
version of our evolutionary characteristics as humans. 
Even the strong version of the rational economic man results useful 
for analytical purposes. Nor only it has provided the theoretical frame-
work for discussing other alternatives; but it also signals one of the key 
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features of modern societies. Information is more and more easy to pro-
cess and to analyze, and such analysis is more easily transferable, which 
means that individual agents have more and more access to a rational so-
cial processing of information, which has become a free public good. And 
that indicates, that one has to be very careful with assumptions or empiri-
cal studies - such as Behavioral Economics - that point to an individual 
that takes important decisions based in the wrong analysis. However, 
in science the answer fortunately lies in the capacity of a given abstrac-
tion to explain real phenomena. This is how the proposals of Behavioral 
Economics must be judged. As we will see, many crucial economic issues 
and problems can be explained by using a soft version of the rational 
economic man. However, some relevant economic phenomena are better 
explained by Behavioral Economics or by Sen´s Economics; and even by 
the strong version of the rational economic man. 
selfishness and rationality
The economic man has been described as been rational and selfish. Be-
havioral economists had shown that man is not rational – his behavior 
is strongly influenced by his emotions and by the values, judgments and 
attitudes of the social group to which he belongs; and it has also provided 
evidence that man displays altruistic and cooperative behavior, which ne-
gates the notion that man is a selfish creature. With this evidence, Thaler 
has emphatically argued that we are humans and not econs.
As we will see in the next chapter the results of Behavioral Economics 
do have solid empirical basis, they follow a long tradition of experiments in 
cognitive-behavioral psychology and in social psychology, and cannot really 
be questioned. We are in fact to some extent humans; but, that does not mean 
that econs are not any longer useful to understand key economic issues. To 
understand Why? Is useful to further discuss selfishness and rationality.
Selfishness
The problem with Thaler´s comparison between humans and econs is that 
they are not comparable – they belong to different dimensions of analysis. 
Humans is a description of the full blown behavior of real man, econs refer 
to a very specific behavior of man under a particular Institutional Ar-
1) who is the economic man 25
rangement – large markets. Humans refer to the nature of man, econs to 
a policy description as to which institutions should be established in a 
society. Econs are selfish, but they only exist in economic relations in large 
markets. Econs in fact should behave selfish because this is good for the 
society as a whole. Econs are the consequence of a very peculiar histori-
cal Institutional Arrangement, that allows and promotes selfish economic 
individual behavior in large markets.
The abstraction of the economic man is not a description of the nature of 
man, it is not an attempt to study the evolutionary characteristics of the Homo-
Sapiens. In this sense the comparison between humans and econs made by Thal-
er seem to us not to be very meaningful. Econs do not exist, they refer to a 
specific human behavior in a particular institutional setting – large markets. 
The relation between the individual and the society happens in several 
systems. Following Boulding, I have previously described three systems8. 
The Integrative System, the Power System and the Economic and Exchange 
System. The Integrative System defines the identity of the society or group 
and includes traditions and customs, ethical principles, norms and social 
obligations, social categories, values and beliefs, religion, benevolence, the 
social law, social and individual commitments and so on. The Integrative 
System is the fundamental one in any group or society. The Power System 
is defined by the public use of social force. Individual power is restrained 
and regulated to allow for social harmony and integration. Social force is 
only used as support of the Integrative System. Power relations, however, 
often define the interaction among groups or societies. The Economic and 
Exchange System relates to the production and distribution of economic 
goods and includes exchange selfish relations. In many Primitive societies 
the Economic and Exchange System does not allow for the individual´s 
exercise of his self interest and therefore the production and distribution 
of economic goods is rigidly defined by the Integrative System. But as the 
societies diversify, the Economic and Exchange System acquires a life of 
its own. It is not however until recently, that contemporary societies allow 
the individual to exercise his selfish interest through market exchanges. It 
is this specific institutional feature of modern capitalist societies that called 
the attention of Adam Smith. 
Smith had previously written The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in which 
he describes both the ethics of moral sentiments and the ethics of duty; 
thus, he was well aware that we are humans. However, what is relevant 
to focus on is, that Smith, for the first time in philosophical thought, 
8 Obregón, 2014b; 2016.
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discusses in his book the ethical implications of selfish individual actions 
that do not damage society. He argues that the individual must be free to 
act, provided that he (both in his judgment and in the judgment of the so-
ciety) does not harm others. Latter on, analyzing the history of England, 
particularly versus Spain and Portugal, Smith found that the key institu-
tional difference is that England allowed for individual freedom in the 
markets. And England was growing much faster than Spain or Portugal. 
Therefore, in The Wealth of Nations Smith finds what he was looking for 
since The Theory of Moral Sentiments – the conditions on which individual 
selfishness nor only did not harm others but instead produced benefits 
for everybody. The first abstraction of the economic man is the one pro-
vided by Smith. In this version of the economic man, the individuals in 
pursue of his selfish interest promote economic growth and development. 
Now, the fact that the individual is institutionally allowed and even en-
couraged to pursue his selfish interest in economic exchanges in large markets, 
does not mean that the individual does not display cooperative, aggressive or 
altruistic behavior in other systems of relationship between the individual and 
the society – as Smith was well aware. Moreover, the integrative and Power 
Systems do have an economic expression of its own that can be reflected in 
monetary relationships; but, that does not negate the importance of institu-
tionalizing large markets where the individual could express his selfishness.  
Rationality 
There is a lot of confusion in the literature as to what rationality really 
means. In a soft version man is rational as long as he can distinguish his 
preferences and expresses them in the market; this soft version is the 
one used by Smith. Notice that this soft version does not preclude emo-
tions or social influences. It really is not that important where preferences 
come from, as long as they are recognizable and can be express through 
the market. In this soft version of rationality, markets play the very im-
portant function of transmitting individual preferences through actions 
– what Hirschman called Exit9. 
In stronger versions of economic rationality several of these other 
elements are added: 1) an ordinal utility function. 2) a well defined set 
of alternative strategies. 3) a behavior of maximizing expected utility. 4) 
that preferences are transitive. 5) that they maintain today´s transitivity 
through time. 6) a known probability function of future scenarios. 7) 
9 Hirschman, A.O., 1970.
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that future markets can be treated by adding dated commodities as dis-
tinct goods. 8) that the risk facing the individual is probabilistic risk 9) 
that uncertainty can be managed through insurance based in probabilistic 
risk. 10) that individual economic agents use all available information 
and process it accordingly to rational expectations – that is using the best 
economic model available. Many of these additional stronger conditions 
were introduced to develop the three research projects in neoclassical 
contemporary economics already mentioned above: Welfare Economics, 
General equilibrium Theory and Rational Expectations Theory. 
The rational economic man of Smith does not satisfy the strong condi-
tions imposed latter on by contemporary neoclassical thinkers. The self-
ish economic man of Smith is the consequence of a specific Institutional 
Arrangement - under which the individual is free to pursue his selfish 
interest through the Economic and Exchange System - which defines the 
conditions for the economic markets to operate. 
The rational economic man is not, and it did not ever pretend to be a 
description of the full blown relation between the individual and the society 
or of the nature of man. Smith was clearly aware that humans were not econs; 
he just emphasized in The Wealth of Nations what was his new discovery- that 
social institutions that allow for econs to exist in large markets where they can 
express their selfish preferences are the key that explains the rapid economic devel-
opment in Capitalism. The strong rational economic man of contemporary 
neoclassical thinkers was neither a description of the full nature of man, it 
was an abstraction of how individuals behave in large markets, which unsuc-
cessfully pretend to demonstrate that markets have a unique stable equilibri-
um, maximize social welfare and maintain economies near full employment.
prices and allocation of resources,  
a historical background 
By the time in which Ricardo and Marx wrote, Capitalism was already 
growing rapidly; and therefore economic growth was not any longer 
their concern. Therefore, they concentrated in the problem of economic 
value and the allocation of resources through the price system. Economic 
value for both of these authors came from labor. For Ricardo, was mostly 
a technical problem, which solution allowed for better economic poli-
cies. For Marx, it was mainly a problem of social justice. Ricardo was 
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unsuccessful in finding a numeraire, and therefore could never fully es-
tablished his labor theory of value. The numeraire was finally found by 
Sraffa, almost two centuries latter, and only for a non-monetary station-
ary economy without technological change. Marx labor theory of value 
was trap into a tautology that had no solution. He clearly understood that 
incorporated labor could not produce economic value, unless this value 
was verified by the market – what Marx called socially necessary labor. 
But if economic value can only be defined ex-post, once the market trans-
actions do happen; then, it could never be verified ex-ante that labor is in 
fact the source of economic value. Marx´s labor theory remains a proposal 
about social justice; but as a technical explanation, of market prices and 
the allocation of resources through the markets, it was not unsuccessful. 
Ricardo´s and Marx´s failures send the economic profession into new routes to explain 
Where does economic value come from?
For the old neoclassical economists, scarcity and individual preferences, 
as expressed in the market, define through supply and demand the market 
prices. This was both an elegant and successful solution. And it must be 
emphasized, that it does not require anything more than the soft rationality 
of the economic man introduced by Smith, it was enough that the indi-
vidual could identify and express his preferences through the market.
It is not until contemporary neoclassical economists established the math-
ematical conditions required for the maximization of economic welfare that 
the notion of rationality fully changes from the soft version to the strong one. 
To prove that markets, maximize economic welfare was an old research 
project in Neoclassical Economics, which culminates in the mathematical 
conditions imposed by the Contemporary Neoclassical School. However, 
it must be emphasized that, all along the development of the mentioned 
research project, neoclassical economists, even the contemporary ones, un-
derstood that the political and social systems were not included in the prob-
lem of maximizing social economic welfare. Lionnel Robbins, of course, 
oppose the usage of interpersonal comparisons, because the question to 
answer was If the economic system by itself could maximize social eco-
nomic welfare?  But Robbins never denied that interpersonal comparisons 
should be made in the political system. Walras, the founding father of the 
general equilibrium paradigm, wrote another book related to the society´s 
social problems10. Samuelson, was a Keynesian who advocated an active 
role of Government. The utility function to maximize only included, al-
ways, economic motives in the utility function. Maximizing social welfare was always 
10 Walras, L., 1896. 
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understood as maximizing economic social welfare, and not the full blown welfare of the 
society. Non-economic motives were first introduced in the utility function by Gary Becker 
and others; and were not widely accepted by the profession. Becker´s individuals maximiz-
ing jointly economic and noneconomic motives fully contradicts the vision of the world of 
Adam Smith, for whom ethical issues and economic issues belong to two different systems 
of relation between the individual and the society11.  
As we have insisted on, there are three routes by which contemporary 
neoclassical economists pretended a positive answer to the old questions: 
Do markets maximize social economic welfare? Do they have a unique op-
timal equilibrium? Do they provide stable full employment? These were: 
Welfare Economics, General Equilibrium Theory and Rational Expecta-
tions Theory. None of them was successful. But they built a solid math-
ematical theoretical frame which actually provided nor only the basis to 
show why they were wrong, but also to understand many key problems in 
economics. The last five decades of Nobel Prizes in economics were almost 
exclusively given to those that built the solid contemporary neoclassical 
paradigm or to new thinkers that proposed new routes to be taken once the 
failure was shown. Among these new routes – New Schools of thought - 
we find: Neo-Institutional Economics, Information Economics, Sen´s Moral 
Economics, Game Theory and Behavioral Economics.
In the first section of this chapter we will discuss briefly the failures 
of Welfare Economics, General Equilibrium Theory and Rational Ex-
pectations and the lessons learnt. In the second section we present the 
main characteristics of the New Schools of thought in economics. This 
provides a good framework for our discussion of Behavioral Economics 
in the next chapter.   
11 It has always been tempting for economists to introduce in the utility function non-eco-
nomic motives. Boulding did, for example, to explain altruism. This is however, the wrong 
route, and one that has never been accepted by the main tradition. There are strong rea-
sons not to do it. Man, as Boulding himself has argued, has other relationships beyond the 
economic exchanges. That was also the vision of Smith. Optimizing welfare, for the main 
tradition, which in this always followed Smith, only refers to economic motives. In Obregon 
1984a, in the appendix, it is shown that mathematically the conditions for an economic 
agent to have altruistic behavior just because it maximizes his own utility function – just 
because he feels good to help – are very restrictive. In a world of n goods, for an economic 
agent A to behave altruistic in a good 1 in relationship to another agent B, it is required 
that agent B has less than the minimum that agent A thinks that agent B should have in all 
the other n-1 goods. Otherwise, it can be shown that, agent A by being altruistic in good 1 
looses trading possibilities to position agent B in any of the n-1 goods with the minimum 
that agent A thinks that agent B should have. This extremely restrictive condition, indicates 
that altruistic behavior obeys to ethical principles and belonging relationships just as Kant, 
Smith and most of the great philosophers thought, and not to utilitarian considerations. 
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the contemporary neoclassical failure:  
lessons learnt
Since 1969 there had been 80 economic Nobel laureates of which 56 have 
work in – or close to - the contemporary neoclassical paradigm, and 24 in 
New Schools of thought: 9 in Game Theory, 5 in Neo-Institutional Eco-
nomics, 5 in Behavioral Economics, 4 in Information Economics and 1 
in Sen´s Moral Economics. The main theoretical frame that maintains the 
contemporary neoclassical paradigm is due to Welfare Economics and 
General Equilibrium Theory, and to a much lesser extent to the Theory 
of Rational Expectations.
Welfare Economics
The story of Welfare Economics is one of a series of frustrated attempts 
to show that markets do maximize social economic welfare. In the first at-
tempt, Marshall and Pigou proposed that an egalitarian society maximiz-
es social economic welfare. It failed due to the recognitions that we can 
not measure utility in a cardinal way, and therefore we can not compare 
the marginal utility derived from the income of different individuals, and 
we cannot affirm that an egalitarian distribution of income maximizes 
welfare12. In the second attempt, Kaldor argues that economists should 
make recommendations only based on efficiency, because if inequalities 
are created, the winners can always compensate the losers. It failed be-
cause Samuelson showed that the only way we can be sure that a bundle 
of goods B is better than a bundle of goods A is in the case where, for 
12 First attempt: Jevons pointed out that the labor-value theory could not be applied to 
things that lack value; for him, utility arises in things because of its relation to human needs. 
In the works of Jevons, Menger and Walras, marginal utility becomes the essential element 
of consumer behavior and they find a rule to transform subjective value into measurable 
quantities. Wicksteed transformed the utilitarianism of Jevons into a scale of preferences 
and analyzed the utilization of resources to the maximum for a certain purpose. Menger, on 
the other hand, developed his theory in terms of needs and not in terms of pleasure, such 
as Jevons. For Pigou, economics was a science because it dealt with measurable amounts 
of satisfaction. Marshall and Pigou accepted the law of incremental marginal utility and as-
sumed that different people obtain the same satisfaction from the same income; under this 
assumption, an egalitarian society would maximize social welfare. 
The first attempt fails: Marshall´s and Pigou´s conclusion was shown as invalid in view 
of the fact that satisfactions can not be added and, therefore, we have to use an ordinal 
ranking and not a cardinal number. Since we can not measure utility in a cardinal way, we 
can not compare the marginal utility derived from the income of different individuals and, 
therefore, we can not affirm that an egalitarian distribution of income maximizes welfare.
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all possible welfare distributions, B is preferred to A. And, like he dem-
onstrates, the above condition is satisfied only in the extreme case, and 
without economic interest, in which B has more of each good than A 
(assuming there is no disutility). This conclusion shows conclusively that 
there is no real efficiency rule. Any efficient solution depends upon the 
given distribution of resources13. In the third attempt, Bergson and Samu-
elson introduced a Social Welfare Function that does not depend upon 
the distribution of resources, it is only the social aggregate of individual 
preferences. But, Arrow shows that if one or more individuals has a non 
linear order in his preferences, the social preferences could be not transi-
tive and therefore the Social Welfare Function could not be built14.
13 Second attempt: Pareto and Barone presuppose independence between the different 
satisfactions of people and the absence of external economies and diseconomies; with this 
frame of reference, it is possible to separate efficiency from equity – i.e. justice considerations, 
which is known as the Pareto principle. Kaldor, considered that the economist should be 
in favor of any change that improves the efficiency of the system, because if inequalities 
are created, the winners can always compensate the losers. Hicks, like Kaldor, argues that 
economists should make recommendations only based on efficiency, since the gains and 
losses are random at the individual level. 
Second attempt fails: Three criticisms were made to Kaldor: 1) it is not always possible to 
measure efficiency (Scitovsky); 2) the consumer surplus used by Kaldor, based on partial 
equilibrium, can give wrong efficiency results (Samuelson), and 3) compensatory payments 
are not always politically feasible. Little criticized Hicks and pointed out that some economic 
changes can cause large changes in the distribution of income; he observed that we can not 
expect these to be compensated in the future.
It is particularly relevant to understand Scitovsky’s criticism of Kaldor, through what was 
known as the Scitovsky paradox. This says, that having shown that a position B is more 
efficient than a position A -according to the criterion of Kaldor and Hicks-, using the same 
criterion it can be shown that after the community has adopted position B, very well A can 
become a preferred position for B. The reason for the paradox is that there is a reciprocal 
relationship between the social valuation of the bundle of goods and their distribution.
Samuelson showed that, even in those cases in which the Scitovsky paradox does not occur, we 
do not have a criterion to define the optimal solution. Since once it is understood that the prefer-
ence judgments about the bundles of goods A and B are different in the case of the two distinct 
distributions, which correspond to positions A and B: it follows immediately, that that there is a 
need to understand what happens when there are other distributions: because A and B are not 
the only feasible ones. Due to the above, Samuelson concludes that the only way we can be sure 
that B is better than A is in the case where, for all possible welfare distributions, B is preferred to 
A. And, like Samuelson demonstrates, the above condition is satisfied only in the extreme case, 
and without economic interest, in which B has more of each good than A (assuming there is no 
disutility). This conclusion shows conclusively that there is no real efficiency rule.
14 Third attempt: Faced with the impossibility of making economic policy recommenda-
tions based solely on efficiency, Bergson introduced the notion of a complete Social Welfare 
Function, which adds the social preferences of individuals and can take into account exter-
nal factors, so that the economist can forget about the problems associated with distribution. 
Samuelson gave an elegant exposition of the mechanism by which social welfare is maxi-
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General Equilibrium
General equilibrium Theory had important repercussions for welfare eco-
nomics15. But, It is not possible to demonstrate a unique optimum equilib-
mized in the tangency between the Social Welfare Function and the production function 
that optimizes the use of resources.
Third attempt fails: However, Arrow showed that it is not always possible to add the social 
preferences of individuals, so that we can not always build a curve of social welfare without 
falling into contradiction. The argument of Arrow can be easily understood, if we imagine a 
community composed of three people: a, b and c, which have to choose between three pos-
sible policies: 1, 2 and 3. Let us suppose that the order of preference of each person is the 
following: a-1p2, 2p3, 1p3; b-2p3, 3p1, 2p1; c-3p1, 1p2, 3p2 (p denotes “prefer”). If we assign 
each person an equal weight and try to build a social welfare function, based on the prefer-
ences of the majority; we find two votes for each of the following preferences: 1p2, 2p3 and 
3p1. As can be seen, this system is incongruent and has no solution. The results of Arrow are 
generated basically because the individual c does not show a linear order in his preferences, 
but this is perfectly valid in reality: for example, an individual may prefer a communist coun-
try to a socialist country and at the same time prefer a capitalist country to a socialist country.
Conclusion: The controversy over welfare economics clearly showed that, as Harrod said, 
we can not talk significantly about efficiency and optimal allocation of resources unless we 
have a market. And the choice of the market as a method of valuation is in itself a value 
judgment, since prices imply a given distribution of resources.
Arrow´s impossibility theorem put an end to the very long term quest of Neoclassical Eco-
nomics to show that markets optimize social economic welfare; it was proven technically 
that they do not. In order to evaluate social economic welfare, we need judgments, external 
to the market, which is what Sen proposes latter on.
15 The general equilibrium model has been very useful to reinforce some of the approaches 
to welfare economics and to understand them more precisely. In particular, the two fun-
damental theorems of welfare economics are derived from the general equilibrium model. 
The first of these theorems states that the process of assigning a market equilibrium is 
Pareto efficient (It is said that an allocation of resources is Pareto efficient if there is no 
possible redistribution that can improve the situation of one person without deteriorating 
the situation of another).This result, which is very general and does not require any as-
sumption of convexity, is also very important because it emulates mathematically and al-
lows to explain the invisible hand of Adam Smith. This result is the axis of the justification 
of the importance of the price system as an efficient system of transmission of consumer 
preferences, a mechanism that, as we have argued, is central to understanding the rise of 
Western Capitalism. But, remember our discussion about welfare economics: this result 
implies a given distribution of resources (and in general a given Institutional Arrangement), 
which is implicit in the prices that manifest themselves in the market. So the success of the 
market as a transmitter of information in the West can not be exported to other cultures 
without basic considerations about the institutions in those cultures; for example, the pres-
ence or not of a middle class, the legal system, the possibility of coalitions, and so on. The 
real world is charactherized by Nash and information multi-equilibriums and to design an 
adequate Institutional Arrangement is a key problem to take into consideration. And in a 
multi-equilibrium world, the pareto optimality of the first theorem does not hold. Despite 
the above, this first theorem is not only an impressive result, but one of great importance 
for the economic science in general. 
The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics states that, if an efficient Pareto alloca-
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rium without the use of a set of strong assumptions16. The relaxation of these 
assumptions leads to imperfect competition models, information models, and 
game theory models in which it is possible to find systems with multiple 
equilibriums of which many are non-optimal, and even explosive situations 
without solution. Multiple equilibrium models show that the equilibrium ob-
tained depends to a large extent on the institutions that are assumed.
General Equilibrium Theory explained carefully the market behavior 
that transmits information from the individual to the society. But, was 
unsuccessful to prove the existence and stability of a unique Pareto effi-
cient equilibrium. Therefore, the need (or benefits) to assume a strong ra-
tional individual was not established. But soft rationality, selfishness and 
the importance of the markets for transmitting information is maintained.
tion is found, then it will always correspond to a competitive equilibrium characterized by a de-
fined set of prices and a redistribution of resources. This result implies, that any redistribution of 
goods that one wishes to carry out, can always be done efficiently through the market, through 
a redistribution of resources. Mathematically, this result requires the assumption of technology 
and convex preferences. Note that the redistribution of resources can not only be politically 
impracticable, but can physically involve the redistribution of human capital, which cannot be 
done. Despite these impediments, there is an important message in this second theorem, because 
it implies that if the distribution of income is achieved by, for example, a tax (or benefit) from a 
single exhibition, then the desired redistribution of welfare can be achieved without sacrificing 
the efficiency of the market. The theoremm has relevant implications. On the one hand, it is a 
natural defender of the importance of using the market and taking efficiency into account, since 
it tells us that the market can always be used; on the other hand, it makes it perfectly clear that 
the market can not solve equity problems and that these must be addressed directly via the 
redistribution of income. This message is important in terms of resisting both the temptation to 
distort efficiency in order to achieve equity, and the temptation to argue that equity must be sac-
rificed for the sake of efficiency. In practice, however, the redistributions that would be required 
do not seem to be politically attractive in many cases, so that considerations are always made be-
tween equity and efficiency, and it is not uncommon for non-Pareto solutions to be established.
16 Walras, also made scarcity the essence of value and forged a process by virtue of which 
by means of “tantonement” the market moves towards equilibrium. Walras studied the 
general equilibrium by counting equations and unknowns, and using the Walrasian auc-
tioneer; however, this method does not tell us anything about the existence, uniqueness or 
stability of the equilibrium.
In the general equilibrium of Leontief, one can prove the existence and uniqueness of the 
equilibrium, but not the stability of the primal and dual problem at the same time. In a neo-
classical general equilibrium with trials (that is, where there are no inventories or transactions 
are not executed unless they are correct; so that implicitly there is a Walrasian auctioneer); 
stability can be proved given certain assumptions, such as the theorem of weak revealed pref-
erences (which implies that the aggregate demand excess function behaves as a function of 
excess demand of a particular individual) or the substitution assumption among all the goods 
(this implies that the price increase in a good , keeping all other prices constant, increases the 
excess demand on all other goods). Stability in neoclassical models without trials, and where 
there are inventories, requires the introduction of new assumptions about the nature of the ex-
change system (see, for example, Intrilligator, 1971, chapter 9, and Varian, 1984, chapter 6).
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Rational Expectations
The theoretical vision of the School of Rational Expectations is that 
of an economy which is basically in equilibrium; it is the triumph of 
the classical economy in reproduction. However, there is nothing in 
the rational expectations method that allows analyzing expectations in 
relation to another potential equilibrium, because the price system of 
that other equilibrium simply does not exist, and there is no informa-
tion about it. In this sense, Rational Expectations have nothing to say 
in a situation of multi-equilibriums. In the case studied by Keynes of 
an economy substantially far from its equilibrium of full employment 
(the Great Depression or the 2008 crisis), future expectations linked 
to the uncertainty of what is unknown become central. In this case, 
the price system linked to the current equilibrium does not reflect 
the possible economic transactions that characterize the equilibrium 
of full employment17. 
The Keynes-Knight uncertainty does not contradict rational expecta-
tions: it simply complements them. The economic agent can process all 
the information available to them efficiently and, even more, can have 
access to all the available information in the economy, and despite this, 
the fact remains that, in situations such as the Great Depression or the 
2008 crisis, the uncertainty associated with the future is such, that it re-
quires different solutions to the normal macroeconomic adjustment poli-
cies around equilibrium. 
Rational Expectations Theory assumed a very strong rationality of 
the economic agent to prove that the economy remains always near full 
employment equilibrium, but was unsuccessful. Even with strong ratio-
nal economic agents the economy may enter a major economic crisis due 
to uncertainty as to the future; see next chapter comments on Behavioral 
Macroeconomics.
17 Economic activity will always be influenced by expectations. In general, these expecta-
tions can be formed from what is known or may be linked to uncertainty (Knight-Keynes) 
regarding what is unknown. The expectations that are formed from what is known can be 
created based on different methods of using the set of information that is possessed; among 
the methods studied by economists are extrapolative, adaptive and rational expectations. 
The last is the superior method of the three. Expectations linked to uncertainty regarding 
what is unknown may or may not be relevant. If the economy is growing close to the equi-
librium of full employment, the future expectations linked to the uncertainty of what is un-
known are not the relevant ones. The rational expectations method, is extremely relevant in 
the design of macroeconomic policy, but it is not enough to analyze the Great Depression, 
or the 2008 financial crisis. For these problems, characterized by economies far away from 
the equilibrium, the uncertainty and ignorance to which Keynes referred becomes relevant.
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Lessons Learnt
The general equilibrium model´s method of analysis has been shown to 
be fundamental to understand the importance of relative prices in the ad-
equate distribution of resources in the economy. The great and indisput-
able neoclassical contribution is the understanding of the function of the 
price mechanism, as an efficient transmitter of information that allows the 
genesis of social action based on individual choices. The price mechanism 
relates changes in individual utility to changes in the cost of production. 
The great difference that occurred in the 20th century between West-
ern Capitalism and Soviet socialism was due to the rapid technological 
revolution that occurred in the West. Such technological revolution was 
consequence of an expanding market, guided by the fast dynamics prefer-
ences of the mass consumption of the middle class. In this, the neoclassi-
cal economists were right; Mises criticized socialism for lacking a rational 
pricing system. The spirit that we find in neoclassical thought is that 
of a search for the relationship between individual choice and collective 
needs. The desire to explain the equilibrium methodologically from indi-
vidual choices is not only a search for individual freedom, but also for the 
rules of action of the community that best allocate resources according 
to individual needs. Through the market, information is provided to the 
community about individual preferences; this information is essential to 
make optimal decisions about allocation and distribution of resources.
The general equilibrium model however, ended up in the recognition 
of the existence of multi-equilibriums which are not necessarily Pareto op-
timal. Therefore, proper information channels and adequate institutions 
are needed for the markets to operate reasonable well. The extension of 
the general equilibrium model to intertemporal markets by simply treat-
ing a merchandise on different dates as a different merchandise, implies 
perfect future foresight – there is no real time, the future is traded today. 
And it is only an adequate extension when the future looks very much like 
the present – again when the economy is maintained for a long period of 
time near equilibrium. The model can also be extended to the treatment 
of uncertainty by simply assuming complete insurance markets or prices 
associated with possible future contingencies, in such a case then it is said 
that there is a complete set of future markets (Arrow-Debreu). Again insur-
ance markets – derivatives like the Credit Default Swaps in the 2008 crisis 
– only work if the economy remains near equilibrium. Uncertainty in the 
Knight- Keynes sense cannot be treated with general equilibrium models. 
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Markets do work, but only when there is proper information and adequate 
institutions that maintain future uncertainty under control, and allowed the 
economy to remain near full employment equilibrium. 
One of the key assumptions of general equilibrium models is that 
each economic agent is small in relation to the whole, which implies that 
if a coalition is formed that seeks to control the market, an anti-coalition 
will be formed that will destroy it. The result is based on the fact that 
each member of the initial coalition can benefit personally by establish-
ing agreements outside the coalition. This implies that forming coalitions 
and getting rid of them has a zero cost, but in the real world this does 
not happen. The cartels and coalitions put exit and entry costs and seek 
rules that guarantee their permanence. This is the reason for the need for 
an antitrust law, as exists, for example, in the United States. Thus, the 
model only works under the assumption that coalition formation is not 
costly, but this depends on the Institutional Arrangement. In capitalist 
Russia and in some Latin American countries, privatizations and free 
relative prices meant the rapid formation of coalitions and monopolies 
that legally, or using mafia illegal actions, control large proportions of 
certain markets and make the formation of coalitions by other market 
participants very expensive. The neoclassical economists of the second 
generation made their recommendations in privatizations in these coun-
tries, without understanding: that the institutional conditions historically given 
made the key assumption in coalitions of the general equilibrium model irrelevant. 
Had they relaxed the assumption, they would have been able to study 
conditions of imperfect competition and models of Game Theory with 
Nash equilibriums, which would have made them understand the practi-
cal and inadequate consequences of their recommendations. The failure 
of privatizations, both in Latin America and Russia, due to the extreme 
concentrations of property that they produced, clearly showed the limita-
tions of the general equilibrium model. Markets only work if there is a 
proper Institutional Arrangement.
Prices reflect a whole set of institutions -including the distribution of 
resources- under which the economic relationship in the market is ges-
tated, so that prices reflect the entire Conceptual System and the Institu-
tional Arrangement of the society in which the economic relationship in 
the market occurs. Within this Institutional Arrangement there are rela-
tions between individuals who do not pass through the market: power, 
benevolence, envy, traditions and customs, legal, political and others. A 
solution of pure efficiency would require adding in a single way the indi-
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vidual preferences in relation to a Social Welfare Function, but this is not 
possible for the general case because, as we have seen, inconsistencies in 
the aggregation can be generated. But what does this mean? Well simply 
that we can not obtain an efficiency solution that does not depend on the 
distribution of resources, and that this in turn depends on many other 
value judgments and in general on the whole Conceptual System and the 
Institutional Economic and Social Arrangement.
The decisions of equity and institutional changes, can not then depend 
exclusively on the market and on considerations of efficiency, since, as 
we have seen, efficiency in turn depends on the distribution of resources 
and, in general, on the Conceptual System and the Institutional Arrange-
ment. However, given the distribution of resources, the price system does 
provide information on individual economic preferences, which is impos-
sible to obtain via other mechanisms; and this information is useful for 
making social decisions. Note, however, that the fewer the individuals 
that can participate in a market, the more the information will be biased; 
thus, while we do not know that an egalitarian distribution of resources 
is the best; we do know that an excessively concentrated distribution of 
resources means that the market does not reflect the interests and prefer-
ences of the majority - in particular, overly unprotected groups cannot 
communicate their preferences via the market.
Note also, that even the preferences of an individual with high resourc-
es, are not necessarily expressed in the market-for example, he may wish 
that the poorest groups receive a higher income and may be willing to pay 
an additional tax for it, conditional upon the fact that everyone with high 
resources also pays the tax. The market does not provide a way to transmit 
this preference. And a single unilateral transfer of this individual to others 
without other individuals with high resources making also transfers, can 
be seen by this individual as of no consequence for the poorest groups to 
reach the social status that he prefers. The individual with high resources, 
for example, may want more resources for the needy classes, because it 
may represent greater public safety and other benefits. But this will only 
happen if the tax is not paid also by other individuals with high resources. 
If only he makes the transfer, no benefit is achieved – then he will not do it. 
The information obtained through the market is useful, but we must 
understand from what distribution of resources comes and from which 
Institutional Arrangement arises. There is no escape other than to make 
value judgments in social analysis. The question however, is: Who should 
make the value judgments? To the extent possible, they should be shared 
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in society, and to the extent that this is not possible, they should be taken 
by the political representatives of the people. At this point we will return. 
in our analysis of Sen´s Moral Economy in the following section.
Markets cannot foresee the future, the best they can do is to forecast 
it based upon today´s information. If there is proper information and the 
Institutional Arrangement works properly and is trustable, the economy, 
in the absence of external shocks, may remain near equilibrium – and Ra-
tional Expectations may be a good proxy of the economic agents´ behav-
ior. But institutional failures to cope with internal or external shocks will 
reduce confidence, and the uncertainty as to the unknown may dominate 
economic agent expectations, and then a major crisis can occur. In econo-
mies already far away from equilibrium, Rational Expectations do not 
work, the only way out is institutional intervention to rebuild confidence.
The previous reflections, however, should not be understood as the 
assertion that the information that the market provides is not relevant. 
It is so, for several reasons: 1) given the distribution of resources, it al-
lows to quantify the cost or benefit of many social actions; 2) even more 
importantly, it allows the expression of individual selfishness and gives 
the individual a sphere of freedom; 3) this sphere of freedom has been 
fundamental to capitalist development - mass consumption has been the 
key to technological development (Smith); but note, that this requires the 
expansion of the middle classes; 4) add information instantaneously on 
a set of problems that would be impossible to obtain by other means; 5) 
offers information on which many equity problems can be reconsidered; 
6) transmits information about individual preferences to the production 
process in a dynamic way, which stimulates technological development 
in the productive process and this in turn stimulates new preferences that 
guide again technological development in the production process, and so 
on. The most important points are (2) and (6). The difference between 
the communist failure of the 20th century and the success of the capital-
ist countries can perhaps be explained exclusively by these two points. 
Thus, the existence of markets is vital and the social system must seek to 
expand them and use them for decision-making, but this unequivocally 
implies the creation of a broad middle class. It is important to understand 
that purely efficient solutions do not exist; but, it is also necessary to re-
alize that efficiency directs, restricts and provides information about the 
equity decisions that are under consideration. 
Recognizing that there is an Institutional Arrangement, and that 
change and adequate development of the institutions is necessary, since 
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they are a precondition for the market to exist and to work properly; 
does not eliminate the problem of the interaction of the individual with 
the institutions. Whatever the given Institutional Arrangement is, the in-
dividual human being maintains his own personal creativity and also an 
intimate relationship with his emotions and preferences. Whatever the 
social order, the questions of How to socially capture the individual´s 
creativity? and How to increase the individual’s spheres of freedom? are 
fundamental. And, they are particularly relevant for the West. The mar-
ket is not the only solution, but it has proven to be one of the important 
mechanisms in the individual-society relationship, and in the enrichment 
of the sphere of individual freedom. However, the success of the market 
in Capitalism occurred in a specific institutional context, characterized 
among other things by a broad middle class, an efficient democratic state, 
a developed legal system, free press and respect for both physical and in-
tellectual property. In different institutional contexts, the social decisions 
taken based on criteria of market efficiency do not necessarily yield as 
good results as it has happened in the West. The failure to take into ac-
count the previous reflections, partly explains the great failure of the rec-
ommendations of economic policy made by the neoclassical economists 
to the communist economies in transition. Particularly in underdevel-
oped countries, a fine balance between equity and efficiency is indispens-
able, taking into account the historical Institutional Arrangement. If only 
equity predominates, we produce a Cuba with enormous inefficiencies; 
but if we only implement efficiency, we generate the social and economic 
crisis experienced by the communist economies in transition or the low 
economic growth suffered by México. 
The three great lessons learnt are: 1) markets do not eliminate the 
need for social value judgments, to work well, they need proper informa-
tion and an adequate Institutional Arrangement; 2) the price system and 
the existence of markets is still, however, the most efficient, known, way 
to transmit information from the individual to the society; 3) markets 
have been key in the development of capitalist societies.
Behavioral Economics has shown that individuals do cooperate and 
have altruistic behavior; but, that empirical result is irrelevant to the self-
ishness of the economic man expressed in large markets – an institutional 
feature of Capitalism which has been key for its economic development. 
Behavioral Economics’ humans just do not compare with the econs, they 
are in different dimensions. Humans are related to man´s behavior, econs to 
the institutional characteristics of large markets. Econs do not have to be 
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strongly rational, nor do they have to be humans, they just have to behave 
selfishly in the large markets. 
The introduction of the strong rational economic man was mainly due 
to the attempts to show that markets maximize economic social welfare; 
that they have a unique, stable, optimal equilibrium; and that they main-
tain the economy near full employment. Since such attempts failed, there is 
really no need (no benefits) to assume the strong rational economic man. 
We do not need such strong rationality for econs to operate in the markets, it 
is enough soft rationality. Soft rational selfish econs operating in the markets 
are the key for capitalist development, and are the consequence of a specific 
institutional feature of Western societies, which is key to preserve. We do 
not want to go back to a human’s society with no economic growth, like it 
happened through many centuries of Western history.
the new schools of thought in economics
The New Schools of thought addressed the failures of contemporary Neo-
classical Economics. The need to understand What is the role of institu-
tions? generates the new Neo-Institutionalism. The failure of Rational Ex-
pectations, particularly given the 2008 crisis, caused a revival of Keynes´ 
thought.  The consequence of Arrow´s impossibility theorem, which sealed 
the failure of Welfare Economics, was Sen´ Moral Economy - which as a so-
lution introduced value judgments, an external factor. The failure of Gen-
eral Equilibrium Theory ended up in multi-equilibriums analyzed both by 
Information Economics and by Game Theory. The failure of Neoclassical 
Economics to explain Organizational Behavior generates the beginnings of 
Behavioral Economics, which will be explained in the following chapter. 
In what follows, we will briefly review the contributions of the other New 
Schools and how they relate to Behavioral Economics.   
Neo-institutionalism
Both Neo-Institutionalism and Behavioral Economics argued that the 
contemporary neoclassical vision of how the economy works is wrong, 
and they both agree that institutions are needed. However, their vision 
of the economic dynamics of the social system is diametrically opposed. 
Neo-Institutionalism focus its analysis on the institutions; while Behav-
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ioral Economics focus it on the limitations of the individual. For Neo-In-
stitutionalism the analysis of social dynamics and economic equilibrium 
starts with the Institutional Arrangement, the individual economic agent 
is always a given datum. The individual is always creative, and he is the 
source of economic progress; but whether there is progress or not depends 
upon whether or not the Institutional Arrangement is the proper one. A 
proper Institutional Arrangement is such that allows for individual cre-
ativity to be express. For Behavioral Economist the individual economic 
agent cannot identify always what is his real interest and institutions are 
need to help him. This is a critical difference, for Neo-Institutionalism 
proper institutions are required but not to guide the individual, just to 
let him express his creativity. For Behavioral Economist the individual 
has to be guided and institutions are responsible to guide him so that he 
arrives at a proper solution. For Neo- Institutionalism the individual is a 
given datum and there is nothing wrong with him, economic problems 
such as underdevelopment arise due to improper institutions. For Be-
havioral Economics individuals have to be guided and institutions must 
decide what is best for him – because even though the individual is given 
a choice, it is predictable what choice he will take depending upon how 
the institution frames the question or the circumstance. 
Neo-Institutionalism has been influential to such a degree, that it 
could be said that nowadays the thesis according to which the market is 
delimited by an Institutional Arrangement is generally accepted; this is re-
flected in the fact that several neo-institutional economists have received 
the Nobel prize: Coase (1991), Fogel and North (1993) and Olstrom and 
Williamson (2009). In spite of this, it is still not clear what is meant by 
Institutional Arrangement and there is discussion about this18.
In general, Neo-Institutionalism has been predominantly influenced 
by the analysis and study of the institutions of Western economies. The 
vision of institutions is the consequence of the microeconomic analysis of 
transaction costs, the analysis of property rights and the development of 
contract theory. Coase’s proposal19 that Neoclassical Economics without 
friction does not correspond to the real economy -which is characterized 
by transaction costs (costs of searching and obtaining information, costs 
of negotiating and deciding, and costs of monitoring and make contracts 
effective) - led to important changes in the study of the industrial organi-
zation in the contributions of Alchian, Williamson and others.
18 Obregón, 2008b.
19 Coase, 1937.
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In this friction economy, the system of property rights defines the 
incentives of economic agents. North, for example, makes a historical 
analysis of the consequences of different systems of property rights. In 
this type of economy, asymmetric information problems as well as incen-
tives are central, and contract theory becomes basic for the analysis. The 
agent´s theory studies the information problems between the contractors 
(Fama, Alchian, Demsetz, Stiglitz and Holmstrom), while the relational 
and incomplete contracts theory studies the information problems be-
tween the contractors and an interested third party, a judge for example 
(Macaulay, McNeil, Williamson and Alchian).
The historical roots of the thought of Neo-Institutionalism are in the 
North American institutional thought of Commons. This author defined 
the institution as the collective action in control of individual action20. 
Commons placed a special emphasis on the study of the transaction as a 
transfer of ownership. It is particularly notable that there is no influence 
of Veblen’s thinking in the New-Institutionalism, and this is particularly 
due to the vision of this New School, which considers history and institu-
tions only from the point of view of the Institutional Arrangement that 
characterizes the West; so that a broader and more general historical 
point of view, like Veblen’s, was left aside. More in this point, below.
In fact, the idea that markets work under uncertainty and lack of 
information, and that, therefore, economic decisions depend on an In-
stitutional Arrangement, has a long tradition in economic thought. Even 
though this idea never managed to dominate the mainstream of economic 
thought, it was always defended by various economists throughout the 
history of economic thought. In this tradition I have pointed out21, among 
other authors, Smith, Malthus, Marshall, Keynes, Knight, Marx, Schum-
peter, Veblen and Boulding.
Neo-Institutionalism is a great contribution to economic thinking, un-
certainty and lack of information make institutions essential. The Neo-In-
stitutionalism has allowed a new vision of the harmony of Adam Smith. 
Coase, Alchian, Williamson, North and others have had a great influence on 
contemporary economists. The most recent growth models explain the non-
neoclassical convergence based on institutions. The Information Economy 
finds in the institutions the explanation of the possibilities of multi-equilibri-
ums. The Sen´s Moral Economy sees in the establishment of institutions -for 
example, democracy or individual freedom- the path of economic progress.
20 Commons, 1934, p.69.
21 Obregón, 1984a.
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Despite its great successes, Neo-Institutionalism is far from being an 
integrated discipline with a precise unique vision. There are important 
contradictions, for example, Williamson versus North. At one extreme, 
Neo-Institutionalism has adherents who consider it an extension of the 
neoclassical model22, which should be expanded and include more re-
strictions. At the other extreme, some other exponents of Neo-Institu-
tionalism consider the new paradigm as antithetical to the neoclassical 
model and incompatible with it23. There is not a well-integrated view, of 
general acceptance, that we can call the Neo-Institutionalism model of the 
economy, which could constitute a true alternative to the well developed 
neoclassical model. However, Neo-Institutionalism clearly delimits and 
enriches the neoclassical perspective, even giving rise sometimes to op-
posite conclusions: as for example in anti-oligopoly regulation and the 
auction of public monopolies. 
Neo-Institutionalism shares with most of the other New Schools the 
concept that underdevelopment is the result of the absence of the institu-
tions that the West has. For this school, the Western individual´s creativi-
ty is the motor that generates historical change; and progress is generated 
by establishing institutions that adequately motivate respect for private 
property, democracy, order and for the law in general. The problem with 
this vision is that it prevents the study and understanding of the historical 
evolution of other societies, which do not take the individual as a central 
figure in their social dynamics. 24
From the point of view of economic policy, Neo-Institutionalism al-
lows to understand problems such as the firm, oligopolies and others, for 
which it has been very useful. However, as regards to the international 
policy of patent protection, the case of its importance for global develop-
ment has been exaggerated by some exponents of this school. Rodrik, 
has pointed out that such a protection is not always justified from the 
point of view of the interests of the underdeveloped countries25. 
North’s contribution on the resilience of informal institutions, allows 
explaining why in certain cases the export of Western institutions to un-
derdeveloped countries does not work properly (this is the historical ex-
ample of India, or México); and this in itself was a great contribution. But 
22 Dahlman, 1979.
23 Furubotn and Richter, 2003.
24 This topic is developed with breadth in Obregón, 2008c.
25 (Rodrik, 1999, p.148)
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what North does not explain are the strengths of these informal tradition-
al institutions that, mixed with heterodox new formal institutions, have 
produced economic success stories in countries like China, and other 
Asian countries, that never fully adopted the Western institutions26. 
Neo-Institutionalism showed that economic development is a func-
tion of the Institutional Arrangement; but it failed to prove that Western 
institutions are indispensable for such development, nor that the estab-
lishment of Western institutions in underdeveloped countries promote 
economic development.
The comparison between Neo-Institutionalism and Behavioral Eco-
nomics shows the limitations of the second to deal properly with such 
problems as economic development or the role of institutions in the es-
tablishment of the economic equilibrium. Starting the analysis from the 
individual agent and not from the institutions makes Behavioral Econom-
ics quite distinct from Neo-Institutionalism.
26 Rodrik represents an advance on North as he recognizes the importance of the strength of 
domestic institutions to stimulate development, but there is still in Rodrik the insistence of 
seeing the institutions of other countries as a transition to the optimal institutions, which are 
the Western ones; and to explain the success stories based on these institutions, i.e., respect 
for private property and democracy. (Rodrik’s proposals are presented more extensively 
in Obregón, 2008a.) The reality is that Asia developed mostly without democracy and that 
in China respect for individual rights is very limited, and of course there is no democracy. 
These societies are competitors of the West, not their followers; they have adopted from 
the West the minimum necessary to integrate globally and compete, but basically they 
continue to be societies with values and institutions that are very  different from the West. 
Openly analyzing these differences is relevant, and changes our focus on the problem of 
underdevelopment; Obregón, 2008b and 2008c are widely dedicated to this analysis. The 
New Schools of economics, like the previous ones, have not dealt with the consequences 
of not seeing development as a natural process. In particular, the vision that development 
is a process that occurs naturally once the appropriate institutions (and policies) are imple-
mented, has diverted the attention of economists, both of the new and old schools,  from 
the study of two central problems: 1) the analysis of how development could be generated 
from the current conditions of the underdeveloped countries and from the own specific his-
torical institutions of each country, and 2) the possibilities and development consequences 
of reordering the international Institutional Arrangement that exists between developed 
and underdeveloped countries have not been sufficiently studied. The thinking of the New 
Schools, even though it means a great advance over the old ones, continues to be influenced 
by the predominating epistemology in economic thought, that of the economy of reproduc-
tion. This epistemology conceives economic development only as a natural consequence 
of individual economic freedom – which suppose to produce progress and accumulation 
of capital; and has restricted the analysis of underdevelopment to answering which are the 
absent Western institutions in the underdeveloped countries that impede individual eco-
nomic freedom. This epistemological position has precluded the analysis of other routes to 
development, like the one followed by China and other Asian countries.
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A historical note on institutionalism
Even though it is not the central topic in this book, it is convenient to es-
tablish the main difference between Neo-Institutionalism and traditional 
Institutionalism, particularly in the works of Veblen and Boulding.
In Veblen, as in the Neo-Institutionalism of North, an institution in-
cludes both the Conceptual System of values and the actual institutions 
that implement such Conceptual System. But there are two key differenc-
es, one that in our opinion favors North and another that favors Veblen. 
In Veblen, like previously in Marx, social change happens only through 
technological change; North introduces the social change that happens 
because of social intentional design, a key feature of contemporary societ-
ies. But what favors Veblen is that, while the individual is a given datum 
in North, it changes historically in Veblen. Thus, in Veblen we can un-
derstand the historical genesis of the free economic man. It becomes very 
clear thanks to Veblen, that the free expression of the individual´s selfish-
ness in large markets is a particular institutional characteristic of contem-
porary Western societies. The individual is not historically always the 
agent of change in Veblen; while it is clearly so in North. In Chapter four 
we will present our own vision in these issues.
Boulding, as we have discussed above, pointed out that the economic 
relation trough the market is just but one of the three key relations of 
the individual with the society, beyond the economic system there is an 
Integrative System and a Power System. This contribution of Boulding 
is central, because it points out that man´s behavior changes accordingly 
to the system in which he interacts with society. He may behave selfish 
in large economic markets and altruistic and cooperative through the 
Integrative System. Moreover, if we put together Veblen´s and Boulding´s 
contributions we can see that there is a historical dynamic of the three 
social systems. And therefore the interaction of the individual with the 
society in each one of the three systems is distinct in diverse societies and 
in different points in time in the same society. All this means that there is 
not a unique nature of man as human. There are basic evolutionary traits 
of man and those will be described in chapter four, but how they are 
expressed depends upon the specific historical Institutional Arrangement. 
Our nature as humans cannot just be found through empirical laboratory 
findings in a particular society and at a given point in time – mainly 
because such findings imply already a given Institutional Arrangement. 
Human behavior cannot be disentangled form the institutions that are 
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influencing it. An individual economic agent just does not exist by itself. 
The laboratory findings are very useful, but they have to be related to 
what we know from other social disciplines in an evolutionary and his-
torical institutional context, as we will do in chapter four.
Take for example the finding that in the Dictator Game people dis-
plays altruistic behavior. Voluntarily 74% of participant dictators divide 
money equally (see next chapter); which is argued by Behavioral Eco-
nomics as an empirical demonstration that humans are not rational selfish 
calculators maximizing their personal well being. What it really shows is 
that in developed countries there is a strong Integrative System. And we 
must recall that both the Integrative System and the Power System are 
reflected in monetary and economic transactions. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising to find that the Integrative System plays a role even in monetary 
transactions in the laboratory, in the Dictator Game and others. 
The Integrative System and the Power System are part of the econ-
omy. Governments at the beginning of the 20th century were in aver-
age in developed economies only around 10% of GDP, today they are 
around 40%; of which the Power System represents around 4%, social 
expenditures around 25% and other integrative functions 11%. Thus, the 
Integrative System represents 36% of the economy, the Power System 
4% and the Economic and Exchange System 60%27. Individuals living 
in developed economies live in a world in which social cooperation is a 
reality, that is why they display cooperative and altruistic behavior. That 
however does not mean that they will behave altruistic in a large competi-
tive market, in these markets they behave selfishly.
Information Economics
Information Economics success is also shown in the fact that it has pro-
duced four Nobel laureates: Mirrless and Vickrey, 1996; and Spence and 
Stiglitz, 200128. Information Economics represents a strong critic to the 
27 These calculations are not precise because available data does not allow to do it. But they 
are good enough proxies. For calculations on government size and social expenditures see 
Obregón 2018b, which uses OECD data. Military expenditures can be found in CIA world 
factbook – www.indexmundi.com, which are updated up to January 1, 2018. Military ex-
penditures are around 2.5% of GDP. The Power System includes military expenditures 
plus other enforcing agencies of which no hard data can be found, but we estimate that they 
do not add more tan 1.5% of GDP.
28  Akerlof also won in 2001 the Nobel prize due to his contributions in Information Eco-
nomics; but, given also his relevant contributions in Behavioral Macroeconomics, we have 
included him in the group of Nobel laureates in Behavioral Economics. 
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vision of the economy of the free market neoclassical theorists, according 
to which neither the institutions nor history matter. For the free market 
neoclassical economists, given the distribution of income, which is as-
sumed not to be a problem to be solved by economic theory, equilibrium 
is basically determined by fundamental forces: such as preferences and 
technology. On the other hand, Information theorists argue that informa-
tion problems, coordination and other institutional characteristics may 
impose limits on economic possibilities which are as real as technology 
or preferences.       
Information economy focuses on understanding the causes of coordina-
tion failures due to which the neoclassical equilibrium is not obtained. This 
literature shows the possibilities of multiple equilibriums in which one 
or several of them can be sub-optimal; and, nevertheless, the markets, 
and in general even the existing institutions, may be insufficient to move 
the economy from the sub-optimal equilibrium to an optimal neoclassical 
equilibrium29. In addition, the sub-optimal equilibrium can create path 
dependence30. And temporary shocks can have long-term consequences, 
there is hysteresis31.
The models used in the study of the information economy are dynam-
ic, either with continuous or discrete decision variables. In some cases, 
the economic actors are identical; in others, they differ in their benefit 
functions (payoff); and in others, they differ in their strategy sets.
The inefficiencies of information give rise to a large set of economic 
externalities, that can not be resolved through private arrangements, such 
as: 1) information; 2) group reputation effects; 3) effects of agglomera-
tion; 4) spillovers of knowledge, and 5) pecuniary. The sequence is that 
there are multiple Pareto equilibriums that can be ranked according to 
their degree of efficiency; one of these equilibriums is superior to all the 
others in the sense that it is better for all, but the other inferior equilibri-
ums exist, with their corresponding vector of prices, that do not move the 
system out of the inferior equilibrium.
Information Economics has been applied to diverse economic prob-
lems, among them, financial crisis32, and underdevelopment33. 
29 Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991, Kranton, 1996, North, 1994.
30 Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, Hoff, 1994, Mookherjee and Debraj, 1999.
31 Tirole, 1996.
32 Greewnwald and Stiglitz, 2003.
33 Hoff, 2000; Hoff and Stiglitz,2002.
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There is a very close relationship between the absence of information, 
the Institutional Arrangement and the uncertainty regarding the future. 
Knight and Keynes had explored the consequences of uncertainty for ob-
taining economic equilibrium and for the determination of employment 
levels, but none of these authors managed to properly formalize their 
thinking. Theorists of underdevelopment have argued for a long time 
that it was due to development traps such as low industrialization, low 
research and inappropriate institutions; but they did not formalize their 
thinking either. The great contribution of the Information Economy is 
that it formalizes: 1) that the economic equilibrium depends on the Insti-
tutional Arrangement; and 2) that the growth path of a given economy 
also depends on the Institutional Arrangement. A critical message is that 
today market prices and institutions may not deliver neither the desire 
economic equilibrium nor the required long term growth path.
Information Economics argue that whatever institutional interven-
tions have to be done must be analyzed in a dynamic path. 
Just like Neo-Institutionalism, Information Economics analyses the 
fundamental economic problems of unemployment and underdevelop-
ment from the point of view of the institutions and not from the point of 
view of the characteristics of the individual economic agent as Behavioral 
Economics does. Information Economics proved that even with strong 
rationality assumptions, markets do not necessarily produce either full 
employment or the desired growth path. 
Game Theory 
Game theory has shown that there are nor only multi-equilibriums but that 
many of them are not Pareto optimal – they are Nash equilibriums. Nine 
Nobel Prize winners have had very relevant contributions in Game Theory: 
Harsanyl, Nash and Selten (1994), Aumann and Schelling (2005), Hurwicz, 
Maskin and Myerson (2007) and Tirole (2014). The main message is that 
once the game is set, it defines the conditions under which economic agents 
operate – basically not knowing what the other economic agents will do. And 
since there are not coordinating agencies, many of the economic decision 
are optimal - condition upon what economic agent A thinks other economic 
agents will do. But such decisions, will not necessarily take the game solution 
to a Pareto optimum, and in fact may produce very suboptimal equilibriums.
Notice that even informing the participants that it is possible to achieve 
a Pareto optimal solution will not help, because the fact of the matter is 
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that they cannot communicate with the other participant or participants 
and establish a pact of no aggression and of cooperation to the common 
goal of the Pareto optimal equilibrium. Given the game, agent A does 
not know what Agent B (or other agents) will do; and a movement of 
A towards the Pareto equilibrium, may end up putting him in a worse 
position that he started if B decides not to cooperate – this can easily be 
shown in the Prisoners Dilemma Game.
There is a close relationship between the game, the Institutional Ar-
rangement, the lack of information, and the uncertainty as to the future. 
Both the wrong game and the absence of information can be seen as the 
equivalent of having the inadequate Institutional Arrangement. And the 
uncertainty as to the future may also be seen, as the lack of confidence in 
the Institutional Arrangement to manage properly future events.
Tirole (1996), is a good example of what occurs in the real world, he 
shows that both a corrupt economy and a non-corrupt economy have 
stable equilibriums. In a non-corrupt economy, the optimal individual 
strategy is to be no-corrupt; but, in a corrupt economy it is to be corrupt. 
That is why both equilibriums are stable. Notice that the equilibrium 
has little to do with the individual´s preferences. Even if we assume that 
all the individuals in the corrupt economy would rather live in a non-
corrupt economy, the corrupt economy will persist as long as there are 
not institutional features (including market prices – because markets are 
in itself an institution) that allow the individuals to act together in a non-
corrupt manner. This example can be extrapolated to full employment 
or to the right development path; almost all, if not all, of the individu-
als rather have full employment and proper economic development, yet 
their individual optimal behavior may not take them there. Institutional 
interventions are required.   
Game theory, like Neo-Institutionalism and Information economics, fo-
cuses in the institutions – that define the game – and not in the individual char-
acteristics of the economic agents, as Behavioral Economics does. Even strong 
rational agents, in the wrong game, will produce suboptimal equilibriums. 
A revival of Keynes´ thought
Already the success of Information Economics, as we have been saying, 
had produced a renew interest in Keynes´ macroeconomics. This, can 
be seen in Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003), which is more or less a formal 
presentation of Minsky´s model of a credit economy, which in turn was 
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based in Keynes liquidity preference theory. But the 2008 crisis made the 
revival much stronger. Because reality had shown in a dramatic way, that 
Lucas was wrong in saying that Keynes was dead, and that the Ratio-
nal Expectations claim that the markets will always maintain developed 
economies near full employment equilibrium was seriously mistaken. 
In Keynes thought economic agents are rational, but they cannot fore-
see a future that does not exist; therefore, if institutions make mistakes 
that show them as incapable, confidence as to the institutional capacity to 
deal with future unknown events may deteriorate rapidly. There are two 
channels through which such lack of confidence impacts the economy. 
The first one is the liquidity preference theory, which basically says that 
banks confronted with a deterioration in the balance sheet of the eco-
nomic agents will raise the banking lending rate and that this rate will 
become inelastic (it will not respond) to changes in the Central Bank rate. 
Therefore, traditional monetary policy will not be successful. Bernanke´s 
policy of buying directly private sector debt, was an explicit recognition 
that there was in fact a liquidity preference phenomenon in the 2008 
crisis, and that traditional monetary policy influencing the Central Bank 
rate was not going to be successful. The second channel is the marginal 
efficiency of capital, which says that the lack of confidence will force in-
vestors to increase the discount rate of future investment´ returns. Notice, 
that nor only investors are affected by the lack of confidence, but also 
consumers of durable consumer goods who should also increase their 
rate of discount. This second phenomena, explains why consumer confi-
dence took so long to recover in the USA34.
The revival of Keynes´ thought is explicitly recognized in Mervyn King´s 
latest book, The End of Alchemy (2016), in which he calls Keynes´uncertainty - 
radical uncertainty; and argues that it has an enormous relevance to understand 
the real economy and the financial markets. Mervyn King was the Governor 
of the Bank of England 2003-2013. Akerlof´s and Shiller´s book on Animal 
Spirits (2009), also pretends to be a revival of Keynes thought; although, as 
we will argue latter on in chapter three, they misinterpret Keynes.
In Keynes, as in Neo-Institutionalism, Information Theory and Game 
theory, markets are unable to reach the optimal equilibrium due to insti-
tutional failures and not to the lack of rationality of the economic agents 
as it happens in Behavioral Economics.
34 Keynes never discusses this second phenomenon, but it could be argued that it is implicit 
in his consumption function, in which consumption is a function only of today´ income. See 
the section on Behavioral Macroeconomics.
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Sen´s Economics
Sen´s Economics and Behavioral Economics are the only two of the New 
Schools of economics that, following the tradition of the contemporary 
Monetarist-Rational Expectations Neoclassical School, center their analy-
sis in the economic agent rationality –or irrationality, and not in the in-
stitutional characteristics of the economy. Both schools have in common 
that they are critical of the selfish rational economic man; both the humans 
of Behavioral Economics and Sen´s moral economic agent are socially co-
operative and altruistic. However, Sen´s economic agent is diametrically 
opposed to the one in Behavioral Economics. For Behavioral Economics, 
Kahneman´s system 1 (see next chapter) is very influential: thus, humans 
display conducts fully defined by emotions. Moreover, humans in gener-
al behave ethically, but they are not fully trustable, because certain ethical 
conducts would change if the monetary reward is significant. In contrast, 
Sen´s rational economic agent is fully rational, even beyond the strong 
rationality assumed by contemporary Neoclassical Economics. He is ca-
pable to distinguish good and evil, is able to control his emotions and his 
passions, and can be trusted to do what is right beyond his selfish interest. 
As we saw before, Arrow´s impossibility theorem meant that a Social 
Welfare Function cannot be built; and therefore, contemporary neoclassi-
cal economists were unable to demonstrate that markets maximize social 
economic welfare. Sen solves this problem going back to what precisely 
economist from Leonel Robbins onwards were wanting to avoid: inter-
personal comparisons. They became feasible in Sen, because economic 
agents are not longer selfish but ethical individuals, who understand ra-
tionally their social responsibility. In Sen, the preferential order of a set 
of social alternatives is not narrowly defined in the space of individual 
selfish utility, but in other spaces on which individuals can manifest their 
responsible and ethical preferences.  
The theory of underdevelopment of Sen is based on his theory of 
freedom 35 and rationality36. For Sen, the value of freedom has a strong 
universalist assumption37. Freedom for him is not only the ultimate goal 
and the way to measure development, but also what drives and causes 
it. For this author development must be measured through the capacities 
that the individual has to satisfy: what he considers necessary (according 
35 Development as freedom, 2000.
36 Rationality and freedom, 2002.
37 Sen, 2000, p.244.
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to his reason). Sen argues that all individuals. according to their reason, 
always consider five basic freedoms of value: 1) political liberties (free-
dom of expression and choice); 2) economic facilities (opportunity to par-
ticipate in trade and production); 3) social opportunities (education and 
health); 4) guarantees of transparency, and 5) protection and security. 
For Sen, one form of freedom reinforces the other and so development 
is generated, which is measured in the individual’s own freedoms. Sen 
points out, that it is necessary to focus on the deprivation of these basic 
needs and not on poverty (even though there may be some correlation). 
According to him, improving the capabilities of people has positive effects 
on development38. For him, the counterpart of freedom is the responsi-
bility (his integral man) and the possibility of justice, and the latter is a 
relevant factor for evaluating economic and social changes. 
For Sen, the possibility of maximizing social welfare rests on the social 
participation of responsible (ethical) individuals. Sen rejects the selfish 
homo economicus of liberal ethics. According to him, man is an integral be-
ing and his economic participation in the market does not capture his 
social preferences, which must be added directly, making interpersonal 
comparisons, in a Social Welfare Function.
Sen points out that the political process is insufficient to aggregate 
individual preferences at the social level for several reasons. 1) does not 
guarantee that the individual is informed and has analyzed in detail the 
consequences of his decision; 2) frequently, marginalized groups are un-
derrepresented in the political apparatus because they do not exercise 
their voting rights39, and 3); Given Arrow’s impossibility theorem, not 
all voting aggregation processes give consistent aggregate results, so it 
is necessary to redefine the possible areas of congruence and obtain the 
social choice of the individual in relation to those areas.
Sen’s proposal provides a new mechanism of social communication 
distinct from the market and democracy, through which the responsible 
(ethical) individual directly expresses his social preferences. The exercise 
of social choice confronts the individual with the possibility and the need 
to reflect on the consequences of certain social states, which go beyond 
38 This proposal of Sen seems to us to contradict the facts.  The lowest ranked HDI (Human 
Development Index) – The Central African Republic improve its HDI from 0.32 in 1990 
to 0.35 in 2015. But economic development was reversed, The PPP GDP per capita (The 
Purchasing Power Parity Gross Domestic Product which is the one comparable between the 
two years) went down 33% in the same period. See Obregón, 2018b table 4.7 in Chapter four.
39  Sen, 2002, p.77.
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the economic relations contained in the markets. The individual who 
uses a large old car and pollutes the environment, and who acts in this 
way because everyone does, could be willing to use a new and smaller 
car if he knew that everyone else is going to do it. Models, for example, 
of multiple equilibriums, such as Tirole’s model on corruption, as well as 
many others, show that the result obtained depends on the Institutional 
Arrangement imposed. In this way, there is room to ask what are the 
social preferences of individuals that are not expressed in the market, and 
Sen´s social choice may be useful in these cases.
For Sen rationality is the discipline consisting of subjecting decisions 
and personal actions, as well as individual objectives, values  and priori-
ties, to the scrutiny of reason. Sen asks what is the use of rationality and 
responds that the fundamental use is that it allows us to act wisely and 
judiciously, that is to say that it has a normative role. Rationality can be 
used to explain the behavior of others, but should not be based on the 
narrow concept of the liberals, which assumes that others are always op-
timizing their own interest. Sen finds the use of homo economicus completely 
unjustified in economics, in social choice, in politics, in legal matters, and 
even in conflict and defense; and proposes that, we must abandon the 
concept of homo economicus and its restricted rationality. However, he says, the 
extended rationality of the integral man is useful to explain how to reach 
social decisions.
The rationality of the integral man, according to Sen, has the follow-
ing limitations: 1) there is no surefire test to discriminate the rational 
behavior from the one that is not. The rationality of the integral man 
can not be expressed easily in consistent algorithms, such as the theory 
of revealed preferences. However, for Sen this limitation is simply an ac-
knowledgment of the complexity of the use of reason itself; 2) depends on 
the person’s own reasoning process and a permanent need to scrutinize 
with reason. Therefore, both the problems of irrational correspondence 
(incongruence between what is reflected and what is done), as well as 
reflective incongruence (not properly reflected due to lack of training or 
intellectual capacity) can occur. Thus, personal freedom to reason is for 
Sen a limitation, but also an important virtue, and is congruent with the 
vision of a socially responsible man able to exercise an intelligible social 
reasoning, the kind of man conceived by Kant, Smith and Rawls. This 
man is not driven by instincts, but by his moral reason, which he is in the 
process of constantly scrutinizing. Note that in Kant and Smith the moral 
rationality of man comes from his ability to understand through his rea-
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son the moral law of God. Smith refers to God as the impartial spectator; 
Sen also refers to the impartial spectator, but is never clear whether he is 
referring to God or not.
Sen develops his theory of justice and ethics mainly in The Idea of  Jus-
tice (2009). For Sen, it is not possible to find justice in Rawls’s hypothetical 
contract, which originates in a closed impartiality to a specific commu-
nity, it requires universal ethical principles that generate an impartiality 
open to man in general. Sen refers to the impartial spectator of Smith, whose 
requirements are that reason is used to reflect: If what is considered fair 
for one and for his community would be fair for others and their com-
munities? and If the others observing us would consider what we propose 
fair? For him there is no social justice possible if it is not based on ethical 
principles of the individual behavior of an integral and responsible man 
who reaches these principles with the help of his reason. The ethical man 
not only understands ethical principles, but acts according to them. It is 
not, however, an isolated individual, but one that learns in his relation-
ship with society to distinguish the moral from what is not. The benevo-
lent feelings of man are a guide, but they are insufficient, moral conduct 
has to be based on reason.
Sen recognizes that there is not a single possible solution to determine 
which are the ethical principles that should guide individual behavior, 
and that different cultures, communities, groups and individuals can 
reach different principles. But he insists that there will always be common 
principles that will guide possible agreements between different individu-
als, groups of a community, between communities and at a global level, 
so that it will always be possible to move towards a less unfair world.
There are many unresolved issues in Sen’s vision of justice and ethics. 
First: there is nothing that guarantees that all individuals will use their 
methodology of the impartial spectator and even less that they will behave 
according to the morality they discover with their reason. Second: there is 
an incompatibility between his theory of freedom exposed in Development 
as Freedom (2000) and his theory of justice introduced in The Idea of  Justice 
(2009). Sen replaces Rawls’s notion of overlapping consensus with that 
of incomplete orderings based on the discussion between different points 
of view on fairness. But if we accept the notion of incomplete orderings 
of The Idea of  Justice, then there is nothing to guarantee that these incom-
plete orders will result in Sen’s basic capabilities related to freedom. The 
freedoms of Sen do not have to be accepted by all, nor do they have the 
universality that he confers to them in Development as Freedom. Third: if 
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there is a plurality of conceptions about justice and incomplete orderings, 
nothing guarantees us that there will be, as he affirms, always partial solu-
tions that reduce injustice. 
Empirical international aid data does not seem to justify Sen´s vision 
of common ethical partial orderings between diverse communities. The 
difference between us and them seems clear in the data; which seems to 
confirm Rawls vision that west humanistic values relate only to the west. 
Social expenditures in developing countries as GDP percentage are in the 
range of 20 to 30%, international aid is only 0.2% of world´s GDP40.  
The undeniable contribution of Sen is that it clearly points out one of 
the most important limitations of traditional economic literature, which 
does not emphasize enough the need to inform the individual of the con-
sequences of social choices. As we have already seen, there are many 
possible Nash equilibria that are not Pareto optimal. Market equilibrium 
always depends on an Institutional Arrangement that defines the rules 
of the game. The social choice of said Institutional Arrangement is of 
great importance, and can not be carried out through the market because 
it depends for its solution of the Institutional Arrangement given exog-
enously. The political elections, for the reasons described by Sen, are not 
a sufficient solution to the previous problem, so there is always room 
for the social choice proposed by Sen. And it is true that this solution 
requires the participation of an integral man who, being well informed of 
the social consequences, makes ethical judgments that go beyond his per-
sonal interests. The social choice proposed by Sen enriches the delicate 
balance that exists between the individual and society, and therefore is an 
important contribution. 
But, admitting the method of social choice, does not necessarily imply 
accepting the rationalism of Sen ´s freedoms. The great triumph of Rousseau 
and democracy was to free the individual from the tyranny of reason. 
The return to rationality is not acceptable. It is true that man can use his 
reason, but it is not true that he can reach unchangeable universal truths. 
It is true that there is room for reasonableness and for the scientific study 
of social problems, but it is not true that the reasonable determines social 
relations. It is true that there is room for the method of social choice, both 
internationally and locally, to illuminate different social alternatives. But 
it is not true that local democracy (or the political system that prevails 
40 Social expenditures come from Obregón 2018b, which uses OECD data. International 
aid data is our own estimation based upon World Bank Data available in the web - con-
sulted September 12, 2018.
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in each case) will always revalidate the inalienable freedoms of Sen, nor 
that internationally the participating countries will accept them as a guide 
in their actions. The basic freedoms of Sen are based on the  humanistic 
values of the West, which nor even the West is willing to respect in the 
international arena. Therefore, given the current global Institutional Ar-
rangement, it is almost impossible to obtain globally Sen´s freedoms. And 
even if they were obtained, they would not generate economic develop-
ment. The truth is that even given Western freedoms, development may 
not occur, as many underdeveloped countries illustrate; and even with-
out them it can happen, as China and other Asian countries have shown. 
Sen does not have a theory that can explain economic development41. 
It is not true that the individual always acts in society taking into ac-
count ethical considerations. Precisely what distinguishes contemporary 
Western societies is that the social order does not come only from ethical 
considerations about the reasonable. The political order (although influ-
enced by ethical discussions) is based on the individual desire expressed 
in the popular vote. The great virtue of the democratic agreement is that 
it makes explicit the fact that we can not resolve the balance of power via 
the reasonable. Finally, democracy –is based on the will of the people – and it 
is the ultimate source of justice in a contemporary Western society.
And given the West´s legal Institutional Arrangement (that democracy 
has decided), the individual in Western countries had been allowed to par-
ticipate in economic activities in the large markets based on his personal 
selfishness – and this is the key, as Smith have shown, of Capitalism’s 
rapid economic growth. It is true that an ethical individual is required, but 
not always, not in all activities. The integral ethical man of Sen can be used 
for social choices in which the markets or the political system are not suit-
able; but it can not, and should not, supplant neither the will of the democratic 
man nor the selfishness of the homo economicus. Man in contemporary western 
societies acts and should act as a selfish homo economicus in the market, as a 
citizen in democracy and as a citizen in social choices (in which he can be 
encouraged to express ethical preferences – i.e. taking social well being into 
consideration, but there is no guarantee that he will do so). 
Economic freedom as the space in which the individual acts on the basis 
of his selfishness must be maintained, and does not conflict neither with the 
need for democracy or an efficient political system, nor with the need for 
some social choices taken by well informed individuals. It is not convenient 
41 See Obregón, 2008a. In this work, it is shown that, in cross sectional data, there is no 
relationship between Sen´s capabilities and economic development.  
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for the individuals to participate in the markets thinking mainly on the 
interests of the community (as would the integral man of Sen), this would 
transform efficient economic markets in bureaucratic slow ones.
a digression on economic growth
Economic growth per man in a Solow´s model is due to savings and to 
exogenous technological development. Modigliani´s life cycle hypothesis 
provided an explanation of how savings were decided. Therefore, the 
next step was to have an endogenous explanation of technological devel-
opment. The contemporary Monetarist - Rational Expectations Neoclas-
sical School developed an endogenous theory of growth in which techno-
logical development was due to human capital42. In this vision the main 
difference between developed and underdeveloped economies is the 
quality of human capital. And moving human capital from one country 
to another, it is argued is difficult, because it is connected with the whole 
network of human knowledge that characterize a developed economy43. 
This explained, according to this school, why there was growth conver-
gence between regions in a given country, but there was not absolute 
convergence between developed and developing economies. 
In longitudinal studies human capital is closely related to technologi-
cal development, but human capital cannot explain adequately cross sec-
tional data. At the beginning of the sixties Mexico had clearly much more 
human capital than South Korea, even Philippines had more; yet South 
Korea was the one with an amazing economic growth. There was more 
human capital in East Europe or in Argentina than in the key Asian coun-
tries that had shown a rapid economic growth. Reality has shown that 
the contemporary neoclassical explanation of economic growth based in 
human capital was not correct. Empirical studies have found that only a 
minor percentage of the growth difference between countries is due to 
human quality distinctions, and that a more significant percentage has to 
be explained with institutional differences44.
42 Lucas,1988.
43 Lucas, 2002.
44 Between 25% to 33% is due to human capital, between 17% to 25% to physical capital 
and around 50% to institutional differences. See Hall and Jones 1999 and Klenow and 
Rodriguez- Clare 1997. 
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There have been several other endogenous theories of technological 
development. Among those, we would like to mention three groups of 
theories. The first group, argues that technological development is the 
outcome of scientific discoveries45; the second group, that it is due to 
learning by doing46; and, the last group, that it is the consequence of re-
search and development47. 
Scientific discoveries no doubt are closely related to technological de-
velopment; and both go hand to hand with the fast economic growth of 
capitalist economies in longitudinal studies. However, when one looks at 
cross sectional data, science does not longer seem to be the cause of tech-
nological development and fast economic growth. Think for example, on 
the USSR, with very rapidly scientific progress and yet was very unsuc-
cessful in achieving the required economic growth. The USSR concen-
trated in military and aero-space technology, but it did not have a key 
element: the middle class that in a Smith´s sense enlarged the market and 
allowed for the mass production required for technological development. 
What the USSR did not have was: the dynamic preferences of the middle class 
as guidance of technological development.
Learning by doing is closely related to technological development, but 
it does not distinguish between types of learning, workers in the USSR 
did learn by doing but economic growth did not happen.
Research and development has a similar problem that science and 
learning by doing, it is related to technological development in longitu-
dinal data, but it does not explain well cross sectional data. Successful 
research and development in the military and aero-space industries in the 
USSR, did not produce the required economic growth.
There is no way out, economic growth at the country level has to be 
explained, among other things, by institutional factors48.
Modigliani´s consumption function is important as a microeconomic 
determinant of savings, but national savings are defined by other very 
relevant macroeconomic factors such as the government´s policies to pro-
45 Phelps,1966; Nordhaus,1967;Shell,1966-1967.
46 Arrow, 1962.
47 PM Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt,1992. D Romer, 
2001.
48 Acemoglu and Robinson 2013, present a powerful case of the importance of institu-
tions for economic growth. Although as other exponents of Neo-Institutionalism, they focus 
mainly in the need to adopt the Western institutions.
1) who is the economic man 59
mote savings and the country´s export strategy49. Asia has shown that 
macro-policies are a key determinant of national savings. Thus, national 
savings are to a large extent institutionally defined50.
The recent technological revolution – TIC - in information (I), com-
munications (C) and new technologies in the work place (T); has made 
possible the manufacturing production offshore. Thus, large multination-
al companies have maintained at home manufacturing services such as 
marketing, general management, competitive strategy and so on; but, the 
actual manufacturing production happens fragmented offshore in under-
developed countries. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to export hu-
man capital or full production process technological knowledge– because 
large multinational have gained access to low wages in underdeveloped 
countries by just exporting a fragment of the manufacturing production. 
As a consequence, the convergence has started between developed coun-
tries and those underdeveloped countries that have participated in the 
TIC technological revolution51.
The TIC revolution has shown that technology is not physical capital 
embodied nor is it human capital embodied; nor it depends exclusively on 
science, learning by doing or research and development. It depends cru-
cially on the institutional characteristics of the global process of production, 
and as Smith thought: it benefits a lot by the enlargement of the market.
Economic growth in China and other manufacturing centers in the 
new TIC revolution has happened without adopting the full set of West-
ern institutions - as North and other Neo-Institutionalisms’ argued was 
required. It was neither the consequence of adopting Sen´s economic free-
doms. It occurred as a consequence of new institutions specially devel-
oped to adapt themselves to the new TIC revolution; taking into account 
the competitive advantage of underdeveloped economies in low salaries, 
but also its traditional strengths due to a solid traditional Institutional 
Arrangement52.
Economic growth has to be explained based upon institutional char-
acteristics and cannot be understood if one focuses only in the individual 
agent’s characteristics as Behavioral Economics do.
49 Since due to national accounting the difference between savings minus investments has to 
be equal to exports minus imports.
50 Obregón, 2018b.
51 See Obregón, 2018b.
52 Obregón, 2018b.
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conclusion 
Despite the strong rationality assumed, contemporary neoclassical econo-
mists failed to show that markets maximize social welfare, have a unique 
optimal equilibrium, maintain economies near their full employment 
level and produce endogenous economic growth. However, contempo-
rary neoclassical economists have provided the economic profession with 
solid mathematical models which have nor only been useful to prove the 
failures mentioned above, but also to further understand how markets 
settle prices, allocate resources and manage expectations. 
The New Schools of economic thought had explored new routes to 
understand what defines economic equilibrium, social economic welfare, 
the economies capacity to remain near full employment and economic 
growth. Most of these New Schools have conclude that, even assuming 
strong rationality, the Institutional Arrangement is the key that allows 
contractual stability, adequate information and confidence as to the fu-
ture. Therefore, both economic equilibrium and economic growth are 
institutionally dependent. 
There are only two New Schools that were looking at new solutions as 
a consequence of criticizing the strong rationality of the individual econom-
ic agent: Sen´s Moral Economics and Behavioral Economics. Behavioral 
Economics will be discus in the following chapter.  Sen´s Moral Economics 
attempted to find the solution to the welfare maximization problem by 
re-defining the nature of man. Sen´s solution however requires absolute ex-
ternal ethical values, which the individual economic agents can use as a ref-
erence. But, man is not evolutionarily made to be able to achieve such ex-
ternal universal truths (see chapter four).  Social choices are welcome, but 
are by definition embedded in the Conceptual System and the Institutional 
Arrangement of a given society- something that Sen never fully recognizes, 
even though he seems to get close to it with his partial orderings. So we 
are back to the notion that markets cannot be shown to maximize social 
economic welfare, because social choice will always be relative to a specific 
Conceptual System and its corresponding Institutional Arrangement. The 
fact, is that there is not one, but a set of economic equilibriums of which 
many are sub-optimal and can be characterized by unemployment and/
or underdevelopment; and social choice will not be enough to move these 
equilibriums to the optimum – which in any case is relative. 
The discussion about the limitations of Sen´s Moral Economics pro-
vides two important lessons. The first lesson is, that is not possible to 
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solve the traditional economic problems such as welfare maximization 
or economic development just by focusing in individual choices or in the 
nature of man. Whether man is rational, in any sense of the word, or ir-
rational; to understand the key economic problems, we need to introduce 
institutions and what they represent - values, history and so on. The 
second lesson is, that the criticism of the rational economic man based 
in the suppose real characteristics of human nature looses sight of the fact 
that the soft rational man, introduced by Smith, who expresses his self-
ish preferences in the market, is not a description of human nature, but 
the recognition of a special institutional feature of contemporary West-
ern societies. And, therefore criticisms of the soft rational economic man 
must be address as discussions of the alternative institutional features of 
contemporary societies and not as discussions on the nature of man. If 
anyone wishes to propose that individuals should not longer be allowed 
to be selfish in the large markets, he must confront the consequences 
from the point of view of economic growth of such a drastic change in 
the Institutional Arrangement. This is almost a reduction to absurdity, 
I know: because almost no one of the contemporary economist will feel 
comfortable with such a proposal. But the intellectual exercise we have 
done is useful, because it teaches us to be careful not to base our analysis 
only and foremost in the criticism of the rational economic man based upon an 
alternative view of human nature. These two lessons will be useful, in the next 
two chapters, in our discussion of Behavioral Economics.
[62]
HUMANS IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ROOTS
Behavioral economics integrates psychology and economics and argues 
that we are humans and not econs53. Humans are not rational, they are emo-
tional beings who under some circumstances may take the wrong choices 
and therefore need help from the government. 2) Humans are not selfish 
individuals, they are altruistic and socially cooperative. They argue that 
there are powerful socio-economic and psychological incentives. People 
gets well being by compensations different from money, whether intellec-
tual gratification, respecting others, social conventions, and social status. 
That explains why: paying students to study reduces the quality of their 
intellectual effort; charging parents for picking up late their child from a 
nursery had the effect that more parents did it, because they fell free to 
do it, once they paid for the service; payments for blood donation reduce 
donations; and higher wages encourage more work only if they are re-
lated to be treated well by the employer. Economic decisions, behavioral 
economists argue, are nor only related to prices but to human relation-
ships and social interactions.
The scientific method in psychology has been very different than the 
one used in economics. Psychologists based their results in empirical find-
ings in the laboratory, while economists study reality from an abstract de-
ductive mathematical model. They also differ in the object under study. 
Psychologists are concerned with broad human individual and social be-
havior. While economist’s main interests are market prices, consumer´s 
and producer´s microeconomic behavior, allocation of resources, econom-
ic value, economic growth and development, income distribution, the 
open economy and financial and macroeconomic stability. Economics 
has been able to advance, in the problems it is trying to solve, by intro-
ducing the assumption of the economic man- the econ. Which, as we had seen 
in the last chapter, varies widely between diverse schools of economic 
thought, going from a very soft version of rationality to a very strong 
53 Good reviews of Behavioral Economics, order from simple to complex are: Baddeley, 
2017; Tomer, 2017; Cartwright, 2018; and Dhami, 2016.
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one. In any case, economists are only concern with individual and social 
behavior to the extent that its study is helpful to solve the set of economic 
problems mentioned above. 
Behavioral Economics can be defined as the quest to integrate psy-
chology and economics by showing that the definition of humans in psy-
chology can provide light into specific economic problems. At the outset, 
then, one has to understand that Behavioral Economics is not and will 
not be a new paradigm in economics - simple because it cannot solve the 
full set of problems that economics needs to address.
That emotions and group´s influences do count in the individual´s 
perception of reality and in his decisions, has been shown for decades 
in many laboratory findings both in social psychology and in cognitive-
behavioral psychology. Therefore, to some extent, it is not surprising 
that Behavioral Economics has found that economic decisions are also 
influenced by these two factors. Therefore, the interesting question is: 
Whether or not Behavioral Economics has brought value added in the 
understanding of a relevant subset of economic problems? And the clear 
answer is that it has. There are five Nobel Prize winners that can be asso-
ciated with Behavioral Economics: Simon (1978), Akerlof (2001), Kahne-
man (2002), Shiller (2013) and Thaler (2017).  
In this chapter we will discuss the background and the psychological 
roots of Behavioral Economics and in the next we will discuss the Nudge, 
Behavioral Macroeconomics and Behavioral Finance. In our exposition we 
will pay especial attention in analyzing the value added that Behavioral 
Economics has or has not brought to specific economic problems. This 
chapter is divided in four sections. In the first one, we will briefly present 
the background that gives rise to Behavioral Economics. In the second, 
we analyze the psychological roots of Behavioral Economics and the main 
results found as to the behavior of humans. In the third section, we discuss 
the question of whether or not the individual confronts too many choices 
and in the fourth whether or not we are predictably irrational.
the background
There are five reasons for the success of Behavioral Economics. The 
first one is that as we mentioned in the previous chapter economics only 
touches one of the main relations between the individual and the society 
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- the Economic and Exchange System - and the other two – the Integra-
tive System and the Power System - are left unexplained. Any organiza-
tion is a social micro-cosmos, where the three social systems mentioned 
above exist; there is an Economic, a Power and an Integrative System. 
Therefore, as a consequence the neoclassical economic theory of the firm, 
based only in the economic system, was clearly insufficient. Thus, those 
concerned with business organizations had to look elsewhere and, given 
the relevance of human relationships in any organization, psychology 
was a natural discipline to go to.
The second reason is that there had been significant advances in cog-
nitive-behavioral psychology and social psychology which had shown 
the relevance of emotions and group influence in the individual´s decision 
making process; therefore, it was natural to ask what happens in econom-
ics if we replace the abstraction of the rational economic man with humans 
with emotions belonging to a social group. The third reason is that economics 
and business departments became more integrated in the main univer-
sities, and therefore the business community became more influential 
in economic thinking. The fourth reason is the success of game theory, 
which provided a specific tool to test in the laboratory the hypothesis 
of Behavioral Economics, particularly at the time that other economists 
such as Vernon Smith and his collaborators started using the laboratory 
to explore economic thesis. And the fifth reason is that the 2008 crisis 
discredit the contemporary Monetarist - Rational Expectations Neoclassi-
cal School, which had become the predominant one, and which argue that 
markets always stabilized by themselves; and therefore, people was willing to 
look elsewhere for alternatives. In what follows we will explore further-
more each one of these five reasons.
The First Reason: The Need to Explain Organizational Behavior
Leibenstein X efficiency theory, which started with his already famous 
1966 article, developed a conceptual frame to understand why firms in 
the optimal state of affairs do not optimize internal efficiency – they main-
tain only X efficiency. Leibenstein´s theory borrowed behavioral insights, 
but it did not provide a full framework to integrate social disciplines like 
psychology and sociology into the understanding of the firm. The real 
pioneer of Behavioral Economics was Herbert Simon54. In 1945, Simon 
54 Herbert Simon won in 1978 the Nobel Prize in economics “for his pioneering research 
into the decision-making process within economic organizations”
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wrote Administrative Behavior. In this book he studies human decision mak-
ing in an organizational environment. He argues that the organization 
influences decision making through authority, communication, efficiency 
and organizational loyalty. Organizational goals he affirms cannot be ob-
tained only through authority based upon contractual agreements. To 
understand the organizational process, we need to focus in the sociology 
and the psychology of the organizations. Organizational decisions imply 
nor only scientific and technical knowledge, but also ethical stands. He is 
already critical of the Thomistic refinement, that implies the rationality 
assumed by economists, which he argues has “little discernible relation 
to the actual or possible behavior of flesh-and-blood human beings”55. 
For him rationality is bounded by man´s limited cognitive capabilities. 
Emotion helps reason in its task but occasionally it may lead us to ignore 
important matters. For him, individuals in isolation cannot achieve any 
high degree of rationality; because, there are many alternatives and end-
less information to be gathered to be able to evaluate them. The future is 
not known and can only be imagined. Man purposive behavior is docile, 
which means is characterized by stage of exploration and inquiry fol-
low by one of adaptation. Memory and habit withdraw from conscious 
thought in repetitive situations. Attention and behavior tend to persist in 
the initial direction for a considerable interval of time. Organizations are 
fundamental to the achievement of human rationality in a broad sense. 
The function of social organizations is to permit stable expectations and 
provide intermediate objectives that stimulate action. 
Human rationality gets its higher goals and integrations from the 
institutional setting in which it operates. “Human choice is often more 
nearly a stimulus-response pattern than a choice among alternatives. 
Human rationality operates, then, within the limits of a psychological 
environment”56. For him the meaning of organizations is to regulate the 
behavior of individuals through appropriate stimulus patterns. The ad-
ministrator does not maximize he just look for a “good enough course 
of action”. Administrative theory is about bounded rationality, its cen-
tral concern is the boundary between the rational and the non-rational 
aspects of human social behavior. Managers need analytical tools, in-
tuition and judgment; to be able to respond to situations rapidly. The 
formal system of authority does not include the informal system, nor the 
propositions about the psychology of the person who is behaving. There 
55 p. 87
56 p. 117
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are formal and informal channels of communication. The revolution in 
information technology, he argues, will provide more tools for efficient 
organizations. Measuring efficiency, however, is difficult. It is key that 
the organized society obtains the individual´s identification: identification 
is the process by which the individual substitutes social values for his per-
sonal motives. Organizational loyalties can be very strong, independently 
of the personal benefits related to those loyalties. 
In 1983 Simon writes Reason in Human Affairs, in this book he explores 
the limits of reason in human affairs. He argues that reason is instrumen-
tal but does not define the goals to be achieved, which depend upon a set 
of values and emotions. Given the goals and the facts of reality, reason at 
best can tell us how to get there. He discusses subjective expected utility 
theory, SEU. And he argues that it is a crude abstraction that may or may 
not provide satisfactory solutions to specific real world problems. But 
he mention that, in the laboratory in real games - as in real life -  actual 
behavior departs from SEU mainly because human beings have neither 
the facts nor the consistent structure of values nor the reasoning power at 
their disposal that would be required…”57. Choices are necessarily made 
according to a behavioral model of bounded rationality, which requires 
three conditions:  1) Focusing our attention – a role played by emotions; 
2) Generate alternatives – a process explain by cognitive psychology and 
artificial intelligence; and 3) Acquire facts. Behavioral choices do not opti-
mize. Intuition follows the behavioral model but “exploits the knowledge 
we have gained through our past searches”58. 
The behavioral model explains how organisms, including man, pos-
sessing limited computational abilities, make adaptive survival choices. 
Simon explores the process of evolution and he argues that selfish com-
petition maximizing survival in a local niche is an inadequate view of the 
evolutionary process. There are many niches in an ever changing world 
and maximization and selfishness are only a partial view of what occurs, 
survival requires a non maximizing process that diversifies species for 
their survival across many niches - nor only actual ones but potential 
ones - evolution cannot foresee the changes in the material world but 
diversifies to increase survival. Moreover, he argues altruism understood 
as enlightened selfishness increases fitness and the possibility of survival 
– that is why evolution in many cases requires that the individual devel-
ops in a group context. Therefore, evolution he argues is more compat-
57 p. 17
58 P. 29
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ible with the behavioral model of human decision making than with the 
rational model. There is not one unique optimal equilibrium but many 
suboptimal ones. Individual decisions happen within a social context. 
Markets play a very important role in contemporary societies, but they 
do not operate in a social vacuum. Markets operate in an institutional en-
vironment that among other things control negative externalities and pro-
mote public goods. But institutions go much beyond that – they provide 
individuals with a reliable and perceivable pattern of events. However, 
institutions themselves also operate within bounded rationality. 
In particular, there is not magical formula to compute social conflict-
ing goals. Institutions, given the cognitive limitations of its members, are 
surrounded, like individuals, by uncertainty. Nevertheless, some Institu-
tional Arrangements are better than others to respond rationally to prob-
lems of social choice. Markets are particularly efficient to sum up great 
amounts of information in the price and allow “human beings having 
limited informational and computational capacity to operate more or less 
intelligently”59. But markets are not independent, they can only be used 
in conjunction with other methods of social control and decision making 
– like the judicial system, the social information, and the political system. 
Scientific knowledge is important but it will not solve by itself critical 
social problems like war and peace, energy and environment or even 
which is the most adequate economic model. Information and knowledge 
is lacking and philosophical principles are relevant. Since pure altruism 
is not evolutionarily possible, as a first approximation we may assume 
that people will act from self interest. “Hence a major task of any society 
is to create a social environment in which self interest has reason to be 
enlightened”60. Reason cannot select our final goals and there are not 
definitive solutions. A less ambitious goal is to enlighten self interest to 
broaden human horizons to understand that a viable self interest needs to 
look “to our living in a harmonious way with our total environment”61. 
Comment
Simon´s contributions are very relevant, and they filled the vacuum left 
by the traditional economic theory of the firm. That is why, in 1978 he 
59 p. 89
60 p. 105
61 p. 107
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receives the Nobel Prize in economics. Simons work was path break-
ing and opened the way for further research integrating psychology and 
economics. He did show that for some concrete relevant social-economic 
problems like organizational behavior, the abstraction of a rational economic 
man was at best insufficient; and, that these problems can be better un-
derstood by a behavioral approach to decision making. Simon´s success 
however, does not prove that the rational economic man, both in his strong 
and his soft versions, is not a useful abstraction for other economic prob-
lems distinct from organizational behavior. In fact, in chapter four we 
will show that the integration of economics with evolutionary approaches 
actually explains why the abstraction of a rational economic man is useful. 
Moreover, we will argue that the decision making process of humans is not 
fully described by Behavioral Economics. And that while the integration 
of economics with other disciplines is very welcome, we need to look 
beyond Behavioral Economics to understand how such an integration 
should be done. 
In Simon´s thinking we already observe one of the limitations of the 
Behavioral Economics´ approach. The discussion should not be about the 
true nature of man but, as to what is the abstraction that makes more sense to solve 
particular economic problems. As we saw none of the classical economists ever 
thought that the true nature of man is full rationality. Markets are not 
natural. Smith´s was an institutional analysis, comparing the Institutional 
Arrangement of England with Spain and Portugal. Free markets and in-
dividual economic freedom were much better developed in England and 
in this institutional feature Smith found the explanation for the capitalistic 
economic growth. The free economic man is not a characteristic of human 
nature, it is an institutional social design. 
The rational economic man in its strong version was an attempt to ex-
plain market economic exchanges through mathematical models, and 
to a large extent was very successful. However, as we had seen, the 
contemporary Neoclassical School could not prove that markets maxi-
mize social welfare. A result that clearly indicates the indissoluble link 
between the markets and the rest of the Institutional Arrangement of 
society. Therefore, the real questions are not necessarily What is the 
nature of man? or Whether we are humans or econs? The questions are 
Why and when are markets necessary? What are the required institu-
tional conditions for they to operate well? What are their limitations? 
and for which economic problems the abstraction of humans operate 
better than the abstraction of econs? 
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There is no question that evolution relates to our human condition, 
and that to understand it requires a broader frame of analysis of man 
than the one that can be provided by the abstraction of econs. But the rea-
son to introduce the abstraction of the econs was not to explain our human 
evolutionary traits, but only to understand economic problems related 
to market behavior. Economics, even in the strong version of the rational 
economic man, is not about the study of human nature; it is the analysis of a 
given human institution and its consequences – economic markets. 
The Second Reason: The Psychological Background
Behavioral Economics has reproduced in the laboratory for economic deci-
sions results that were previously well known in cognitive-behavioral and social 
psychology. In these disciplines it has been shown, since many decades ago, 
that individual decisions are consequence of external stimuli on which the 
social group plays a predominant role. One of the first relevant studies 
was The Robbers Cave experiment, which showed how students became 
influenced by the in-group to which they belong in the experiment, to the 
point of becoming extremely aggressive with other students consider the 
out-group; the aggression was due to competition between the two groups 
for resources in a camping area. Another study was the very well known 
Stanford Prison Experiment, which reproduced the conditions of a jail, 
with students playing both the role of policeman and of prisoners, the stu-
dents playing the policeman role became very abusive and authoritarian 
and the prisoners became submissive. Both experiments had to be stop 
before their initially planned conclusion, because the high and unmanage-
able level of aggression among participants. There is no question that we 
are social beings and that we are influenced by others. 
It also has been shown again and again that emotions play a key part 
in any decision process of a human being. Emotions are an evolutionary 
mechanism of survival that help us discriminate which are the relevant 
cues in the environment. Reason in this sense is bounded as Simon ar-
gued, it is constrained to the information of the environment selected 
mainly emotionally. In chapter four, we will explore more the recent 
advances in contemporary psychology. In the meantime, let us say that 
psychology has left crystal clear that the human decision process is not a 
rational one as assumed by contemporary Neoclassical Economics. How-
ever, as we had been arguing that does not mean that the abstraction of 
the economic man is not useful.
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The Third Reason: Join Economics – Business University Departments 
The failure of economics to prove that markets optimize social welfare, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, opened the door for new routes of eco-
nomic thinking. As economists became more and more open to external 
ideas, and as more and more US universities, and elsewhere, integrated 
economic and business departments, the influence of business organiza-
tional thinking in economics grew – and psychology had its way in. 
The Fourth Reason: Empirical Possibilities
While Simon thinking in organizational behavior had been highly influ-
ential, it was not until economists started using laboratories for empirical 
analysis62 and game theory became successful, that the conditions were 
established for the empirical verification of Behavioral Economics. Main-
ly through the contributions of Kahneman, Tversky and Thaler.
The Fifth Reason: The 2008 Crisis and Behavioral Macroeconomics
The findings in the laboratory, as we will see, had as a consequence 
new solutions in some traditional microeconomic problems. Behavioral 
macroeconomics, however, did not start as a result of such laboratory 
findings. It was mainly the consequence of the 2008 crisis. We will argue 
that the findings in behavioral macroeconomics are not as sustainable as 
the microeconomic ones.
the psychological roots
The social behavior of others influences individual behavior. Energy 
consumers, when provided information, adjust their consumption to the 
social reference of friends and neighbors. We tend to imitate, herd, and 
follow the crowd. In general, we prefer a crowded restaurant. Herding 
implies using collective information, which often is more accurate. Herd-
ing allows to quickly decide what to do. But there are many other heuris-
tic - quick – rules to decide. Behavioral Economics identifies three main 
62 Vernon Smith won in 2002 the Nobel Prize in economics “for having established labora-
tory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alterna-
tive market mechanisms”.
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types of heuristics: anchoring, availability and representativeness.
A good presentation of the psychological roots in empirical Behav-
ioral Economics is found in Kahneman´s Thinking Fast and Slow published 
in 2011. Kahneman starts the book by differentiating between two psy-
chological systems in human beings. System 1 is related to automatic 
operations and system 2 to construct thoughts in an orderly series of 
steps. System two has to overcome the intuitions and impulses of system 
1, and therefore requires self control. However, “the thoughts and ac-
tions that system 2 believes it has chosen are often guided by the figure at 
the center of the story, system 1”63. Children that show more self control 
in an experiment had higher scores in tests of intelligence and were less 
likely to consume drugs as young adults. The priming effect is one of the 
consequences of system 1. For example, voting to increase school funding 
was significantly higher when the polling station was in a school versus in 
another nearby location. People answers are sensitive to quality of print-
ing, quality of paper, color, language used and so on. Repetition and a 
likable presentation produce a priming effect because it is an evolutionary 
trait of survival. 
Cognitive ease and familiarity are required for survival. “Cognitive 
ease is both a cause and a consequence of pleasant feeling”64. In a good 
mood system 1 operates, in a bad mood the control of system 2 over 
performance increases. System 1 produces illusion that may be visual, re-
lated to memory or cognitive. “The main function of system 1 is to main-
tain and update a model of your personal world, which represents what 
is normal in it”65. System 1 is an agent with certain traits and preferences 
which represents reality by associations of complex patterns of links, it is 
a machine that jump to conclusions. Associative memory contributes to a 
general confirmation bias and to exaggerated emotional coherence of the 
story, the quality of the data used to build the story is largely irrelevant. 
System 1 often jumps the gun. Kahneman uses the following example. 
“Will Mindik be a good leader? She is intelligent and strong…. The quick 
answer that comes to mind is yes. But in fact there is not enough informa-
tion, the next words could have been that she is cruel and corrupt. 
Basic continuous assessments are needed for survival and this is the 
task that evolution has given to system 1. “The normal state of your 
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mind is that you have intuitive feelings and opinions about almost every-
thing that come your way”66. Therefore, we are evolutionarily prepared 
to give heuristic answers i.e. adequate and often imperfect quick answers. 
When emotions are high system 1 may prevail more often. There is a 
bias of confidence over doubt; and small numbers are taken as represen-
tative even if they are statistically insignificant. System 1 is the main rea-
son of why the decision making is not rational. Kahneman then goes on 
to show some of the effects that are produced by system 1. Experts show 
the same or even more heuristic biases than normal people, see Gilovich 
et.al. 2002, Kahneman 2003 and Tetlock 1999 and 2006. 
Anchoring Effect 
We use any anchor as a reference for our judgment. Kahneman among 
many other examples provide the following: German judges with an av-
erage of more than fifteen years of experience were ask to rolled a pair 
of loaded dice that always show 3 or 9. Soon afterwards they were asked 
whether they would sentence a woman to less or more months than the 
number showed in the dice. And finally were asked to specify the sen-
tence they would give. On average the sentence given by the judges that 
had rolled 9 was 8 months, and was only 5 months for the ones that had 
rolled 3. The ratio of the two differences (9-8)/(5-3) is 50%, a typical an-
chor ratio found in many experiment 
Availability Heuristic
Norbert Schwarz and his colleagues observed that the task of listing in-
stances may enhance the judgment of the trait by three distinct routes: 
1) the number of instances retrieved; 2) the ease with which they come 
to mind; 3) the focus with content. In general:  the more instances re-
trieved is a positive reinforcement. However, the less easy is to retrieve 
them is a negative reinforcement. Therefore, as the number of retrieves 
increases substantially it is more difficult to retrieve the experiences and 
the negative reinforcement dominates. For example, if a professor asks 
the students to recall many instances in which his class has not been very 
good he will end up with a positive evaluation of his class; because as it 
becomes more and more difficult to retrieve the negative aspects, stu-
dents would become convinced that they are not sure anymore of such 
66 p. 97
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negative aspects. Following this logic, people believe they use bicycles 
less often when they recall many rather than few instances and are less 
impressed by a car after listing many of its advantages. Route 1) and 2) 
are due to system 1, however when system 2 enters because the content 
is highly relevant the logic is reverse. Students whose family never had 
a hard attack followed the logic impose by system 1. But, for those with 
family history of hard attacks, as the number of instances in which they 
were having save conduct – protecting them from a hard attack - in-
creased significantly and it became more difficult to recall the instances 
- the lack of easiness did not play its normal negative reinforcement role. 
These students felt safer with more instances no matter how difficult was 
to recall them. 
It is very important then, to understand in which cases the ease of 
retrieval dominates the content – i.e. system 1 dominates system 2, this 
happens when people: a) are engaged in another effortful task; b) are in a 
good mood; c) score low in a depression scale; d) they are novice in the 
topic of the task in contrast to true experts; e) score high on scale of faith 
on intuition and f) they feel powerful.
Availability shapes the way we perceive reality. After an earthquake 
people buys more insurance and protective measures are taken by the 
government and individuals related to the dimensions of the last disaster. 
Slovic, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff showed that people image of causes of 
death is shaped by media information and contradicts statistical facts. For 
example: death by diseases is 18 times more likely than accidental death, 
but people thinks they are equally likely. Strokes cause twice as many 
deaths as accidents, but people think accidental deaths are more likely.
Representativeness
Judging probability by representativeness, following the intuitions of sys-
tem 1, has many virtues because it allows us to quickly discriminate the 
environment; but in other instances, produce wrong inferences that bla-
tantly contradict probability theory. Personal beliefs are guided by per-
sonal experience and are difficult to modify just with information.  System 
1 jumps to causal explanations that may be unjustified. Kahneman puts the 
example of the following statement: “Depressed children treated with an 
energy drink improve significantly over a three-month period”; system 1 
jumps then to the conclusion that energy drinks reduce depression, which 
is wrong - the fact is that depressed children improve by themselves, no 
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matter what they do, they regress to the mean. System 2 however, can be 
trained to distinguish cases like this and come up with the right conclusion; 
example, using a control group not drinking the energy drink would show 
that the drink is not the cause of the reduced depression. 
System 1 builds good coherent stories, which however may turn to 
be no right. Hindsight bias however underestimates how much we were 
wrong in the past, and make us believe that we do know something about 
the future – there is a demand for illusory certainty. That is why “high 
subjective evidence is not to be trusted as an indicator of accuracy”67. In 
general, “organizations may be better able to tame optimism”68.
Frames
Due to system 1 people decides differently depending how a question or 
a sentence is framed. Example: Physicians were asked upon whether or 
not use surgery for lung cancer, knowing that long term survival rates are 
better that radiation but short term mortality rates are higher with sur-
gery. When short term mortality rates with surgery were frame as “The 
one-month survival rate is 90%” 84% of physicians choose it, when it was 
frame as “There is 10% mortality in the first months” only 50% choose 
it. When people is exposed to several rounds of the framed information 
some of them become rational and are less influenced by the frame, but 
others continue to be highly influenced. Framing is relevant in real life, 
for example if people is asked to check a box only if they do not want to 
donate organs there are many donators, if people is asked to check a box 
only if they want to donate organs there are few donators. 
Memory
Memory is psychologically distorted. Many studies show that, due to 
system 1, we remember the most intense moment – the peak – of a bio-
logical episode of pain or pleasure but not its duration. In fact, we tend 
to remember our lives and to judge other people lives by critical peak 
moments. In an experiment Ed Diener found, that people judges other 
people life happiness not by how long they lived but by the peak mo-
ments in their lives. Our lives are nothing else than psychological stories. 
Therefore, there cannot be consistent rational preferences through time.
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Regret
Due to system 1 people take decisions to avoid regret. 
Prospect theory 
Prospect theory was developed by Kahneman and Tversky as a descrip-
tive theory capable to take into account the systematic violations of the 
axioms of rationality in choices between gambles. This theory has three 
main differences with utility theory: 1) It has a reference point which is 
relevant for the decision; 2) it takes into account loss aversion; 3) prob-
abilities and decision weights are psychological 
Reference Dependence
Utility from outcomes is relative to some reference outcome. The domain 
of gains is defined when the outcome obtained is equal or greater than the 
reference; the domain of losses when it is less. 
Loss Aversion
We are driven more strongly to avoid looses than to achieve gains. “…
it is the gravitational force that holds our life together near the reference 
point”69. Where both gains and looses are possible loss aversion causes 
extremely risk-averse choices. When only gains are possible people pre-
fers smaller certain gains than higher probable gains. When a loss cannot 
be avoided people prefer a probable higher loss rather than a certain 
smaller loss. Thus, interestingly enough people is risk averse both when 
only gains are possible and when both gains and looses are possible, 
but they become risk seeking when only looses are possible. In all cases 
people tries to preserve as close as possible to the status quo; a behavior 
trait which is an evolutionary heritage. “Animals, including people fight 
harder to prevent looses than to achieve gains. In the world of territorial 
animals, this principle explains the success of defenders”70. Most human 
laws are asymmetric; they restore looses but do not compensate for fore-
gone gains. In Misbehaving, Thaler would argue that prospect theory and 
loss aversion explain the endowment effect- the fact that people “value 
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things that were already part of their endowment more highly than things 
that could be part of their endowment, that were available but not yet 
owned”71. Prospect Theory gives rise to the fourfold pattern-see below.
Psychological Probability - Rare Events
In utility theory probabilities and decision weights are always the same; 
in prospect theory decision weights are defined psychologically. An un-
believable example that Kahneman puts is that in a game in which red 
marbles win a prize, 30 to 40% of students select an urn with 8 red mar-
bles in 100 versus another with 1 marble in 10 which has a higher prob-
ability of success. Concurrent decisions probabilities are most often not 
calculated. And reversals occur when people decide upon a join scenario 
versus the two parts of the scenario isolated. Example, if you are offered 
a choice between the following two bets: 1) 11/36 to win $160, 25/36 to 
lose $15 versus 2) 35/36 to win $40, 1/36 to lose $10; safety dominates 
and most people chooses 2). But if you ask people to own the bet and to 
tell you How much will they sell it for? It turns out that the selling price is 
higher for bet 1) than for bet 2). A reversal has occurred – a result which 
is clearly incongruent. In both cases choices are influenced by system 1. 
When consider together bet 2) dominates for safety, when they are sepa-
rated and a price is asked to sell them bet 1) dominates for the high $160 
number. The fact is however, that bet 2) has almost the same probability 
payout than bet 1). Therefore, people do not decide base upon prob-
abilities, but base upon psychological decisions weights. Lichtenstein and 
Slovic 1971 showed that Preference reversals hold for experience players 
(see Tversky and Thaler 1990).
Low probabilities are subjectively over-weighted, while high prob-
abilities are subjectively under-weighted. Rare events if relevant are over-
weighted and if irrelevant are neglected.
The Fourfold Pattern
1) High probability gain – certainty effect - risk averse – fear of disap-
pointment – accept unfavorable settlement – this is utility theory; 2) Low 
probability gain – possibility effect - risk seeking – hope of large gain – re-
ject unfavorable settlement – explains why people buys a lottery ticket; 3) 
High probability loss - certainty effect – risk seeking – hope to avoid loss 
71 P. 18
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- reject unfavorable settlement – explains desperate gambling in a casino; 
4) Low probability loss - possibility effect – risk averse – fear of large loss 
– accept unfavorable settlement – explains why people buy insurance.
Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity
In traditional economics risk is given by the objective probability distri-
bution over a set of possible outcomes related to the economic decision. 
Under uncertainty no objective probabilities can be identified which can 
be universally agreed upon. Therefore, probabilities are obtained by a 
Bayesian approach. Once Bayesian probabilities are obtained uncertainty 
problems are resolved as if they were risk problems. Under ambiguity 
there is not enough information to form Bayesian probabilities, but any-
way the modern ambiguity aversion literature requires decision makers 
to form an immediate probability assessment of an event by recursive 
and other methods. Ambiguity can be seen as source-dependent uncer-
tainty. Many of the ambiguity models in traditional economics do reduce 
themselves to a risk problem as to the way they are solved. Ambiguity 
aversion has been shown to be related to fears of negative evaluation of 
others and to one´s competence in the problem, see Curley et al.,1986; 
and Trautmann et al. 2008. In the three cases – risk, uncertainty and 
ambiguity - probability weighting is linear - and the attitude towards risk 
is captured by the shape of the utility function. In portfolio theory, for 
example, it has been empirically found that most investors are risk averse 
because they diversify between bonds and cash which means that their 
utility function is concave. 
In Behavioral Economics decision weights are not equal to objective 
probabilities, they are psychological and therefore subjective – the de-
cision maker´s own perception of the objective probabilities – therefore 
there is a non-linear probability weighting. In traditional economics the 
carriers of utility are the final levels of wealth and there is no distinction 
between gains and looses, in Behavioral Economics the carriers of wealth 
are deviations of actual wealth and therefore utility differs in the domain 
of gains and losses. In prospect theory there is concavity of utility in 
gains and convexity in losses. As for ambiguity, Behavioral Economics 
recognizes that they may be value in waiting for additional information. 
In behavioral Support Theory due to Tversky and his collaborators, 
the support for one hypothesis over another depends on how they are 
framed and how events are subdivided.   
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Sociality, Inequity Preferences and Altruism
Empirical results are often obtained in Behavioral Economics in the labo-
ratory using game theory as a reference, the main result found is that 
members of a society nor only compete, they cooperate. The most repli-
cated game is the Ultimatum Game. In its simplest form player A is given 
a sum of $ 100 – and can offer any amount he wishes to player B. If B 
rejects the offer. Player A has to return the $ 100 and neither player gets 
anything. The result is that the offer is often very generous and that 
even offers as high as $ 40 or slightly more are rejected Why? If B was 
purely rational $1 is better than nothing and he should accept it. And 
player A knowing this should offer just $1 Why It does not happen this 
way? Because B does not want to be treated unfairly. Trust, reciprocity 
and inequity aversion play a role in economic decisions. In public goods 
games experiments people are generous. People go as far as paying to 
punish uncooperative players. In the dictator game in which the player 
A is a dictator that can give whatever he pleases and keep the rest, sur-
prisingly enough 74% divide the money equally and in the punishment 
stage 81% choose to share $10 with a fair allocator in instead of $12 with 
an unfair one. In public good games the standard traditional economic 
prediction that no one will cooperate turns out to be wrong; on average 
people will cooperate half their stake to the public good. Cooperation can 
be maintained even in repeated games if players are given the opportu-
nity to punish those who will not cooperate. Cooperation, trust, inequity 
preferences, punishment of antisocial behavior even at one´s own cost and 
altruism are social behaviors that contradict the neoclassical predictions 
of selfishness individual optimization.
The model of self-regarding preferences explains properly the behav-
ior of competitive experimental market subjects, see Roth et al., 1991. In-
dividuals exhibit self- regarding preferences in anonymous, large group, 
market situations but exhibit other- regarding preferences in small groups 
or in bilateral interactions, see Fehr and Schmidt 1999 model. 
In models of other-regarding preferences individuals also care about 
other payoffs in a reference group. Preferences may be model as inter-
dependent – that is actions being reciprocal to other´s actions whether 
they are selfish or altruistic; they can be model as independent of others 
actions; or may be hybrid. The models could also include some form of 
social maximization that the individual pretends, such as the utility of the 
poorest members of society. 
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Direct democracy voting has been shown to be better explained when 
social preferences are included, 2/3 of subjects prefer a policy that pro-
motes equity and only 1/3 prefers a policy that promotes efficiency, see 
Bolton and Ockenfels 2006.
Income, Happiness, Adaptation and Time
It has been shown through happiness studies all over the world that income 
has a satiation level beyond which more income does not translate into more 
well being. Happiness is a psychological dimension related to the experience 
of spending time with people you love and who love you. There is no way 
to dissociate utility from the whole psychological experience of living, which 
is very complex and it is not steady along time. Adaptation happens to new 
circumstances in life and preferences change. Paraplegics are not always in 
a bad mood, they adapt. In many choices time is neglected, “causing experi-
ences that will retain their attention value in the long term to be appreciated 
less than they deserve to be”72. Time is a psychological dimension.
Kahneman concludes that humans are not irrational, but are not well 
describe by the rational model which imposes a coherence of choices 
across time which “demands adherence to rules of logic that a finite mind 
is not able to implement”73. Humans often need help to make more ac-
curate judgments and better decisions, and in some cases policies and 
institutions can provide that help”74. For Kahneman, “the assumption 
that agents are rational provides the intellectual foundation for the lib-
ertarian approach to public policy; do not interfere with the individuals 
right to choose, unless the choice harm others75”. But freedom has a cost 
when decisions are made unaware or uniformed. Humans in opposition to 
econs need help in their decisions. System 1 is necessary for survival and 
quite useful for decision making, but heuristic responses may be wrong 
sometimes and may require the assistance of an inform system 2. “Or-
ganizations are better than individuals when it comes to avoiding errors, 
because they naturally think more slowly and have the power to impose 
orderly procedures. ”76.
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Morality and Social Identity
Traditional economics has seen morality as the consequence of maxi-
mizing one´s own self interest. In an experiment Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi 2013 showed that even though it was beneficial to lie only 22% of 
the subjects did lie as much as they could, 38% did lie but less than their 
own personal interest indicated and 40% remain fully honest going again 
their own self interest. Gibson et al., 2013 showed that the extent of lying 
is sensitive to the incentive to lie. Vanberg 2008 shows that people has a 
preference for keeping their promises.  
Individuals identify themselves with social categories, and each so-
cial category is governed by a norm that specifies the behavior that a 
member must follow, see Akerlof and Kranton 2005; and there is more 
favorable behavior for in-group members, see Tajfel and Turner 1986 and 
Mcdermott 2009. Priming subjects to induce group identities can explain 
in experiments the choices of subjects, see Benjamin et al., 2010. Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2000, 2005, 2008, have shown that might be optimal for 
organizations to alter their member’s identity, so that they become insid-
ers who internalize the mission and objectives of the organization.
Pay-for-performance incentives can only be applied to observable and 
verifiable outcomes, and may have the consequence of employees´ dimin-
ished effort in unobservable and unverifiable ones. Extrinsic motivation 
related to external material incentives may not work well in many situ-
ations. In gift exchange games, negative or positive extrinsic incentives 
may reduce the effort level; Titmuss 1971 argues that blood donation is 
higher when no extrinsic incentives are used. 
Akerlof and Kranton (2010) argue that identity economics “yields a 
theory of decision making where social context matters”77. It describes 
how people´s identity notion as to who they are - associated with beliefs 
about how they and others are supposed to behave – “ play important 
roles in how economies work”78. People care about being fair and being 
treated fairly as laboratory experiments have shown. –But in the real 
world, individuals´ conceptions of fairness depend on the social context–79. 
Identity implies identity itself, norms and social categories. There is an in-
terplay of tastes and norms. Identity economics: first, associates individu-
als with particular social categories; second, specify the prevailing norms 
77 p. 6
78 p. 4
79 p. 10
2) humans in behavioral economics: the psychological roots 81
of such social categories; third, posit individual gains and losses – given 
identities and norms; and fourth, applies standard economic analysis to 
describe the decisions. A firm works well when employees identify with 
it, good schools transform students´ identities and norms. People often do 
have some choice as to their identity – choosing a school or a job and so 
on. – Choice of identity, then, may be the most important economic decision 
that a person ever makes”80. Norms and boundaries of race, ethnicity and 
class limit what people can be. Identity sets limits which “are the most 
important determinant of economic position and well being”81.
The crucial role of identity, they argue, has long been established in 
social psychology from the Robbers Cave experiment in 1954, previous-
ly mentioned, to Tajfel and others lab experiments. Chen and Li (2009) 
have shown that even when monetary costs are involved people gave 
more to in-group members, rewarded in-group members more and punish 
out-group members more. In social psychology it has been shown that 
priming - i.e. reminding – people of their racial, gender or ethnic identities 
change their behavior. Hoff and Priyanka (2004) have shown that even 
when monetary incentives are involved priming works. In a trust game, 
at Harvard, it was shown that how much money is giving back to the 
sender is influenced by race or nationality. It has also been shown that 
gender changes behavior in public good games. 
Identity economics follows Gary Becker´s tradition of broadening eco-
nomics to include non-economic motives, but instead of focusing in how 
prices and income affect behavior it focuses in how the social context 
define preferences –tastes- that influence behavior. 
Becker and others included non-economic motives in the utility func-
tion mainly to study the effect of market behavior and monetary incen-
tives in individual behavior. For example, Becker argued that a competi-
tive market would eliminate discrimination, because firms that hire the 
most efficient worker will outperform and eliminate from the market the 
firms that choose workers based in discrimination. Following this logic, 
it can be shown that the costs and benefits of having children will affect 
fertility rates, and that a marriage tax will affect marriage rates. Becker´s 
(and followers) research focus in how prices and income affect behavior. 
In identity economics people internalize norms and adhere to them 
because they want to do so. “…people desire confirmation of their be-
liefs. When actors with such utility functions interact, groups, norms, and 
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identities emerge”82. Firms invest in making workers insiders rather than 
outsiders; discipline in the Air Force aims to alter airmen´s state of mind. 
In both cases the idea is to change the individuals´ preferences. In work 
groups, it was found that productivity varies less in cohesive groups. 
Worker identification is perhaps the dominant factor in the success of an 
organization. And – loyalty to one´s buddies is part and parcel of all ac-
counts of military life– 83. Norms, roles and traditions do count “Women, 
even when they work more hours outside the home and supply the ma-
jority of the income, do more of the housework”84. 
The economics of discrimination is a good place to appreciate identity 
economics´ contributions. In Becker´s theory of taste based discrimination, 
white employees and white workers dislike black workers. In Arrow´s 
theory of statistical discrimination, whites discriminate against blacks not 
because of social distance, but because they believe they have on average 
low skills, which ends up being a self fulfilling prophecy. Both theories 
can explain overt discrimination which still exists, and both will argue 
that the market will reduce it, which has happened. But other facts can-
not be explained by such theories, such as: the high incarceration rates of 
African Americans, when it is a fact that crime does not pay in economic 
terms; the lower employment rates in African Americans versus other 
minorities; the fact that there is a huge divergence of outcomes among 
African Americans; a rise in single parent families; incarceration rates and 
non employment happens at the same time that the fraction of African 
Americans with middle income is increasing; the rate of return of skill-
acquisition is higher for African Americans than for whites, but they have 
higher levels of drop outs. 
The choice of an African American is whether to play the role of an 
insider, working with whites and loose identity utility for betraying the 
African American community values, and suffer the lack of acceptance of 
whites; or, play the role of an outsider to the white culture, gaining iden-
tity utility for maintaining the African American values. This explains 
why some chose to integrate – be an insider - and some to oppose the 
white system – be an outsider. Policies will not be very successful unless 
they change the identity paradigm through one of the following routes: 
1) Eliminate the distinction between white and blacks in the insider ideal; 
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2) Change what it means to be black, so that choosing to be an insider in 
the white world is not longer judge as betrayal of the African American 
values; 3) Change what it means to be black, so that choose to be an out-
sider is not longer viewed as a behavior to emulate. 
Identity impacts behavior and explains choices that yield no economic 
benefit – which can be nor only costly, but uncomfortable and even in-
jurious. It can explain us for example: why many public goods are pro-
vided voluntarily – people do not always free ride even when they have 
the opportunity; why voters nor only vote for their narrow economic 
interests, but also taking into account norms and ideals. Identity clearly 
influence choices. But, to some extent people can also often chose their 
identity, examples: choosing whether to become a mom that stays home, 
or pursue a professional career; choosing which school to attend; choos-
ing how much to integrate, being a migrant        
Comment 
Through many examples and experiments Kahneman carefully and pa-
tiently shows that the strong notion of a rational man, with consistent 
preferences through time, cannot be sustained given the psychological 
knowledge that we have of human beings. The psychological dimension 
of the human mind is a reality that cannot be denied. As we will insist in 
chapter four, imagination and reality are to a large extent psychologically 
identical, because after all reality for us is nothing else than images store 
in our minds. 
The delicate balance between psychological well being and our ca-
pacity to reason properly is something which Kahneman does not fully 
explore, but it is a fact that under emotional distress our reason – system 
2 – does not operate well85. 
Kahneman´s system 1 is due to our evolutionary heritage. The evo-
lutionary reason for system 1 to exist is: that it is very helpful in a rapid 
changing uncertain environment; in which, survival requires rapid re-
sponses to threat signals, time of response is more critical than accuracy. 
The psychological dimensions of the human mind are required for sur-
vival. To survive in an uncertain risky external world, human beings 
seek refugee in an imaginary psychological world that allows quick re-
sponses, reduces stress and permits flexibility in responses through creat-
ing alternative imaginary scenarios. 
85 Obregón 2013a.
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When the world is uncertain, the status quo gained through thou-
sands of years of adaptation is highly valued. People in this situation is 
uncertainty averse, but this aversion cannot be described in a probability 
sense, like for example choosing a lower variance of returns. Uncertainty 
aversion is just fear as to the unknown, in a world of existence which has 
proven to be a risky. In such a world: what we have is more relevant than 
what we can obtain (the endowment effect); we make inferences from 
the small available information around us (versus statistically consider-
ations); we respond emotionally (because emotions are the consequence 
of thousands of years of successful adaptation); we follow the herd, be-
cause survival requires belonging to the group and because group be-
havior happens according to an evolutionary accumulated knowledge. 
The best guess is that the group is correct. Animals guessing the opposite 
would not survive. We have a selected psychological memory, because 
it helps to reduce the stress of past undesired events and help us to main-
tain optimism which is required for survival. Stress produces cortisol that 
may destroy our cells and neurons. Dopamine and oxytocin in the other 
hand are produced with human interaction with others that we love, and 
they give us an optimistic feeling of life that is required for survival. Oth-
ers are necessary for survival, nor only in an economic or social sense, 
but even in a chemical one. 
Due to evolutionary reasons, we belong to a group; then, it is not 
surprise that the group has a strong influence in our judgments and per-
ceptions. The effects discussed by Kahneman and Tversky have been 
known in psychology since decades ago, and they are consequence of our 
emotional equipment for evolutionary survival. Man belonging to Afri-
can and Asian primitive tribes usually remember small details from their 
environment which are cues used to, for example, find their way back 
home. A western man does not remember such small details, because he 
would find orientation from the positions of the sun or the moon or from 
a compass, if he has one. Evolutionarily, we are made to pay attention to 
small things and to be influenced by them, because they provide infor-
mation; a small movement in a plant may uncover a dangerous animal. 
Anchoring, availability, representativeness, loss aversion, a psychological 
selected memory and being influenced by frames are evolutionary sur-
vival emotional traits which do not contradict reason; but, instead help 
it to achieve better survival decisions. All these psychological traits do 
not mean that that we are irrational humans; emotions and reason are just 
parts of one integrated brain, they cannot be separated.
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The fact that the superior survival answer in an uncertain world is 
given by our psychological characteristics, does not mean that we are 
irrational/or non rational. The brain is only one, and works together, 
and involves both our emotions and our reason. In normal psychological 
conditions reason –system 2 - is an important complement of our emo-
tions, and it is also a surviving evolutionary feature of the more complex 
social animal that human beings are. Our superior capacity for reasoning 
is due to a more sophisticated language consequence of a more intense 
social life in larger groups (see chapter four). Reason is not disassoci-
ated from emotions; it is a complement of them. The brain is only one 
and we are evolutionarily built to use all of it. However, reason form an 
evolutionary point of view is not the same as economic rationality. The 
rational economic man is an abstraction which is useful for some specific 
economic problems; but, as we have been insisting, it is not a description 
of human nature.
Soft rationality: As we have mentioned in the last chapter, there are 
diverse abstractions of the economic man; and nor all of them require 
the strong version of the rational economic man, proposed by the con-
temporary Neoclassical School. We can forget about the assumption of 
consistent preferences across time just by recognizing that there is future 
uncertainty in the Keynes-Knight sense. Economic agents do not need 
to specify their whole future preferences to transact today. In fact, even 
quick emotional buys send market signals. For example, fast moving con-
sumer goods bought by impulse do provide a market signal. One of the 
virtues of those signals is that they are transmitted as Hirschman argues 
through actions – exit. And, they are transmitted fast and for a large 
number of transactions. There is no question that prices are defined by 
supply and demand. Whatever the elements of demand are, as long as 
they remain somewhat constant, they provide information to the produc-
ers, which is the key of the relevance of the markets both to properly 
allocate resources and to stimulate technological development and eco-
nomic growth. In a soft version – as in Smith´s writings - the abstraction 
of a rational economic man only implies institutionalizing economic indi-
vidual freedom through allowing the markets to work. This soft version is 
compatible both with system 1 and with system 2 behavior. 
Strong rationality. In its strong version – contemporary Neoclassical 
School - it implies coherence and stability of preferences through time 
and several other assumptions, as we saw in the previous chapter. The 
strong version is not compatible with system 1 behavior non-aid by sys-
carlos obregón86
tem 2. In its strong version the rational economic man implies the use 
of reason for sophisticated ranking of preferences, provide coherence to 
the preferences and for a proper analysis of alternatives. But it must be 
pointed that the strong rationality does not refer to an isolated individual, 
but to one that receives proper information and aid from many organiza-
tions and other individuals that are also in the market place. One of the 
main functions of the markets is to inform the individuals and help them 
in their analysis, this in itself is one of the largest business in the contem-
porary market economies.
The fact that, given certain scenarios, we respond emotionally and 
even incorrect do have relevance for some economic and business prob-
lems like organ donation, individually selected saving rates or impulse 
buying; but, its role in generally, in real markets, should not be overem-
phasized. Let us look again some of the examples that we have analyzed: 
1) The Anchoring Effect. The example of the judges: in the real world judges 
have social objective parameters for their sentences –like jurisprudence, 
and enough time to consider and analyze whether they are being just 
compared with other sentences; which does not exclude that certain psy-
chological parameters like sex, race or empathy may be of influence in 
some cases. But, there is clear objective parametrical information avail-
able, time to take the decision and even the opportunity to discuss previ-
ously with other judges or legal assistants. What judges have in the real 
world, and is lacking in the experiment, is group institutional information 
and support. 2) Availability. The fact that those with a history of family 
hearth attacks were not influenced by system 1 (in the example already 
presented above), illustrates very well the point we want to make. Many 
of the factors under which system 1 becomes irrelevant: do happen in real 
markets. Markets are not only composed of individuals, but also of firms 
which only business is to provide information and advice to the custom-
ers. There may be market failures, but markets do have organizations 
which unique business is to help the customers to understand their al-
ternatives and to analyze them properly. Quick emotional buys86, made 
without much thinking, are relevant and they may be explained by Be-
86 One has to be careful with what one means by emotional buys. All buys are emotional 
because human beings are emotional beings, but the fact that they are emotional does not 
mean that reason is not being used. If a customer buys an expensive sport car which he re-
ally does not need, it is an emotional buy, but it is not a mistake due to system 1. Most likely 
system 2 spent quite a bit of time analyzing the decision. And from the point of view of the 
customer´s satisfaction it may be a very good decision. Moreover, the fact that the customer 
analyses many variables beyond only price does not mean that he is irrational.
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havioral Economics87. But even quick emotional buys are not the end of 
the story. Think in a pen or a razor, if there is no quality the brand does 
not last in the market. Gillette or Sheaffer are not brands which prestige 
was made by selling - by surprise - to the customer, appealing to his irra-
tionality. Customers do go home and like or dislike the product, and buy 
or not buy again, and customers do listen to expert’s opinion, whether 
it is in food or in wines or in any other article. 3) Representativeness. Since 
we live in a world in which providing information is also a business, 
quick jumping emotionally to wrong conclusions does not necessarily 
mean that customers will act based on them. Available information in the 
web or consulting experts may convince the customers otherwise. All this 
however, we insist, does not mean that there are not market failures that 
require attention; but, it does mean that individual decisions, especially 
repetitive or unique relevant ones, are seldom made only in emotional 
basis. 4) Loss Aversion and Prospect Theory. They may explain why people do 
not want to sell their houses at a price lower than the one at which they 
have bought, but their intention is not the main determinant of the price 
at which they will actually sell. If there are no buyers at the price at which 
they would wish to offer their property; experts will convince them that 
they have to lower the price, and they will. 5) Frames. Physicians in the 
experiment did respond according to the frame. But in real markets, hos-
pitals and groups of experts carefully analyze the information at their 
disposal before making recommendations. Free information is available 
even for non-experts; look, for example, at the information available in 
the Mayo Clinic Web. Markets are not only made of isolated individuals, 
but also of organizations and firms which business is to provide informa-
tion and analysis of the possible alternatives.       
Therefore, while the rational economic man – in its strong version 
- may be an abstraction that do not correspond to reality due to: psy-
87 It is not very clear how much marketing has learnt from Behavioral Economics. Kotler 
(2016) has argued that Behavioral Economics is just another word for marketing. Market-
ing he argues has for decades analyzed the actual behavior of the customer. This bring us 
to a relevant point, business is the art of creating market failures; the perfect competition 
economic model only works under the assumption that each competitor is trying to outcom-
pete the others. Economics as a theory of the aggregate is a good theory. But, price theory 
as a description of the micro-cosmos that the competition in each product in each market 
represents is a lousy explanation, such competition involves many other variables besides 
price, this vacuum has been felt by marketing for decades which of course has used psy-
chology and sociology for its purposes. One of the reasons Behavioral Economic has been 
more successful in microeconomics than in macroeconomics is precisely because it is closer 
to actual individual behavior, this is its strength, but also its weakness, because it makes 
aggregation awfully difficult if not impossible for some problems. 
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chological influences; informational, educational and knowledge market 
failures; and to uncertainty as to the future. It is also true that the weak 
rational, psychological man, dominated by system 1, is neither a good ab-
straction. Markets have two characteristics which make them not suitable 
to be fully described by the humans of Behavioral Economics. First, many 
transactions are repetitive, customers buy the same product many times, 
people learn from previous mistakes, and have time to evaluate the prod-
uct in order to decide the next buy. Second, for relevant unique transac-
tions customers use time, effort and money to buy and understand ex-
pert’s information. There are of course market failures, but even most of 
these are not due to individual psychological features; but to other more 
fundamental factors like lack of information, education or knowledge. 
There is one large segment of the markets dominated by quick psy-
chological emotional impulses, which is fast moving consumer goods, su-
permarkets as an example. And these may be partially explained by mis-
takes due to system 1. But even in this case, repetitive buying puts some 
constrains on impulse buying. And can also being partially explained by 
informational searching costs that are too high giving the relative low 
price of these products.
We should not confuse: 1) individual responses without organiza-
tions helping them with information and analysis, with real markets in 
which such organizations do exist. 2) market failures to provide adequate 
information to the customer that do require government regulation or 
intervention, with impulse buying due to the psychological characteristics 
of system 1. 3) lack of knowledge or insufficient education, with a fast 
inadequate response. Kahneman´s example that people usually answers 
wrong the following question:  a) a bat and a ball cost $1.10; b) the bat 
costs one dollar more than the ball; c) How much does the ball cost? is 
clearly related to lack knowledge. Any person well educated in mathematics 
will immediately recognize that a simple equation will solve it. 4) Indi-
vidual preferences to sell or buy at a certain price, with the price at which 
they will have to transact giving real market forces.
We have to be very careful as what do we mean by rational economic 
man. Behavioral Economics defines him as one who has strong rational-
ity and opposes him to humans who are dominated by system 1 and there-
fore are either irrational or non-rational (depending upon the author; 
Kahneman uses non-rational and Ariely uses irrational).  But, there is 
something in between a man that uses both his emotions and his reason 
and is dominated by neither of them; but who do not satisfy the assump-
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tions of the strong rationality – this is the soft version of the economic 
man; which as we will see in chapter four is the one that better satisfies 
our evolutionary traits. 
Selfishness. As we will argue in chapter four we are born with two 
evolutionary instincts, selfishness, for individual survival, and belonging, 
for group survival. And since group survival is evolutionarily speaking 
more critical, normally the belonging instinct guides and redirects the 
selfish individual instinct. Therefore, in societies with different Concep-
tual Systems and their corresponding Institutional Arrangements, the 
social expression of individual selfishness is also distinct. Individual self-
ishness goes all the way from being forbidden as a social expression, like 
in primary societies, to be openly allowed in the large economic markets 
in Western contemporary societies.  Therefore, one should not discuss 
whether man is naturally selfish or altruistic. Altruistic and social coop-
erative behavior is a consequence of the strength and the particular char-
acteristics of the Integrative System in each case. 
As we argued in chapter four, the laboratory findings that members of 
a society nor only compete, they cooperate and display altruistic behav-
ior, are a consequence of the very solid Integrative System that exists in 
developed economies; as we mentioned previously, social expenditures 
are between 20 to 30% of GDP. But that does not mean that man is, 
by nature, altruistic. While altruism and social cooperation is very high 
inside the developed economies, it is almost non existent in the interna-
tional arena. At the global level, the world economy presents us a Real 
Global Dictator Game, which results in minimal altruism-due to the extreme 
weakness of the global Integrative System; international aid is only 0.2% 
of GDP, and even some of it is conditioned to the interests of the donor. 
We should not confuse individual selfishness as an evolutionary trait 
with individual selfishness in a social setting. Individual selfishness as an 
evolutionary trait is almost always guided by another powerful evolu-
tionary trait – belonging. Belonging to a group or society is necessary for 
survival, therefore it is the Integrative System of such group or society 
the one that defines the individual´s social role and how the individual 
should channel socially his evolutionary selfish instinct. In many societies 
the individual is not allowed to behave selfish in any social setting, his 
social role is fully defined and society takes care of the individual´s evo-
lutionary needs of survival. It is a particular institutional feature of con-
temporary societies that individuals can express their selfishness through 
market actions. To show the virtues of such specific institutional setting 
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was Smith´s purpose when he wrote The Wealth of Nations. But the fact 
that markets exist as an institution, and that individuals are allowed by 
the contemporary Western societies to behave selfish in this particular 
setting, does not mean that it is the only arena in which the individual 
and the group or society interact. The main interaction actually happens 
through the Integrative System; which define the set of values, norms, 
institutions and so on. 
The fact that one of the values of contemporary societies is that the 
individual is allowed to behave selfish in large market settings, explains 
why individuals exhibit self- regarding preferences in anonymous, large 
group, market situations; Roth et al., 1991. When such institutional mar-
ket setting does not exist, or it is weekly defined, the individual does not 
express any longer only selfish preferences because his relationship with 
the society or the group goes well beyond his economic relation, that 
explains why individuals exhibit other- regarding preferences in small 
groups or in bilateral interactions; Fehr and Schmidt 1999 model. 
Since the basic relationship of the individual with the group or society 
is through the Integrative System, due to the belonging evolutionary trait, 
it is then to be expected, that outside well establish market institutional 
interactions, the behavior of the individual does show cooperation, trust, 
inequity preferences, and punishment of antisocial behavior even at one´s 
own cost and altruism.
We must not confuse the evolutionary characteristics of man (i.e. the 
evolutionary traits of human beings), with his behavior as an economic 
man in a market setting, which happens to occur only due to the social 
institutional permission of contemporary societies. Moreover, that there 
are monetary benefits and cost involved, does not mean that the relation-
ship happens through the Economic and Exchange System. In todays 
contemporary western economies 40% or more of the Gross Domestic 
Product ends up in the government, not due to economic transactions 
but mostly to political decisions. And how this money is used, is also 
a political decision. Social expenditures in some societies are as high as 
30% of Gross Domestic Product – and they are not defined by economic 
transactions. 
A large part of the live of a contemporary economy is defined through 
the Integrative and the Power Systems. It is because contemporary societ-
ies have given an economic solution to the Integrative System via govern-
ment participation, that they can allow the individual to be selfish in the 
market interaction. There are economic situations, defined both by the 
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Integrative and the Power System, that are not commanded by the Eco-
nomic System which is characterized by exchanges. The economic man 
in its soft version was related to the proposal that market relationships 
should be allowed by the society. And the economic man in its strong 
version was the attempt to show mathematically: how does the price sys-
tem explains the allocation of resources in a market economy. But nor 
even Samuelson, who created the initial strong version of the economic 
man, ever thought that the market was the only relationship between the 
individual and the society – after all Samuelson was a Keynesian.
Economic problems cannot be solved only through the markets; eco-
nomic convenient equilibriums also require a proper Institutional Ar-
rangement. Therefore, economics cannot be limited to the analysis of 
choice data as it can be obtained through the markets; other sources of 
data are welcome such as survey evidence, forums of discussion, experi-
mental evidence, neuroeconomics evidence and so on. To choose the 
proper Institutional Arrangement representative democracy may not be 
enough, and as Amartya Sen has argued - the direct participation of in-
dividuals in other discussion forums may be required. But all of this, do 
not mean that choice data as it is transmitted through the markets is not 
fundamental. While markets cannot do it all, they cannot be replaced by 
bureaucratic institutions without jeopardizing economic growth and an 
adequate allocation of resources.       
It is not clear that the individual´s behavior is always or even mostly 
defined by the individual´s preferences. In many societies the role of the 
individual has been, and in some still is, very well defined. Thus, the 
critical discussion is nor only whether the individual has selfish prefer-
ences or other regarding preferences, but in which institutional settings 
they express themselves. The whole question as to how, historically spe-
cific, Integrative, Power and Economic and Exchange Systems evolve in 
particular societies is key to understand the dynamics of the relationship 
between the individual and the society. 
The discussion of which is the nature of man and whether his prefer-
ences are selfish only or also regarding others, misses the whole point that 
the evolutionary traits of man express themselves differently in distinct 
social institutional settings. The whole purpose of economics is to explore 
one of such particular settings, the large markets in Western contempo-
rary societies, where the individual is socially allowed to express freely 
it selfish preferences; which does not mean that the individual does not 
have other regarding preferences in other settings. Therefore, discover-
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ing through laboratory experiments or other settings that the individual 
does have others regarding preferences in relations that involve monetary 
benefits and costs is only to be expected, and it is not yet that valuable by 
itself – unless it can be shown to be useful to solve particular economic 
problems, and that is where the discussion should be centered.     
It is not evident that the individual always defines his behavior 
through maximizing or satisfying his preferences, should they be self-
ish or regarding others. It is not clear that individuals always behave 
in a certain way because it maximizes or satisfies their utility function. 
Are ethical decisions done because they maximize or satisfy the utility of 
the agent deciding to behave ethically? We will argue that the answer is 
no. The individual may behave out of duty or playing a social role that 
does not have anything to do with selfish preferences or others regarding 
preferences. His preferences may not be the only thing that motivates 
behavior. The individual may cooperate out of a sense of duty. Coopera-
tion, trust, inequity preferences, punishment of antisocial behavior even 
at one´s own cost and altruism are social behaviors that do contradict the 
neoclassical predictions of selfishness individual optimization, but that 
does not mean that such behavior is explained only for other regarding 
preferences. Nor only the individual may not be optimizing - he may only 
be satisfying himself; but, even more important, he may not be calculat-
ing at all- he may just be acting out of duty. 
Identity economics. It goes one step beyond Behavioral Economics 
by arguing that identity, norms and social categories do count. However, 
it again confuses an economic relationship with the fact that there are 
monetary benefits and costs. And again defines the whole social dynam-
ics from the individual´s utility function. But, it is not always the indi-
vidual maximizing or satisfying his utility what explains the individual´s 
behavior. Identity, norms and social categories can be bounding to the 
point that the individual´s choice is predefined. There is an unbelievable 
contradiction in quoting the Robbers Cave experiment and then using 
the Becker´s tradition to include non-economic motives in the utility func-
tion; because precisely what the Robbers Cave experiment showed is that 
the individual´s preferences do not count. The experiment would give 
the same result with distinct groups of individuals whatever the ex-ante 
differences in their individual preferences are. Arguing that individuals 
internalized the social norms, identities and social categories in their util-
ity function, becomes pretty un-meaningful when such internalization can 
be manipulated at will in just one week with the right experiment. 
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Notice that the contribution of identity economics is to propose solu-
tions which are non-economic in nature. Firms should make workers 
insiders, schools must instill academic values and whites and African 
Americans have to change their cultural setting. All of these recommen-
dations can be made using social psychology and sociology, and they do 
not require to imagine an individual calculating his preferences related to 
economic compensations versus identity, norms or the utility associated 
with social categories. It is true that we require to integrate diverse social 
sciences or disciplines in order to understand real world phenomena like 
the firm, the school or social discrimination. But is is not at all evident 
that the best way is to do it is through including non-economic motives 
in the utility function. This approach have several shortcomings: 1) basis 
the whole social dynamics in individual decisions based upon maximiz-
ing or satisfying preferences, thus underestimates the role of institutions 
which incorporate in themselves such identity roles, social categories and 
norms; 2) one of the consequences of this individual centered approach 
is to imagine the individual as capable to choose himself the identity, 
norms and social categories that he prefers – individualism to the ex-
treme; 3) underestimate the role of history and the enormous differences 
between societies as to the way they define the relationship between the 
individual and the society; 4) centers individual decisions on maximizing 
or satisfying his own preferences, and thus discards ethical decisions and 
others taken despite the fact that they may generate disutility even to the 
extreme – think in individual´s sacrifices, like the Japanese kamikazes in 
the second world war. It is impossible to reconcile the world of ethical 
principles and social duties with the individual maximization or satisfac-
tion of utility. 5) fails to take into account that the individual interacts 
with the society in diverse systems which cannot be collapsed into the 
individual´s utility function. 
Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity.  Neither risk, uncertainty or 
ambiguity as defined by the main tradition or by Behavioral Econom-
ics captures properly the notion of uncertainty as to the unknown future that 
dominates the thinking of both Knight and Keynes. Risk, uncertainty 
and ambiguity are always reduced to a probabilistic calculation whether 
directly (risk), through Bayesian methods (uncertainty) or by source de-
pendent uncertainty estimated by recursive and other methods (ambigu-
ity). In Knight and Keynes uncertainty as to the unknown future cannot 
be reduced to any probabilistic calculation. This fundamental distinction 
does not go away by saying that probabilities are psychologically biased 
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through all sort of mechanisms. Kahneman´s distinction between system 
1 and 2 becomes irrelevant for the understanding of the definition of 
uncertainty as to the unknown future proposed by Knight and Keynes. 
Even with the full usage of system 2, and with all the repetitions that one 
may wish so that full learning is allowed, and with experts advise and so 
on, the uncertainty as to the future of Knight and Keynes cannot be re-
duced or understood through any sort of probabilistic calculation which 
by definition is limited to the availability of present and past informa-
tion. The uncertainty as to the future for the individual is mitigated only 
through the adequate Institutional Arrangement, which provides a solid 
belief that institutions will behave as needed to confront future events. 
The Institutional Arrangement allows for: individuals to establish con-
tracts, for the proper dissemination of information and for the legal and 
political system that provides stability to economic transactions. Institu-
tions cannot forecast the future either, but they can influence it in a much 
more significant way than the individual. Therefore, uncertainty at the 
individual level grows immensely when there is concern that institutions 
may not do what has to be done in the future. That is why conceptually, 
in mathematical abstract modeling, one can see multi-equilibriums due 
to Game Theory or Information Theory as mirrors of distinct Institu-
tional Arrangements; and Keynes and Knight uncertainty as reflecting 
mainly the lack of confidence in the actual Institutional Arrangement. 
Uncertainty as to the unknown future in Knight or Keynes is not due to 
the psychological characteristics of the individual, it is a fact of the uni-
verse of existence in which live develops itself. Thus, it is the other way 
around: uncertainty as to the future explains why for survival reasons we 
have the psychological characteristics that we posses.
Rationality and Institutions. The strong version, as we saw in chap-
ter one, was not successful to show that markets maximize social welfare, 
nor that there is a unique stable equilibrium. Therefore, it is a technical 
fact that institutions are needed to establish the economic equilibrium, 
and that there are many of such equilibriums corresponding to distinct 
Institutional Arrangements. Now What institutions to establish? and 
What should these institutions do? cannot be answered just rationally. 
If it could be done, we would be back into Plato´s world, where the most 
intelligent should rule. But we are beyond that, we have accepted that 
social solutions are not just a question of reasonability - but of social pref-
erences, that are expressed through voting in a democracy. Democracy is 
based on the will of the people.
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Democracy is the explicit recognition that there is not a unique op-
timum political order that can be design rationally or through rational 
deliberations. Preferences are not just based upon reasons, but also upon 
emotions and interests – that is why we just not deliberate, we vote. And 
just as political preferences involve emotions, market preferences also in-
volve emotions and that cannot be denied. However, this does not mean 
that only emotions count, man´s preferences whether political or econom-
ic always also involved reason, we have only one brain. But, the discus-
sion about economic rationality is not about whether emotions count or 
not, it is as to whether they predominate or not. For Behavioral Econo-
mists, emotions predominate in many instances and therefore individuals 
do not always know what is best for them, a deficiency that markets do 
not solve and therefore government must intervene. But what Behavioral 
Economics cannot answer is: How the government knows what is best 
for the individual? Unless we assume Plato´s rationality again, there is 
just no way. Just like individuals vote, they have to decide what is best 
for them. Now, there are market failures and the individual may require 
more information and training – and government intervention may in 
some instances be required; but at the end of the day, it is not a question 
of properly manipulating him (through framing, availability and so on), 
but of letting him choose.
Rationality and Science. The world out there has an order, a syn-
chrony that allows for the common existence of the particulars. But each 
particular has its own diachronic existence, defined by its own arrow 
of time, which goes from its beginnings to its decay and disappearance. 
Thus, despite the universal harmony, each particular is at risk to dis-
appear; whether it is the earth, life itself, humanity, a given society or 
each one of us. Therefore, while harmonious, the world is also a chaotic 
and ever changing risky place for each one of the participants. In such 
uncertain world, belonging to a social group or a society is a surviving 
evolutionary feature. Since emotions are nothing else that evolutionarily 
learned patterns of survival responses, belonging happens both emotion-
ally and rationally. Emotions are always key in any human interaction, 
analysis or decision.
Science studies the out-there and its harmonious laws and also the 
peculiarities of the particulars. Since the human mind understands reality 
through images that are emotionally selected; our understanding of the 
out there is also emotionally biased. But that does not mean that such un-
derstanding is not rational - we always also use reason. It is precisely due 
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to our extended imaginary repertoire, that the human sophisticated lan-
guage (due to complex social life) allows us to create, that we can produce 
scientific models of the out-there. Which, therefore, despite being ratio-
nal, are always imaginarily based and influenced by emotions. Science 
can always focus more in the harmony of existence (Newtonian physics 
or General relativity) or in the existence of given particulars (Darwin´s 
evolutionary theory); but, in both cases uses rational models which hap-
pen to be both rationally and emotionally influenced. 
At one extreme, the strong rational man behaves like a scientist, de-
spite the emotional influences, he gets a sophisticated rational explanation 
of his preferences; and to arrive to such explanation, he uses the support 
of many other market participants, whether they are individuals or or-
ganizations. In the other extreme, the weak rational man of Behavioral 
Economics, heavily influenced by his emotions - system 1, cannot iden-
tify well his preferences in many economic realms. The soft rational man 
of Smith is somewhere between these two extremes. 
The point however, that we want to stress here is: that the strong 
rational economic man, the humans of Behavioral Economics and the 
soft rational economic man are in themselves scientific abstractions of 
reality. Each one of them, imaginarily overemphasize different aspects 
of economic life; and therefore, are useful to explain distinct economic 
problems. And none of them is a true representation of our human evo-
lutionary self; because science can never get to know the true reality, it 
is always restricted only to know rational images of reality - emotion-
ally biased. Even oppose or quite distinct visions of reality may explain 
the out-there reasonably well. Newtonian physics notion of time is quite 
distinct than Einstein´s and yet both work well for 95% percent of the 
macro-physical phenomena. We will argue that beyond its differences, 
and the limitations of each view of the economic man, all three of the 
visions mentioned above result useful for particular economic problems. 
There is no doubt that the psychological characteristics of human be-
ings do play a role in economic decisions and in some cases they are 
key to understand some specific economic problems; such as organ do-
nations, individual savings decisions and impulse buying. However, we 
wish to point out that the main problems in economic theory cannot be 
answered through Behavioral Economics. Two examples will do for our 
argument. First, in real life there are large markets, and products are 
transacted at certain prices consequence of demand and supply. Now, in 
order to reproduce mathematically the real market phenomena of alloca-
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tion of resources and determination of prices, the abstraction of a strong 
rational economic man made by contemporary Neoclassical Economics 
works reasonably well. But, if we take into account Prospect Theory and 
all the psychological effects found by Kahneman and others, the equa-
tions become unmanageable and we cannot any longer emulate the real 
phenomena of price determination and allocation of resources in large 
markets. Second, Smith introduced his economic man to explain econom-
ic growth. Growth for him is the consequence of technological develop-
ment stimulated by the enlargement of the markets due to the allowance 
of more economic individual freedom. Neither the weak rational man of 
system 1, nor the cooperative altruist human of Behavioral Economics, 
can help us to explain economic growth in the Smith´s sense88.
too many choices?
In 2004 Barry Schwartz wrote The Paradox of Choice in which he questions 
the common belief that more choice implies more freedom and therefore 
more well being. He mentions that it has been shown by Sheena Iyengar 
that “for every ten additional mutual funds offered by the employer, the 
rate of participation went down 2%”89. He argues that we will be better 
off by: 1) embracing voluntary constrains in our freedom of choice; 2) 
not seeking the best but just what is good enough; 3) lowering our expec-
tations about the results of decisions; 4) adopting nonreversible decisions; 
5) paying less attention to what others around us are doing. 
Too many choices, he argues, may be demotivating, for example: “Thir-
ty percent of people exposed to the small array of jams actually bought a jar, 
only 3 percent of those exposed to the large array of jams did so90”. Elec-
tric, telephone, health and pension plans decisions overload the customer. 
88 For understanding the whole universe, whether it is the material universe or the eco-
nomic universe, simple elegant mathematical theories like Newton´s Gravitational Force, 
Einstein´s General Relativity and the Neoclassical Price Theory seem to work better. How-
ever, because their simplicity and generality these theories are not good explanations of the 
micro-cosmos. In physics, the micro-cosmos is explained by Quantum Physics. In business, 
Organizational Behavior and Marketing always found the neoclassical theory of the firm 
insufficient to explain the relevant microeconomic problems that they were facing; so they 
have to develop their own explanations. 
89 p. xiv
90 P. 20.
carlos obregón98
The consequence is: that most customers do not make electric or telephone 
choices, they just stick with what they have; bad decisions about prescription 
drug plans, hurt senior citizens; and investment decision are split in similar 
percentages among the investment options, offered by the employer. We 
have many choices open to us. From how do we look, due to modern plastic 
surgery, to where and for whom do we work, many people today work at 
home through the internet. We chose how to love, how to pray and even 
who to be. We are overload, and it produces dissatisfaction. 
We do not always know what we want. Memory relates mostly to 
peak and end moments of an experience and it does not describe it well 
(Kahneman´s results); thus, often there is a discrepancy between memory 
and accurate descriptions of what we actually felt. And as a consequence, 
there is also discrepancy between predictions and accurate descriptions 
of the real feelings that we end up having. Therefore, it is difficult to set 
proper future goals. 
Moreover, available information is psychologically distorted (again 
Kahneman´s results); people overestimate dramatic causes of death versus 
mundane causes. Fortunately, group predictions are better than individ-
ual ones, because they put together many individual´s memories. People 
make mistakes also due to anchoring, frames and accounts, the endow-
ment effect and the sunk costs. He refers to Prospect Theory. 
He argues that the time, money and anguish involved in getting infor-
mation and taking into account all of the options is so huge than “maximiz-
ers” do worse than “satisfiers”. Creating a Maximization Scale to classify 
people either as maximizers or satisfiers, Schwartz show that maximizers, 
measured by other psychological scales already proven, “experienced less 
satisfaction with life, were less happy, were less optimistic and were more 
depressed”91. Using a regret scale, it can also be shown that maximizers are 
much more susceptible to all forms of regret, especially post-decision regret, 
also known as buyer´s remorse. Maximizers are concerned with social status.
He introduces a scale to measure perfectionists and he found that they 
are correlated with maximizers, but they are not the same. Perfectionists 
have also high standards, but they do not expect to meet them like maxi-
mizers. Perfectionists are not depressed, regretful or unhappy. 
Schwartz reminds us of learned helplessness, discovered by Seligman 
(1967,1975), rats that could not escape a series of shocks by any response, 
become unable to learn future tasks. Too many choices, that we cannot 
process, do not mean more control, they mean less. We know that there 
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is a relation between connecting socially and being happy; but social ties 
actually decrease freedom, choice and autonomy. We have moved from 
a social fabric of birthright to one based in a series of deliberate demand-
ing choices that increase loneliness. He quotes Robert Lane “too many 
life choices…demands to discover or create an identity rather than to 
accept a given identity”92. He mentions that Lane (2000) has shown that 
serious clinical depression more than tripled in the last three generations 
in the United States and David Myers (2000) that between 1960 and 
2000 the divorce rate doubled, the teen suicide rate tripled, crime rate 
quadrupled, prison population quintupled, babies of unmarried parents 
sextupled, and cohabitation without marriage increased sevenfold. 
A society that has chosen individual freedom has paid a price. It has 
reduced social constraints, but such freedom sometimes affords a kind of 
enslavement. Therefore, “people would be wise to seek out some measure 
of appropriate constraint”93. In order to ease the burden that freedom of 
choice imposes we should make decisions about when to make decisions – 
what Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit have called second-order decisions; 
example: always buckle up or never cheat on your partner. Using rules, presump-
tions, standards and routines we reduce the decisions to make. Survival 
requires biological and cultural constrains. “The need to choose in ever 
more aspects of our lives causes us more distress that we realize”94.
Choices trade-offs have psychological consequences, which reduce 
the satisfaction of the final choice made. Being forced to confront trade-
offs makes people unhappy and indecisive. As the following examples 
show: 1) researches found that, related to CD players, 66% buy when 
confronted with an interesting alternative; however, when confronted 
with two interesting alternatives only 54% buy one of them, because the 
second alternative creates a trade-off and cause indecisiveness; 2) doctors 
in relation to patients with osteoarthritis faced the o0ption of a new medi-
cation or recommending to go to an specialist, only 25% recommended 
the specialist; but when faced with two new medications 50% did. 
Complex decisions with too many options have a high emotional cost 
that creates a negative mood, that impairs adequate thinking and decision 
making. With fewer options there will be less self-doubt. Distinguishing 
bad from good is an evolutionary positive trait, but it is quite different 
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from distinguishing good from better. Learning to choose in a world of 
unlimited possibilities is “perhaps too hard”95. 
A study showed that those who had the option to change their minds 
were less satisfied with their choice than the ones that could not change 
their mind. The pain of making trade-offs is particularly acute for maxi-
mizers and is dramatically attenuated for satisfiers. 
When an alternative could of have turn out better there is post-
decision regret or buyer´s remorse. – Anticipated regret will make deci-
sions harder to make, and post-decision regret will make them harder to 
enjoy”96. In the short run we regret bad choices, in the long run we regret 
failure to act - those things on which we did not decide. Regret is particu-
larly powerful, because it is not restricted to objective reality – it relates 
to our imagination. Since regret implies responsibility “we often choose 
the option that minimizes the chances that we will experience regret”97. 
Sunk cost effects are larger when a person feels responsible of the initial 
decision. –Many people stays in very troubled relationships because of 
all of the time and effort they´ve already put into it– 98. The availability of 
choice exacerbates the two factors affecting regret: 1) personal responsi-
bility and 2) imagination of a counterfactual better alternative. And more 
regret implies less satisfaction with the choice you already made.
Adaptation means either that we get used to things and then we start 
to take them for granted or the result of a change in reference point ow-
ing to a new experience. Real world differences become smaller because 
psychological adaptation. Lottery winners were found to be as happy as 
normal people, and paraplegic and quadriplegic people while less happy 
than normal people - but still judge themselves as happy people. The pur-
sue of hedonic pleasure gets to disappointment. Brickman and Campbell 
call this phenomenon the hedonic treadmill – no matter how fast you run 
looking for hedonic pleasure you do not get anywhere. Moreover, you 
also adapt to subjective feelings, what Kahneman calls the satisfaction tread-
mill. Maximizers making big investments in any decision, will most likely 
be disappointed, because due to adaptation: the pleasure obtained from 
the decision vanishes quickly enough that will not be sufficient to pay the 
large costs incurred in taking the decision. 
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Prospect theory argues that all evaluations are relative to a baseline but 
How do we set the baseline? Michalos (1986), have argued that we due it 
trough establishing three gaps to evaluate perceived experience: 1) between 
what one has and wants; 2) between what one has and what one thinks 
others like us have; 3) between what one has and the best one has had in 
the past. Schwartz adds a fourth gap, 4) between what one has and what 
one expects. The amount of choice and control we have in contemporary 
societies has risen expectations. Real income has increased a lot but satisfac-
tion has not. Longevity has increased significantly but there is unparalleled 
anxiety about health. Status has become as important as never before. Un-
happy people ruminate more about social comparisons, which trap them in 
a downward psychological spiral. Maximizers report to be more concerned 
with social comparison. There has been a dramatic increase in societal un-
happiness, depression in the year 2000 was ten times as likely as in 1900.   
“The revised theory of helplessness and depression argued that help-
lessness induced by failure or lack of control leads to depression”99. Mod-
ern culture encourages the individual to blame himself for failures, and 
this promotes the increase in depression and suicide rates that we had 
been seen. Today´s culture neutralizes the best vaccine against depression. 
“deep commitment and belonging to social groups and institutions…”100. 
In Bowling Alone, Putnam (2000) focused on the deterioration of social 
connection in contemporary life. “Unattainable expectations, plus a ten-
dency to take intense personal responsibility for failure, make a lethal 
combination”101. Schwartz found a strong positive correlation between 
maximizing and measures of depression. Eckersley (2002) Eckersley and 
Dear (2002) point out that nations who value more individual freedom 
do have individuals that prosper to an extraordinary degree, but they 
also tend to have the highest suicide rates.
What to do about choice? Schwartz recommends the following steps 
at the individual level: 1) Choose when to choose; 2) Be a chooser not a 
picker; 3) Satisfice more and maximize less; 4) Think about the costs of 
missed opportunities; 5) Make your decisions non-reversible; 6) Practice 
an “Attitude of gratitude”; 7) Regret less; 8) Anticipate adaptation; 9) 
Control expectations; 10) Curtail social comparison; 11) Learn to em-
brace constrains.
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Comment
The Paradox of Choice establishes successfully that there are psychological 
dimensions related to the choices we make. These psychological dimen-
sions are associated with societal pressures from the culture that we belong, 
and with individual differences as to how we approach choice. He argues 
that contemporary society has increased individual choices too much, and 
that the individual, which has become responsible of himself, is overload 
by choices. He ends the book recommending the individual what to do to 
reduce such overload. Despite the richness of the argument, as we will ar-
gue below, it fails to make its case against the excess abundance of choices. 
Schwartz arguments about why more choices are really less satisfactory 
is not convincing. Choices do have an economic value. Options are not 
only bought daily in the large financial markets, they are also embedded 
in many product offerings that customers buy all the time. People is will-
ing to pay to have more choices. If we one looks carefully at some of the 
experiments he quotes, the conclusions he reaches are not really due to the 
increase in choices, but to the absence of information and knowledge to 
compare them properly. The rate of participation of employees goes down 
when mutual funds are significantly increased by the employer because it is 
awfully difficult to compare between them. Real choices are those which can be 
understood and analyze. The answer to the paradox found in this example 
is to increase information, education and knowledge; but, it is not to reduce 
the number of options. The example of the doctors is again badly inter-
preted. The doctors, referred to, are not specialists, and if there is only one 
new medication, a reasonable assumption is that this medication is what 
the specialist would give to the customer anyway, that is why in this case 
they send less people to the specialist. With two new medications, their un-
certainty increase as to what to do, it shows to them more clearly the limits 
of their knowledge; that is why they send more people to the specialist. He 
confuses again the burden of choices with the lack of knowledge. There is 
in several instances lacking information and not enough knowledge as to 
the alternatives that the customer face; and yes, he is overload with alterna-
tives that he does not fully understand. But, he is still better off that what 
he would have been had he not had the alternatives. 
Those countries in which the supply of cars, or other goods, is re-
stricted because imports are regulated, have customers that wish they 
could have more options - like the customers in USA do. Latin American 
people enjoy going shopping in USA, because there are more options. 
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He refers to the telephone bill and says customers just stick with what-
ever they have, this again does not explain reality well. In México, for 
many years there was only one provider of cellular phone lines, as a 
consequence customers overpaid substantially for this service, until new 
regulations brought new choices, to which customers rapidly moved forc-
ing the initial monopoly provider to reduce drastically its prices. Options 
have a positive value for the customer that should not be undermine. 
In particular, Schwartz underestimates and misunderstand the conse-
quences of the new technological revolution, so called TIC, in information 
processing (the I), communication (the C) and working place technology 
(the T); which allows very large sets of choices to be process, analyzed and 
understood. There is a growing industry that facilitates access to informa-
tion and the understanding of it, either through the web or to specialize 
companies that produce consumer reports. In fact, the largest companies in 
the stock market in the USA today have grown their business by increas-
ing customer´s choices. Amazon started by increasing the supply of books 
to which the customer had access; and had then do it for almost any good. 
Uber created a new choice for urban transportation. Airbnb created a new 
accommodation choice while traveling. In all the cases, customers respond-
ed to the increase of choices by buying a lot more and sending the stock 
price of these companies to the roof. The name of the game in the new 
TIC world is to increase customer´s choices and to make them manageable.
Another argument Schwartz uses to be critical of too many choices is, 
that when they are too abundant they produce helplessness, individual 
depression and higher suicide rates. The idea that suicide can be the con-
sequence of individual isolation is a very old sociological proposal due 
initially to Durkheim. Schwartz has a good point linking extreme depres-
sion and suicide. He mentions that the revised theory of helplessness and 
depression argued that helplessness induced by failure or lack of control 
leads to depression. Contemporary western societies do make individual 
responsible of their own well being and therefore the connection is there 
with failure and loneliness, I have written elsewhere about this phenom-
enon. But, this individual isolation is not related as Schwartz argues to the 
increased number of choices. Suicide rates in countries that provide few 
choices can be much higher than in countries that provide more choices, 
the suicide rate in Sri Lanka is 34.6, in Guyana 30.6 and it is only 12.6 
in USA and 7.4 in the UK102. Therefore, more choices do not increase 
102 Data per 100 k population, taken from World Health Organization, last updated 2017 
04 04 available in apps.who.int.
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the suicide rate. Suicide rates are related to individual isolation and sense 
of helplessness, but not to the number of choices offered by the society. 
Strong traditional cultures maintain traditional ties between the individ-
ual and the society and have in general low suicide rates, like México 5, 
Brazil 6, Iraq 4.1or Philippines 3.4. It is interesting to contrast the rate of 
suicide between India which was conquered many times and has many 
cultures, 16, and Bangladesh, 6, or Afghanistan, 7, more influenced by 
the Islam. There are diverse reasons for a high suicide rate, Japan for 
example does have a traditional society and has a 15.4 suicide rate; this 
is due to the fact that in this culture the individual who fails in the task 
indicated by the group is isolated by shame. Suicide is a complex social 
phenomenon, that has to be explain by many social factors; we need to 
understand the specific institutional history of a given society, to be able 
to appreciate whether the individual is isolated or not as compared to 
other societies. What is relevant for our purposes in here is, that more 
choices cannot be associated with more individual depression and higher 
suicide rates; therefore, discussing the number of available choices to the 
individual to explain suicide rates is not the right way to go. 
Because of the previous arguments, we can conclude that Schwartz´s 
case against too many choices is not successful. There is however, one more 
contribution of this author, that we should discuss, and that is his distinc-
tion between maximizers and satisfiers. He shows that given the condi-
tions of a real world, characterized by Simon´s bounded rationality and 
by Kahneman´s human fallibility, it is better to have the attitude of a 
satisfier rather than a maximizer. Simon have shown previously, convinc-
ingly that the attitude of satisfier is superior from an adaptive perspec-
tive. Schwartz shows that maximizers experienced less satisfaction with 
life, were less happy, were less optimistic, were more depressed, were 
more susceptible to all forms of regret, were more concerned with social 
status and spent more money and anguish in getting information and 
taking into account all of the options. This is a relevant finding, but it is 
a psychological result. Which is largely unrelated to the discussion as to 
whether, and for which economic problems, the abstraction of an econ is 
useful or not; and which are its limitations. Econs are not necessarily indi-
viduals with attitude of maximizers. Econs, in a soft version, like Smith´s, 
are not an indication of the right psychological attitude to have; econs are 
the consequence of a social institution – of a society that institutes individ-
ual economic freedom –a society that allows individuals to act selfishly in 
a particular social arena – the economic markets.  And in a strong version 
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econs are a scientific abstraction trying to explain how markets and prices 
behave. Econs in this strong version are congruent individuals with ratio-
nal foresight acting in the economic markets. In the strong version econs 
do maximize, but it is a theoretical scientific abstraction of the way eco-
nomic markets operate – it never pretended to be a description of the best 
psychological attitude to have in real life in many social issues. Therefore, 
while the empirical results comparing maximizers and satisfiers do have 
psychological relevance, and they are important for a discussion about 
appropriate individual psychological attitudes; they are not relevant in 
the discussion of whether the abstraction of a human is better or not than 
the abstraction of an econ to understand particular economic problems. 
Schwartz´s writings make evident the need for an integrated view of 
social sciences, in order to be able to put each result to where it belongs, 
and not to confuse the discussion. We will be doing so in chapter four. It is 
however fair to mention here that the confusion between the abstraction of 
the econ in its strong version and the discussion of human´s best psychological 
attitudes in social issues is partially due to the insistence of some Chicago 
economists – like Becker - to generalize the economic man´s utility function 
to include non-economic motives. Because, by doing so, Becker exported 
the maximizing attitude of the strong rational man, that was an abstraction 
of man behavior in large markets, to other aspects of social life. Samuelson, 
however, the creator of the abstraction was not even a believer in pure free 
markets; he was a Keynesian, who understood well that markets do need 
regulation and government intervention. 
predictably irrational?
We make repeated mistakes – without learning much. We do not diet, 
we buy things we do not need, after a one-cent aspirin we continue to 
have a headache but after a 50-cent aspirin the headache is gone, after 
been asked to recall the Ten Commandments we tend to be immediately 
afterward more honest. Our common held believe, Ariely argues, that 
that we are rational – that is capable to make the right decisions for our-
selves, is inadequate. Ariely writes his book Predictably Irrational to explain 
human predictable irrationality – our distance from perfection. 
He argues that we do not know what we want – our preferences are 
related to contextual comparisons, example: MIT Sloan student’s choices 
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in relation to an annual subscription to the Economist were as follows: 
Context one - three options: 1) Internet-only subscription for $59, 2) 
Print-only subscription for $125, 3) Both internet and print subscriptions 
for $125. Student´s choices: 1) 16%, 2) 0%, 3) 84%. Context two - only 
two options 1) and 3); the decoy option 2) is eliminated. Students´ choices 
were as follows: 1) 68%, 3) 32%. Unbelievable as it seems, the decoy pres-
ence changes drastically the results. Context dependence explains why. 
As Kahneman and Tversky have shown, people is willing to take a 15 
minutes trip to save $7 in a $25 pen, but are unwilling to to take the same 
trip to save the same $7 in a $ 455 suit. Context dependence also explains 
why the more we have the more we want. 
Ariely discusses, how our initial decisions or the first price that we 
encounter become an anchor base. Choices are not the consequence of 
our fundamental likes or dislikes; supply and demand are not indepen-
dent. Due to anchors´ influence, choices “are not necessarily going to be 
an accurate reflection of the real pleasure or utility we derive from those 
products”103. We truly follow our gut feelings and rationalize them after-
wards. An anchor that is powerful is giving something for free, example: 
people prefers a $10 Amazon free certificate than to buy a $20 certificate 
for $7. People go to museums the day it is free even though they know it 
is a mistake, because they will be awfully crowded. 
This author points out that, we live in two worlds: one with social 
norms and one with market rules and we keep them separated. Good 
sex belongs to the first, prostitution to the second. People is willing to do 
social work for free, work that they are not willing to do for a payment. 
It has been shown in studies, that for a given task, any payment that do 
not meet market standards will unmotivated people; people that could be 
well motivated to do the same task free for social reasons. Market norms 
relate to a broad range of behaviors including self-reliance and individu-
alism. He reminds us of the study in which the parents who came late 
to pick up their child’s from a care center were impose a fine to encour-
age them no to do it, and the result was just the opposite – the fine was 
interpreted by the parents as a market payment, therefore they were free 
to pick up their child late. Once the care center realized that the implica-
tion of the fine was the opposite of the desire one, it removed the fine. 
But to their surprise, the fathers continue coming late; imposing the fine 
removed the social norm that restraint the parents from coming late, and 
removing it did not bring back the social norm. Which show that “social 
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relationships are not easy to reestablish”104. 
Social norms, he says, are important even in the business world, be-
tween firms and customers and employers and employees. In education, 
related to teachers, he argues that standardized testing and performance 
based salaries “are likely to push education from social norms to market 
norms”, it might be better to “instill in all of us a sense of purpose, mis-
sion and pride in education”105. As for the love of learning – you can´t buy 
it; and if you try, you might chase it away.106” Social norms to motivate 
people are cheaper, and many times more effective. Money is needed but 
in some aspects of life it is not useful. Monetary gifts are more efficient, 
yet most people will rather have a nonmonetary gift. 
In the markets – in economic exchanges – however, “we are perfectly 
selfish and unfair. And we think that following our wallets is the right 
thing to do”107. “we are caring loving animals, but when the rules of the 
game involve money this tendency is mute”. Students offered free candy 
take three each one, but if it is price at 1 cent they take 11 – they do not 
think in social norms anymore. In fact, at positive prices the amount of 
candy taken was inversely related to the price, which means that at posi-
tive prices an economic relationship is established. But the increase of the 
price from zero to 1 cent was contrary to demand theory, it increased 
the demand because we move away from restraining social norms to 
free market behavior. A good practical consequence of these ideas is an-
tipollution policy, which when based only in price incentives may not be 
enough and can be aid by for example public posting of the pollutants 
emitted by each emitter.
He mentions that in a study of sexual aroused students “Prevention, 
protection, conservatism and morality disappeared completely from the 
radar screen. They were simply unable to predict the degree to which 
passion would change them.108” Everything changes to a dark self, in 
Freudian terms the id. We need to strengthen our self control and he 
suggest positive reinforcement – In order to overcome many types of 
human fallibility, I believe it´s useful to look for tricks that match immedi-
ate, powerful, and positive reinforcement with the not-so-pleasant steps 
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we have to take toward our long term objectives.– 109. This he thinks is 
particularly important for preventive good health measures.
He explains the endowment effect, – ownership of something increas-
es its value in the owner´s eyes– 110. In general, we are overoptimistic 
about anything that has to do with ourselves, that is why it is useful to 
listen carefully the advice and feedback from others. 
In an experiment Ariely showed that MIT students were irrational 
about keeping alternatives open, and that they failed to maximize re-
turns in a computer game which required to stay in a giving rewarding 
room versus jumping from room to room to try out all of the potential 
rewards in each room. The trick of the game was that unvisited rooms 
disappeared and could not longer be visited. Even students repeating the 
game failed at the task. From this game he concludes that, we must learn 
to intentional close some options; which may also help us in recognizing 
important ones, that we want to leave open. 
In another experiment he showed how previously held impressions 
can cloud our point of view. People´s expectations influence their view of 
subsequent events. A so-called MIT beer was preferred to a Budweiser 
beer, but the so-called MIT beer was just Budweiser plus two drops of 
balsamic vinegar for each ounce of beer. If people was told before hand 
the content of the MIT beer they did not like it afterwards – knowledge 
of its content change their expectations. However, if they were told about 
its content after they had drink it and choose it, they continue preferring 
it. A coke drink stimulates the hedonistic parts of the brain, but if they 
were told before hand that it was a Coke or a Pepsi the frontal area of the 
brain – related to cognition and ideas - is also stimulated; and more with 
the Coke than with the Pepsi. Expectation change stereotypes, which af-
fect the behavior of people. In an experiment one of the best violinists in 
the world played in a Metro station and people could not distinguish the 
difference, they did not stop or give him more money. “Positive expecta-
tions allow us to enjoy things more and improve our perception of the 
world around us.111” 
In another study, Ariely and others, found that almost all participants 
experienced less pain from electric shocks under the influence of Vela-
done, a placebo that was really jus vitamin c, at a Veladone price of $2.50; 
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and when the price was dropped to 10 cents only half of them did. Similar 
effects were found with energy drinks. 
People tend to mistrust marketers, in an experiment in a commercial 
plaza where people were offer $50 for free with no commitment attach only 
19% stop to pick up the $50; mistrust was so high that 81% choose no to 
take the money, because they did not believe that there was no trick. For a 
stereo, positively described by consumer reports, participants were willing 
to pay $407; and only $282, if the same positive description was done by a 
Cambridge Audio brochure. Trust is a very important tangible asset.
When given the opportunity to cheat, even for just 10 cents per each 
question answered correctly, Harvard MBA students did cheat, but in a 
moderate way. And even with zero chance of getting caught, they still 
cheat only in a moderate way. Ariely argues that “our internal honesty 
monitor is active only when we contemplate big transgressions…”112. Sur-
prisingly enough, in another similar experiments in UCLA and MIT it 
was enough to ask students to read the Ten Commandments or to sign a 
code of honor before the experiment for they not to cheat – the reading, 
or the signing, activated the internal honesty motor. In a series of experi-
ments, Ariely shows that people is more willing to cheat when nonmon-
etary objects are involved, they will steel a coke – but not the equivalent 
cash. They however will cheat with tokens exchangeable for money. 
In a conformity study, Ariely and others have shown, that when people 
order beer or food out loud in public in a restaurant, they are influenced 
by what others have ordered before them. But, there are cultural differ-
ences. In USA they made an effort to order something different from what 
others have asked, in Hong Kong they order something similar. In both 
cases, however, the orders out loud in public were different from what they 
would of order privately if asked to write their order. And in both cases, 
people was ex post less satisfied with the orders provided in public out 
loud; which shows that people is willing to pay a price to conform.
We do not know reality, but only our representations of it, based in 
our limited cognitive tools. That is why emotions, relativity, social norms 
and so on, influence our behavior. Ariely concludes that “our irrational 
behaviors are neither random nor senseless – they are systematic and 
predictable”113; and that economics would be better of by taking into ac-
count how people behave in instead of how should they behave – this is 
for him the basis of Behavioral Economics. He insists that the predictable 
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mistakes are not due to lack of knowledge, lack of practice or being weak-
minded; experts as well as novices are affected in a predictably way. We 
have to be vigilant to understand where and when we make erroneous 
decisions - technology can help. Businesses and policy makers, he argues, 
should design their policies and products to help us achieving better results.
Comment
Irrationality, as presented and defended by Ariely, does not necessarily 
mean that markets do not provide a rational solution. Take for example 
the subscription to the economist, for his experiment we know that the 
decoy induces more people to buy the full subscription; but this is not the 
end of the story, people will use the Economist´s subscription for one year, 
and then will decide whether there is value or not in it and revalue its ini-
tial decision. Moreover, in the real world almost nobody will subscribe to 
the Economist unless it is already a frequent reader, and that means that 
he already has a well form idea of what he needs and wants. The previ-
ous or ex-post experience with the product do changes choices, and make 
them more rational. Anchors, emotional arousal, previous expectations, 
ownership and so on do influence our decisions. But markets through 
information, experts, institutions and real market forces change our irra-
tional decisions. Repetitive experiences with a product do relate demand 
to product quality; expert information and advise brings more objectivity 
to our decisions; friends previous experiences, web commentaries and 
open information and so on provide ways of contrasting potential deci-
sions; complex decisions involving many products and choices are made 
easy by all sort of software programs, that allow relevant comparisons, 
provided in the web free or for a charge. Some of the examples presented 
by Ariely involve more rationality than he acknowledges. For example, 
choosing a free $10 dollar amazon certificate over a $20 dollar certificate 
with a $7 price has the following rationality. We are clearly better off 
with the $10 certificate than we are today. But that is not necessarily the 
case with the $20 certificate in which $7 have to be paid. Once we pay $7 
dollars for the $ 20 certificate, the questions have to be raised Do I really 
need the certificate? Do I want to search something now to buy in Ama-
zon? If the answers are negative, I may end up worse than I am today. 
We are social animals, and our survival requires that we pay attention 
to the group and that we follow the group. Therefore, yes we are influence 
by the group. Also we are endowed with an optimistic survival bias, that 
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produces relaxing chemicals by doing exercise and/or interacting with loved 
ones. If we fool participants with a placebo, we put to function a fundamental 
social trait. Which does not mean that we do not appreciate reality, it just 
means that we are made to appreciate it collectively. Individual rationality 
cannot be detached from social existence; reality is a psychological dimen-
sion that can be influence socially. But there are of course limits. We know 
that people with cancer having dogs leave two more years in average, but 
that does not mean that we can cure cancer just by increasing sociability. Evi-
dence from the out-there is in fact read through our perceptions influenced 
by our social value system and our expectations, but knowledge changes 
when our beliefs do not correspond to cues from the out-there. Copernicus´s 
findings were socially opposed, until facts could not be denied any longer, 
and we had to change our social perception of reality. Survival imposes a so-
cial reading of reality, but has to be enough objective to serve surviving goals. 
In fact, one of the most interesting features of modern societies is that 
they have made significant more flexible the social learning that comes from 
individual´s accumulated facts or knowledge. Individual freedom means that 
many more people is thinking and analyzing reality – which does not elimi-
nate social influences, but makes the process of individual - social interaction 
more fluid and objective. Yes, placebos do work, but they do not cure serious 
health problems. There are rational limits to irrationality. Take the example 
of the violinist, it is true that nobody distinguished him in the metro scene, 
it is also true that not very good violinists may survive in the professional 
world; but what is also true is that the best violinist in the world is pretty 
damn good, and that many experts can distinguish the differences – there are 
real rational differences between diverse violinist’s abilities. 
Ariely is right, economic relations are not the only relation between 
the individual and the society; in fact, we had been arguing that, there 
are two more, via the Integrative and the Power System. The same in-
dividual action can be performed at no charge for social reasons or at a 
very high charge in a market context. One of the confusions caused by 
few extreme radical participants of the so called Chicago school was that 
utilitarian calculations can explain well non market behavior. As we dis-
cuss before, this proposal has to be technically rejected. Altruistic behav-
ior by utilitarian calculations, giving exchange markets, is mathematically 
so unlikely that it cannot explain reality114.  There are different relations 
114 Remember the condition: in a world of n goods, for Agent A to behave altruistic in a 
good “1” towards Agent B is: that Agent B does not have more than the minimum, that 
agent A considers indispensable, in the other n-1 goods. 
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between the individual and the society that must be taken into account, 
a fact that has been amply recognized by classical economists and by 
institutional economists. One of the key roles of institutions is to further 
develop the natural individual instinct of belonging. Belonging, as we will 
see in chapter four, is what prevent selfish socially destructive individual 
behavior. 
Ariely´s is an interesting book because it pushes Behavioral Economics 
all the way to arguing that we are predictable irrational Are we really? 
Because if we assume with him that we are irrational - that is non capable 
to make the right decisions for ourselves, the whole philosophical and 
political system on which the Western world is built collapses What is the 
meaning of democracy if individuals cannot make rational choices? and 
How do markets work in a world of irrational individuals? I know that 
professor Ariely and others in Behavioral Economics do not want to take 
us that far, but whether they want to or not the questions are opened. 
Predictably irrational nor only says that we are irrational, but that we can 
be manipulated Can we? And if so What is the meaning of individual 
responsibility? so crucial to the whole legal system of contemporary soci-
eties. Behavioral economists make a good case against the strong rational 
economic man and do show many instances in which such abstraction 
do not operate well, but that does not mean that the abstraction of an ir-
rational human being operates better. We are left with the need to answer 
many questions: Where and how do rationality and irrationality meet? 
Who are we? What implications do a more integral vision of man have 
for economics? We really cannot read Ariely´s book without feeling an 
urgent need for a broader framework. One capable to put together the 
findings of behavioral and traditional economics with the way markets, 
democracy and law operate in the real world of the contemporary societ-
ies. This is the purpose of chapter four; therefore, in here we will only 
make few remarks in this direction.
Democracy and Capitalism were born together; democracy provides 
the social legal frame on which Capitalism operates. But democracy also 
requires the capacity of the individual to take decisions, again with what-
ever degree of rationality they may have. A society, like the contempo-
rary ones, based upon individual decisions can hardly be understood 
and explain with the idea of an irrational predictable man. However, 
it is true that the scientific evidence is there that in some cases we are 
irrational and even predictably irrational. Therefore, we need to put all 
this together, and for that we need a broader framework that must start 
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with answering: Who are we in evolutionary terms? Who are we psy-
chologically (which as we will see goes well beyond cognitive-behavioral 
and social psychology)? How does reason and emotions interact? How 
do we make decisions? In which cases we can be manipulated and in 
which we cannot? How do groups develop? How are institutions cre-
ated? How do individuals and groups, or institutions, interact? How did 
individual freedom start? And so on. It is only in the context of this broad 
framework, that we can judge the virtues of the soft version of the rational 
economic man, the strong version of the rational economic man and of 
the human man of Behavioral Economics to indicate solutions for economic and 
social problems. As we mentioned, to discuss this broader framework is the 
task in chapter four, but before we do that, we will review the Nudge, 
Behavioral Macroeconomics and Behavioral Finance in the next chapter. 
[114]
THE NUDGE, BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMICS  
AND BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
the nudge
In 2015 Thaler wrote Misbehaving, he starts by referring to the endowment 
effect – people value more what they have, then he describes Kahneman´s 
Prospect Theory and the fact that preferences reversals are found in the 
laboratory i.e. people prefers a to b, but if they were to own a and b they 
sell b at a higher price (see example, previous chapter). He argues that 
people do not always have the possibility of repeated transactions that 
allow frequent practice and immediate feedback, and therefore there are 
many economic transactions that do not allow for learning. Moreover, 
he says many of the so called experts that suppose to help the custom-
ers have conflict of interests. He explains again: mental accounting, the 
inconsistent customer behavior in bargains, sunk costs that cause irratio-
nal usage and how people keeps money in buckets designed for specific 
purposes. 
Thaler shows, what he calls the house effect and the break even effect, 
both based upon Prospect Theory. People usually do not want to partici-
pate in a 50 – 50 gambling in which they can earn the same amount that 
they can loose. However, if people are told that they just won $30, 70% of 
them accept a 50-50 gamble to earn or loose $9. This, he calls the house 
effect, when people has won they are willing to gamble – which, together 
with the tendency to extrapolate recent returns into the future, goes a 
long way to explain, in his opinion, financial bubbles. When people are 
told that they just lost $30 only 40% participate in a 50-50 gambling to 
earn or loose $9; but 60% participates in a 33% chance to gain $30 and 
67% chance to earn nothing versus a sure $10. The increase from 40% to 
60% shows the break even effect, if there is a chance to break even people is 
more eager to participate. 
1153) the nudge, behavioral macroeconomics and behavioral finance
People fairness judgments are related to the endowment effect. A com-
pany making small profits in a recession: 1) with no inflation, decreases 
wages and salaries by 7% and it is considered unfair, but 2) if there is 
12% inflation, and salaries are increased only 5%, it is considered fair. 
In fairness games people do not behave accordingly to economic theory. 
As an example, remember the ultimatum game explained in last chapter. 
Thaler mentions, that Fehr and Lorenz (2007) have shown in the 
laboratory, that firms that elect paying higher wages than the minimum 
were compensated by even higher efforts from their employees, and that 
Rabin (1993) has explained theoretically why people can be altruistic in 
the dictator game and punishing in the ultimatum game the non coopera-
tive behavior – the explanation is that we behave conditional upon others 
behavior.
Finally, in his 2015 book, Thaler refers to Nudges. The Nudge, was 
first published in 2008, and in it, Thaler and Sunstein argue that “The 
false assumption is that almost all people, almost all of the time, make 
choices that are in their best interest or at the very least are better than 
the choices that would be made by someone else”115. There is human 
fallibility in decision making due to: anchoring, availability, representa-
tiveness, optimism and overconfidence, loss aversion, status quo bias, 
and framing. So that –  The first misconception is that it is possible to 
avoid influencing people´s choices116”. They argue that “Choice architects 
can make major improvements in the lives of others by designing user-
friendly environments”117. The answer for them is the Nudge.
Thaler and Sunstein describe, how people try to impose self control in 
their myopic doer self by using their far-sighted planner self, but “doers 
are often difficult to rein in”.118 People uses devices for self control such 
as alarm clocks, Christmas Clubs for saving and mental accounting i.e. 
treating their money in diverse pots as not fungible.
Most people learn from others, social influences come through infor-
mation and peer pressure, humans are Nudged by other humans because 
we like to conform. In the 1950s Asch119 show that people is influenced 
by others even in simple tasks like guessing the length of a visual line, and 
115 P. 9
116 p. 10
117 p. 11
118 p. 44
119 See Asch 1995
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recently brain imaging has shown that people actually see the situation as 
everyone else do120. Conformity effects have already been shown since 
the 30s by Sherif121. Sherif showed that a confederate, designated by him 
(his own Nudge) and unknown to the others, could severely influence the 
group thinking and that the new way of thinking was then internalized 
by the others. Thaler and Sunstein argue, that investors also follow the 
herd, they buy when others buy - they quote Shiller. The intervention 
that had increased more tax compliance was telling tax payers that 90% 
of tax payers had already comply. An advertising informing that most 
70% of Montana teens are tobacco free had as a consequence a significant 
statistically decrease in smoking.
In addition to information and peer pressure, people can be influ-
enced through priming. Priming is directed to the automatic system of 
the brain. People can be “prime” - i.e. directed – into certain behaviors by 
offering apparently irrelevant cues. For example: “Those given ice coffee 
are more likely to see other people as more selfish, less sociable, and, well, 
colder than those who are given hot coffee”122. or asking people whether 
they intend buy a new car increased purchase rates by 35% - this Nudge 
can be accentuated by asking them when and how they plan to do it.
Thaler and Sunstein argue, that people need Nudges “ for decisions 
that are difficult and rare, for which they do no get prompt feedback, and 
when they have trouble translating aspects of the situation into terms that 
120 This is an interesting example. The conformity explanation is that due to the fact that 
others are emotionally important for us our capacity to reason is distorted by their influ-
ence and we end up seeing the length of the line as they say they do – which is actually an 
intentional deviation from reality. But, there is an alternative explanation from an evolu-
tionary point of view. The fact is that people is not sure of the length of the visual line, and 
it is a superior evolutionary survival quality that under this circumstances we are influence 
by others. It is important to remember than in the ego Sherif´s experiments, the influence 
of others is directly linked to how undefined is the objective external reality. No body can 
influence others that an angry lion is not really angry. But when the external reality is not 
clearly defined, to be influence by others is a survival feature that allow us to have collective 
views which are evolutionarily superior. In the Asch experiment, people are fooled, because 
the others intentionally lie as to the length of the line that they are seeing, but that does not 
suppose to happen in the real world. Others, in general, do not lie, and their perception is 
always helpful to create together a better view of the out-there. Therefore, our emotional 
connection with others do not reduces our rational capacity to understand the external 
reality, it actually increases it because provide us with more information coming from the 
others. We will say more on this issue in chapter four.
121 Sherif 1937
122 p. 72-73
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they can easily understand”123. Investment goods and sinful goods124 are 
prime candidates for Nudges, because choices and their consequences are 
separated in time. In general markets do a good job – competition pro-
tects the customer; but it is not always so. There are many clear examples 
in which markets do not work: extended warranties in small appliances 
are a typical bad deal for customers, many TV announced offers are 
customer frauds, and so on. For these frequent market failures, in which 
customers are not properly informed, there are two possible solutions: 
1) that governments outlaw these activities; or 2) Nudges. Thaler and 
Sunstein prefer the Nudges, because they define themselves as libertarian 
paternalists. In many cases humans prefer a default clause to making an 
explicit choice – especially when choices are rather complex. 
Additional help is usually provided to avoid certain common human 
mistakes, example: on many corners in London the pavement has signs that 
say Look right. Feedback is already given by many products like our cellular 
phone telling us that the battery is low. Thus Nudges are all over the place. 
Thaler and Sunstein propose to use a government regulation call RECAP 
(record, evaluate and compare alternative prices) for complex pricing sys-
tems that are neither transparent not comprehensible to the customer like for 
example: credit cards, cell phone calling plans or auto insurance policies. As 
choices become more numerous and/ or vary on many dimensions’ Nudges 
are more helpful. Nudges in many instances are required to make sure that 
choosers actually notice the incentives they face – to establish salience. For 
example: “Cost-disclosing thermostats might have a greater impact than 
(modest) price increases designed to decrease use of electricity”125. 
For Thaler and Sunstein, the six principles of a good choice architec-
ture are: incentives, understand mappings, defaults, give feedback, expect 
error and structure complex choices.
Savings, Investing and Borrowing
Saving decisions are particular difficult for individuals for they require a 
view of the long run. In real life it is observed that “roughly 30 percent 
123 p. 74
124 Investment goods include things like exercise, flossing, and dieting. In these goods costs 
are borne immediately, but the benefits are delayed. Sinful goods include things like smok-
ing, alcohol, and jumbo chocolate doughnuts. In these goods we get the pleasure now and 
suffer the consequences latter.
125 p. 101
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of employees eligible to join a 401(k) plan fail to enroll”126. and that in 
the UK even in defined-benefit plans that do not require an employee 
contribution only 51% signed up. Thus, people do not take care of their 
future properly. People usually chooses very low saving rates. There are 
two options: 1) automatic obligatory enrollment; or 2) a Nudge. The 
Nudge will be designed to require every employee to make an active 
decision about whether to join the plan. Participation rates in a company 
increased 25% due to the Nudge. A Nudge that has been very successful 
is called, Save More Tomorrow. It is typical used with automatic enroll-
ment, and people from the start choose whether or not to commit to an 
escalation schedule in which saving rates are increasing in future dates. 
For example, of an initial group that did not want to increase its today 
saving rates, 78% decided to adopt Save More Tomorrow; which means 
they accepted to commit to save more in the future. This Nudge has been 
so successful that today 39% of large employers in the United States have 
adopted some type of automatic escalating saving plan. 
In the investing area, most people do not have the necessary skills to 
do the right long term decision between stocks and bonds. A common 
mistake for example is to own large amounts of stocks of the company 
where they work, producing inefficient portfolios not well diversified; 
even the law has made the mistake to promote the ownership of one´s 
company stock. A useful Nudge is to provide an easy alternative of a full 
diversified portfolio that will automatically rebalance through time. This 
is an area in which much can be done.
In the credit markets, uneducated and unsophisticated customers are at 
a disadvantage. With an average fee of 3% in loans averaging $105000 
dollars; Latinos paid 3.36% (an additional 12.8%) in their loans, and 
African-Americans paid 3.39% (an additional 13.6%). RECAP Nudges, 
Thaler and Sunstein argue, would be very helpful in the areas of 
mortgages, student loans and credit cards.
Health
In general, “the more choices there are, and the more complex the situ-
ation, the more important is to have enlightened choice architecture”127. 
126 p. 109
127 p. 179
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Todays the prescription drugs plan for seniors give many options and 
provide no help, a RECAP program will be needed. 
Organ donation is a case where Nudges make a very clear difference. 
If an explicit consent rule is used in which people has to take steps to 
demonstrate that they want to be donors, consent is very low, in Ger-
many only 12% consent, and donation turns out to be insufficient for the 
demand of organs. The alternative of course, is to make donation obliga-
tory but if this is politically rejected, Thaler and Sunstein recommend a 
Nudge – presumed consent. Presumed consent means that people has to 
take steps to register their unwillingness to donate (just the reversal of ex-
plicit consent), presumed consent increase consent a lot (in Austria 99% 
consent was obtained). Abadie and Gay (2004), showed that the higher 
consent rates associated with presumed consent were in average 16% 
higher than previous donation rates.
The best approach to fight global pollution is an adequate price sys-
tem of incentives, but better disclose information for customers will bring 
additional help. Public disclosure on the risks of smoking and on the Toxic 
Release Inventory that firms have had been very useful. Thaler and Sunstein 
propose, that the government should create a Greenhouse Gas Inventory 
which should require disclosure by the main emitters. In general, infor-
mational Nudges do help.
Other Areas
Other areas may also benefit from choice architecture, designed to help 
the decision maker; such is the case of education. Choosing a school is a 
difficult problem, that requires an adequate Nudge. Thaler and Sunstein 
also propose, that patients should not be forced to buy the right to sue 
the doctor for negligence, as it happens today. In addition, they propose 
to replace official marriages for civil unions to avoid controversy with re-
ligious institutions. They mention that there are many other Nudges that 
exist like Give More Tomorrow, The Charity Debit Card and Tax De-
ductions, Stickk.Com – to help people remind their commitments, Quit 
Smoking Without a Patch, Motorcycle Helmets, Gambling Self-Bans and 
many others.   
An important point Thaler and Sunstein make, is that governments 
should not be secretive as to the Nudges they are implementing. A good 
principle to understand as a point of reference, they argue, is the one 
of asymmetric paternalism, developed by a collection of behavioral 
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economists and lawyers, which says “that we should design policies that 
help the least sophisticated people in society while imposing the smallest 
possible costs on the most sophisticated”128. But as libertarian paternal-
ists Thaler and Sunstein argue, that the costs to the more sophisticated 
should be as close to zero as possible. They as libertarians are commit-
ted to gentle Nudges that preserve freedom of choice. In Misbehaving, 
Thaler mentions, that the Economic and Social Research Council reports 
in 2014 that 136 countries have incorporated behavioral science in some 
aspects of public policy.
Comment
Behavioral Economics methodology to criticize traditional economics 
works as follows: 1) It shows that humans fail in their process of decision 
making, due mainly to the psychological characteristics of system 1; 2) In-
tervention is required – in this case Nudges are recommended. But, as we 
will show, the link between 1) and 2) is not necessarily well established. 
The following list of failures due to system 1 is not exhaustive, but good 
enough for our purposes. Decision failures due to psychological factors are: 
1) Anchoring, 2) availability heuristic, 3) representativeness, 4) priming, 
5) optimism and overconfidence, 6) status quo bias, 7) loss aversion, 8) 
psychologically overweighting rare events, 9) probabilities miscalculation, 
10) reversals, 11) safety considerations, 12) endowment effect, 13) fram-
ing, 14) psychological memory, 15) time and adaptation as psychological 
dimensions, 16) regret, 17) mental accounting, 18) sunk costs, 19) incon-
sistent customer behavior in bargains, 20) the house effect, 21) the break 
even effect, 22) time inconsistent preferences i.e. hyperbolic discounting of 
the future, 23) altruistic behavior, 24) cooperative behavior, 25) punishing 
non cooperative behavior, 26) psychological fairness, 27) reciprocity, 28) 
conditional behavior, 29) lack of self control, 30) influences of advertising 
or other information, 31) conformity - peer pressure. 
Decision failures are also due to other three factors, mentioned by 
Thaler (2015): 1) economic transactions that do not allow for learning, 2) 
experts with conflict of interest, 3) lack of salience
The reasons to establish a Nudge, according to Thaler and Sunstein, 
are: 1) decisions that are difficult and rare, for which economic agents 
do no get prompt feedback, and 2) when they have trouble translating 
aspects of the situation into terms that they can easily understand. 
128 p. 252
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Notice the jump: Decisions that are difficult and rare are usually subject 
to expert advice, abundant information search and so on. Difficult rare 
decisions are never taking without the aid of system 2, they are always the 
consequence of time invested in analyzing the situation. The fact that deci-
sions do not get prompt feedback is a characteristic of the market which 
is unrelated to the psychological characteristics of system 1. If decisions 
in this case are wrongly taken, it is consequence of the lack of informa-
tion or knowledge due to the fact that the customer does not get prompt 
feedback because market structure inefficiencies; but not to the psychologi-
cal influences of system 1. What Thaler (2015) and Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008) are really talking about is: a market failure either in information and 
knowledge or in the market structure that permits lack of salience and/or 
experts with conflict of interest – but it is unrelated to decision failures due 
to psychological factors. The trouble of translating the decision into terms 
they can easily understand is a matter again of education and information, 
which the market should do – and in occasions may not do it properly. All 
of these may be good reasons for government intervention, because they 
do constitute market failures; but they are related to informational - knowl-
edge problems or market structure inefficiencies that had already been 
pointed out by Information Economics, Institutional Economics, Keynes 
and others. The point to emphasize is that the main reasons mentioned by Thaler (and 
by Thaler and Sunstein) to establish Nudges, are not really link to the psychological 
characteristics of system 1 argued by Behavioral Economics as causes of decision failures. 
Although there are many others, the following list of interventions is 
good enough for our purposes to show that many interventions required 
are not link to failures due to system 1. NL = not link to psychological 
causes; L = link to psychological causes.  
List of Intervention required: 1) Save More Tomorrow -  L; 2) A Di-
versified Portfolio: which automatically rebalance through time - NL; 3) 
RECAP in mortgages -NL; 4) RECAP in student loans -NL; 5) RECAP 
in credit cards -NL; 6) Nudges for the financial mistakes made in the 
2008 crisis - NL; 7) Prescription Drugs Plan for Seniors -NL; 7) Presumed 
Consent for organ donation - L; 8) Disclosure of the main emitters of 
pollution -L; 9) Choosing a school- NL; 10) freedom to buy or not the 
the right to sue the doctor for negligence -NL; 11) Replace official mar-
riages for civil unions- NL; 12) Give More Tomorrow -L;13) The Char-
ity Debit Card and Tax Deductions -L; 14) Stickk.Com – to help people 
remind their commitments- NL; 15) Quit Smoking Without a Patch -NL; 
16) Motorcycle Helmets -NL; and 17) Gambling Self-Bans -NL.
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Only five out of the 15 interventions mentioned are link to psycho-
logical factors, these are: 1) Save More Tomorrow; 7) Presumed Consent 
for Organ Donation; 8) Disclosure of the Main Emitters of Pollution; 
12) Give More Tomorrow; and 13) The Charity Debit Card and Tax 
Deductions. And even in these cases, the link is more in the solution that 
in the causes of the problem. Take for example Save More Tomorrow, 
which arguably has been the most successful Nudge. People is ignorant of 
the future consequences of not saving enough; they need education and 
information. Once they get it, their system 2 pays attention. And if the 
education program is well done they will start saving enough. Now, the 
important contribution of Behavioral Economics is to show that the same 
individual with the same information and education take different deci-
sions depending on the default clause. And as an initial strategy it may 
fine to change the default clause to increase savings. But such strategy has 
to come, as Thaler and Sunstein themselves argue, with transparency i.e. 
informing people that the default clause has been changed and why it was 
changed; and this transparency to be efficient requires again of education 
and information. We cannot get away from the problem that the real is-
sue is that the individuals do not fully understand the consequences of 
not saving enough; and, therefore, at the end of the day, either the deci-
sion has to be taken by the society or the individual has to be educated 
and informed of the consequences129. As for the fact that individuals tend 
to underweight inadequately equities in their portfolios, again it is a ques-
tion of information and education. I personally have given many lectures 
on asset management all over the world, and once you teach and inform 
people, they always change their asset allocation towards more equities. 
Presumed Consent for Organ Donation is also one of the key successes 
of Behavioral Economics, but again transparency involves informing 
why the default clause was change and involves educating and informing 
the individuals. If we are not going to inform and educate the individuals, 
we may just forget about Presumed Consent and we should make organ 
donation mandatory. This brings us to a key issue either the decision 
should be taken by the individual or by the society (who should do it is 
a political choice, that should be taken through democratic routes); but, 
whoever takes the decision has to be well informed and educated
The true contribution of Behavioral Economics is that changing the 
default clause and the time horizon (Save More Tomorrow, Give More 
129 All this however does not reduce the importance of the contribution of Behavioral Eco-
nomics in practical terms.
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Tomorrow, Presumed Consent), providing additional information as to 
who is doing what (Disclosure of the Main Emitters of Pollution), or fa-
cilitating the action and providing information (The Charity Debit Card 
and Tax Deductions) do influence people decisions. Therefore, Thaler 
argues, there is nothing like a neutral individual decision. But, while 
this is true, it does not mean that, given everything else, there are not 
individual´s decisions. That new information and education is required 
for good individual decisions is not new at all. Enlighten the individual 
has been an institutional concern both of public and private organizations 
for a very long time. What is new is how sensitive are the individual 
decisions to the way the questions are ask or framed. But again the more 
educated and well informed the individual is, the more system 2 enters in 
the decision and the less he is influence by system 1. 
Nudges do provide a middle road for society to take decisions in in-
stead of the individual. In one extreme (lets say in the extreme right posi-
tion of a line - with not necessary ideological implications) the individual 
makes his decisions only with market help – due to which he is assumed 
to have proper knowledge and adequate information. Moving somewhat 
to the left, along the proposed line, if we relax the assumption that mar-
kets do allow the individual to have proper knowledge and adequate 
information, something many schools in economics have done, then the 
government and other non market social institutions do need to influence 
the individual´s decision by providing him with the lacking information 
and knowledge; in fact, many of the proposed Nudges belong here, and 
as such they do not represent a new original contribution – governments 
and non market social institutions have provide knowledge and informa-
tion to the individual for a very long time – that it may be insufficient 
and that maybe more in this direction has to be done may be true, but it 
is hardly a new significant contribution. If we continue moving left along 
the line, we find Behavioral Economics, which works under the assump-
tion that in many instances individuals make decisions under a strong 
influence of system 1. And therefore due to the psychological charac-
teristics of humans Nudges most be created to guide individual decisions 
to proper results. And they argue it should be done with transparency. 
Finally, in the other extreme (the extreme left), society takes the decision 
fully, in instead of the individual.
The previous exercise discovers at once one of the main problems 
to be discussed about Nudges. They require the government to take the 
decision as to the default clause or the frame or any other psychological 
carlos obregón124
technique; to influence the individual´s decision in the direction that the 
government wants. Since the government knows how to influence the 
individual because knows how he will react; truly, to a large extent, the 
government is taken the decision. It is true that we are in the middle of 
the road, because the government does not take fully the decision; but 
that does not mean, that the government to make this middle of the road 
decision has not to be politically approved by democratic routes. Trans-
parency does not solve this issue; the government do require political 
approval. Either representative democracy or direct voting should decide 
who takes the decision:1) fully the government; 2) the government only 
chooses the psychological technique to influence the individual; 3) fully 
the individual. In any case, information and knowledge is required by 
whoever will take the decision.    
It is difficult to argue with success; Nudges have already produced 
good pragmatic results in many areas. There is a clear contribution, 
among others, in the understanding of individual´s saving decisions, in 
investing behavior and in the decisions related to organ donations. Thus, 
for many microeconomic problems, the Nudges have shown to be help-
ful. However, as we had been arguing, Nudges are useful for a set of 
market failures which are not necessarily due to the influence of system 1 
or to the lack of usage of the abilities of system 2. In many cases the mar-
ket failures that the Nudge addresses are the consequence of the lack of 
information, the difficulty to understand such information due to lack of 
knowledge and/or inefficient market structures which should be properly 
regulated. Economists have been aware of market failures of these types 
for a long time, and the governments and the non market social institu-
tions have always devoted great efforts to try to help individuals to better 
understand their alternatives. Nudges are a good pragmatic contribution, 
but it is only partially due to Behavioral Economics. 
Behavioral Economics has been unable to show that due to system 1 
individuals educated and well informed cannot take rational economic deci-
sions, understanding rationality as meaning that the individual knows 
what is good for him. This individual rationality, we have known for a 
long time, requires external support (that needs to provide access to in-
formation, education-knowledge, and processing analytical capabilities), 
which may come from the markets, the governments or non market so-
cial institutions. But what is new, and in our opinion is the true contribution 
of Behavioral Economics is: that its research is very important, in the sense that it 
points out areas in which individual economic decisions due to the psychological char-
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acteristics of humans will need more external support to arrive at the proper decision. 
The research, however, while successful in some microeconomic prob-
lems, has not contributed very much in macroeconomics, as we will see 
in the next chapter,
Before we move to the next section we must remind the reader that, 
even though the well educated and informed individual knows what is 
good for him – only knows it within the limits that the Institutional Ar-
rangement allows. An acceptable market equilibrium nor only requires 
that individuals express their preferences, but also the proper Institution-
al Arrangement. Remember Tirole example, in a corrupt economy, what 
is good for each individual is to be corrupt- even though it is not truly 
what is good for the society, nor for the individuals that live in it. There-
fore, there is room for institutional choices, which are beyond individual 
choices. Now, Who, should decide amongst the institutional choices? It 
is for democracy to solve. But, in some cases it may be democratically 
agreed that representative democracy may do a better job than direct 
voting in these issues. And in other cases institutional choices are taken 
by other institutions belonging to the historical Institutional Arrangement 
– such as the Central Banks and others, which even though basically at 
the end depend on democratic decisions – they always have their proper 
sphere of action, in which they decide amongst institutional choices.
behavioral macroeconomics
Within neoclassical contemporary economics, as we said before, there 
has been always two schools of thought. In the first one we may put 
together Keynesians and Post Keynesians. In the second one Monetar-
ists and Rational Expectations Theorists. Both schools shared the same 
view on Welfare Economics and in General Equilibrium Theory. But in 
macroeconomics, they have always had very different and even antago-
nistic positions. Keynesians and Post Keynesians believed that Govern-
ment interventions are required; and they dominated economic though 
from the Second World war to the 80´s. Monetarists and Rational Ex-
pectations Theorists argue that that government interventions are not 
needed – that the markets, if left to operate by themselves, will always 
maintain the economy near full employment equilibrium. This second 
school had been a fervent defendant of free markets and the predomi-
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nant view in macroeconomics from the 80´s until the 2008 financial crisis. 
Becker´s introduction of non-economic motives in the individual´s utility 
function belongs to the second school. Behavioral Economics defends 
that governments must intervene; therefore, it is closer to the first school 
of thought. In fact, Behavioral Macroeconomists see themselves as fol-
lowers of Keynes. Although, as we will argue they really are not.       
Economic Depressions    
In Animal Spirits first published in 2009, Akerlof and Shiller argue that 
“declining animal spirits are the principal reason for the recent economic 
crisis”130. For them, the understanding of the main drivers of the economy 
“lie somewhat outside the traditional boundaries of economic research, in 
the realm of psychology…”131. They identify five psychological factors: 
confidence, fairness, corruption and bad faith, money illusion, and sto-
ries. They defend that the invisible hand story “although right in a funda-
mental way, is wrong at the level of detail and approximation that is nec-
essary to explain what we need to know about macroeconomics”132. The 
2008 financial and housing crisis “was caused precisely by our changing 
confidence, temptations, envy, resentment, and illusions – and especially 
by changing stories about the nature of the economy”133. 
For them, Keynes for the first time gave us an understanding of how 
macroeconomics really behave, and it is unfortunate that “as the memory 
of the Great Depression has faded, so too has an appreciation and un-
derstanding of Keynesian theory”134. They mentioned that with the suc-
cess of the world economy after World War II, it came in the 1980´s a 
new view of the economy which argued that the private sector does not 
need regulation. And they argue, that the 2008 crisis has shown how 
wrong was this view; “capitalist societies have problems if they are not 
watched over”135. To get out of the crisis they say “conventional fiscal 
and monetary policy should aim for full employment levels of demand. 
But, additionally, with the collapse of investor trust, credit markets, will 
130 p. vii
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fulfill an important economic role, also need prosthetic help from the 
government”136.
Confidence
For them confidence is more than just prediction it means trust and “the 
very meaning of trust is that we go beyond the rational. Indeed, the trust-
ing person often discards or discounts certain information. She may nor 
even process the information that is available to her rationally, even if she 
has processed it rationally, she still may not act on it rationally. She act ac-
cording to what she trust to be true.”137. “confidence – implying behavior 
that goes beyond a rational approach to decision making – indicates why 
it plays a major role in macroeconomics”138. For these authors “confidence 
comes and goes. Sometimes it is justified. Sometimes it is not. It is not just 
a rational prediction. It is the first and most crucial of our animal spirits”139.
Comment 
Akerlof and Shiller say that they follow Keynes, but they twist Keynes think-
ing to adapt it to the irrational thinking associated with Behavioral Econom-
ics. In Keynes confidence is nothing else than the appraisal people makes of 
the capacity of the institutions to confront uncertainty as to the unknown 
future. It is the Institutional Arrangement the one that provides the required 
certainty for the economic agents to operate. But the appraisal in Keynes is 
not irrational, as it is in Akerlof and Shiller. Faced with uncertainty, econom-
ic agents do not have any other rational way to act than creating institutions 
that define a reasonable framework to operate economic transactions; when 
such framework fails, confidence goes down. But the failure of the institu-
tions is real and the assessment of such a failure is rational. Confidence in 
Keynes is not just volatile irrational trust like in Akerlof and Shiller. 
Mervyn King, who was for ten tears the Chairman of the UK´s Central 
Bank, argues in his 2016 new book the importance of Keynes´uncertainty 
to understand the 2008 crisis; but he emphasizes that Radical Uncertainty, 
as he calls it, does not mean psychological irrationality. King is right. We 
136 p. xiv
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must not confuse future uncertainty with psychological irrationality, as 
Shiller, Akerlof and others have done. 
In an economic boom, economic agents do not ignore that houses are 
expensive in relation to incomes, they read the newspapers, and do not 
ignore that the interest rates are unusually low. And they do not process the 
information irrationally. They have the information and they process it ratio-
nally -i.e. in the extreme, we can even assume that according to a rational 
expectations model. But that does not mean that what is rational is for them 
not to buy because they have identified a boom. The key to understand 
Why? is the notion of real time (in which Shackle always put emphasis). 
To know that in the long run the real estate prices will return to a rational 
average in terms of its replacement cost (construction cost) does not solve 
the problem of when will it happen. The models run in an abstract time 
different from the historical-time in the real world where economic agents 
live and die. Economic agents do have an age. In this way, even taking all 
the information and using it rationally -having the best model-it is rational 
to buy a good that is expensive-simply because what is not known is how 
much more expensive it will get in the real period that is of interest. Eco-
nomic agents do not buy the house without calculations and only guided 
by their irrational emotions. They do make calculations, and make them 
rationally, with information and with expert’s advice, and in the extreme 
there is nothing wrong with using a rational expectations model to repro-
duce what people do. But the model has the limitation that cannot forecast 
when in real time will the boom end. It can not reduce future uncertainty 
as to the unknown. Take the example of Amazons, no rational expectations 
model would have predicted the boom that occurred in its stock price. 
The acquisition of this company, as of others, implies an optimistic vision 
of the future. If it goes well then it is said that the economic agent had a 
great vision, if it goes wrong is argued that he was irrational. In the face of 
uncertainty, we act. Booms have logical reasons to develop. The economic 
boom may continue for many more years or not, nobody knows. 
The real estate boom could of have lasted longer, real estate prices in 
general, even when already high, were not the reason for the crisis. It was 
not irrational for participants to buy at high prices like Shiller had argued; 
with the low interest rates, it was the rational think to do. And to argue that 
buyers should of have forecasted the increases in interest rates that hap-
pened years’ latter is to ask them to have done something that not even 
the professional markets did, futures of interest rates were low too. And 
just to know that interest rates will eventually go up, does not provide 
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relevant information for present economic actions – because what is not 
know is when will they go up. Participants in the subprime boom could 
not have predicted that interest rates would go up as rapidly as they 
did. If someone could do this kind of predictions with certainty, it could 
become immensely rich. There was nothing irrational in buying houses.  
Real estate in Europe was much more expensive than in USA, yet the 
crisis started in USA and remain there for almost two years. Even using 
the best rational expectations models no body is able to predict for how 
long a market would remain overvalued or undervalued, adjustments 
may take decades. Economic agents buy in a boom not because they act 
irrationally, but because there is future uncertainty and it makes decisions 
very difficult. That you have to make decisions in a world with uncer-
tainty and real time, does not mean that you are irrational in taking them.
We will go back to discuss rationality in the next chapter and we will see 
that the rational expectations model is likely an extreme assumption as to the 
way people process information, but it is also an extreme to assume that they 
are irrational or non rational. But beyond the discussion as to What rational-
ity really means? the point that have to be stress is that even with full rationality 
economic crisis can occur once we relax the assumption of perfect foresight and we introduce 
real uncertainty as to the unknown future, due to which the probability of future 
events cannot be estimated. Before we finish this section, we will get back to 
the 2008 crisis and we will see why Akerlof and Shiller are wrong in the ex-
planation of how did it happen; but before we do that, we should proceed to 
discuss the other four elements of animal spirits proposed by these authors. 
Fairness
They quote the experiments of fairness of Kahneman and others; and 
unemployment according to these authors is the consequence that em-
ployees ask for a fair wage and employers give it to them because em-
ployees then respond with more productivity; but the fair wage is above 
the clearance level, therefore there is unemployment. 
Comment 
This theory is far away from Keynes. In fact, in the Great Depression 
wages were going down, and Keynes argument was that they did not go 
down as quick and as far as they should because future uncertainty as to 
what future prices will be and as to what other workers will do. Fairness 
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is a microeconomic element showed in laboratory experiments that does 
not have econometric validity to explain the massive unemployment pro-
duced in big economic crisis.
Corruption and Bad Faith
They discuss the corruption in corporate America before the 2008 crisis, 
and argue that it was one of the elements that caused it. Recessions they 
argued always involve corruption scandals. They describe Milken´s junk 
bonds, Enron, and the irregularities with subprime loans. They argued 
that the business cycle is connected to fluctuations in the level of corrup-
tion which are related to “cultural changes over time to facilitate or to 
hinder aggressively competitive or predatory activities”140. 
Comment 
There are several problems with introducing corruption as an element pro-
ducing economic crisis. First: Japan, Korea and China have grown quite 
efficiently with corruption. Of these counties only Japan entered a major 
crisis. If corruption produces major economic crisis, Korea and China 
should of have had one already. Second: the major corruption events hap-
pened after the banking crisis in 2008 had already started, not before it. 
As we will argue the 2008 crisis was not a real estate crisis, but a banking 
and credit crisis, therefore the corruption that could had happened in real 
estate - before the banking crisis started - was irrelevant. Third: most ir-
regular mortgages happened after the beginning of the banking crisis and 
as a consequence of the rise in interest rates, and were related to ALT A 
loans and not to subprime loans141. Fourth: there was not corruption in rat-
ing agencies. Fifth: Banks held 75% of the MBS (Mortgage Back Securities) 
that were in private hands; clearly they were not corrupt when structuring 
the securities that they finally held. Akerlof´s and Shiller´s argument that cor-
ruption causes major economic crisis is just not sustainable.
Money Illusion
They argue that at low levels of inflation there should be some degree of 
money illusion. 
140 p. 39
141 ALT A loans have higher credit quality than subprime loans, but less tan the prime loans.
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Comment 
It might be correct, there is wide acceptance that monetary policy given high 
Central Bank credibility might be a powerful instrument. This, however 
would explain only very minor fluctuations around the full employment 
equilibrium. And as it has been shown by rational expectations, money il-
lusion cannot explain the stagflation phenomenon. Money illusion, while a 
Keynesian argument, was not a Keynes´s argument. For Keynes, in a large 
recession monetary policy is not effective, but not due to money illusion, in 
fact it is so, precisely because there are no illusions; people do understand 
well the weaknesses of the Institutional Arrangement to solve the situation, 
and that is why nobody translate the additional monetary demand into real 
demand. Keynes was not interested in short term fluctuations with low lev-
els of unemployment in which they might be some money illusion, he was 
concerned with very large fluctuations like the Great Depression in which 
there is just no role for the money illusion argument.
Stories
For these authors “confidence is not just the emotional state of an indi-
vidual. It is a view of other people´s confidence, and other people´s per-
ceptions of other people´s confidence”142. There are new era stories that 
spread like an epidemic. Confidence is as contagious as any disease.
Comment 
It is true that any Institutional Arrangements does have a corresponding 
story, a Conceptual System that bounds the institutions together. There-
fore, any economic situation does have a story attach, which is reflected 
in the actual institutions that exist. Both stories in the Conceptual System 
and real institutions operating in the real world define the Institutional 
Arrangement. But these stories are not just imagination, nor are they the 
outcome of irrationality. They are built as part of the true real history of 
the economy in question, and they are part of the survival characteristics 
of such society. Stories and Conceptual Systems are not irrational and do 
not have whimsical abrupt changes, they have a rational survival related-
ness with reality which is required for subsistence. Stories may end up 
being wrong ex-post but ex-ante, at their time, they are always reasonable 
142 p. 55
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and compatible with the known real facts. Such facts may be read in an 
optimistic or negativist mood; but the mood is not just irrational either. It 
depends upon a series of events that seem to be changing the Institutional 
Arrangement in question. We should emphasize that stories are there all 
the time, and therefore major economic crisis that occur sporadically can-
not be explained just by the presence of stories. There have to be specific 
real events changes that sporadically modify the story, institutional inad-
equate policies that shake the confidence of the people on the capacity of 
the institutions to face properly an uncertain future.        
The 2008 Crisis
The best way to understand the consequence of using Behavioral Eco-
nomics for macro problems is to review Akerlof and Shiller explanation 
of the 2008 crisis. Basically, for them animal spirits produced a real estate 
boom which eventually had to crash and it did. And “in its wake it has 
left the biggest real estate crisis since the 1930s, the so-called subprime 
crisis, as well as a global financial crisis whose full dimensions have yet to 
be grasped”143. Due to animal spirits “it appears that people had acquired a 
strong intuitive feeling that home prices everywhere can only go up”144. 
The story did spread mouth to mouth and created cycles of feedback. 
“Money illusion appears to explain some of the impressions that homes 
are spectacular investments”145. This housing boom was greater than ever 
before because of the political intention to provide housing to the most 
disadvantageous population. “The feedback that produced the epidemic 
of home-price increases had institutional, as well as cultural and psycho-
logical correlates”146. And “In this atmosphere it was easy for mortgage 
lenders to justify loosing their own lending standards”147.
Comment 
The problem with these authors argument is that major economic crises 
appear almost from nowhere, from animal spirits which dynamics is myste-
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rious and unpredictable. There is no doubt that markets do have herding 
in the sense that people is trying to guess what others will do. But booms 
do not start out of nowhere. Neither do crashes. They start with stories 
and in this they are correct, but two points must be stressed: 1) These 
stories always do have a rational component. And 2) They have to be 
institutionally supported by the financial authorities. The critical point is 
not whether there are or not psychological influences when investing at 
the individual level, because it is clear that they are. The real important 
discussion is: If this psychological influences at the individual level define 
the market prices or not? Keynes´ and Knight´s uncertainty means that the 
future is not known and investors have to built stories about what is go-
ing to happen and doing so they can be optimistic or pessimistic, but there 
is always real basis to do so. In Irrational Exuberance, Shiller argued that 
the mid 1990s stock market boom was due to the story of the invention 
and exploitation of the Internet. One may argue ex-post how accurate 
was the story, and whether it was or not overoptimistic; but, it was a real 
story. People that belief in it and have chosen to invest in companies that 
benefited from the latest so called TIC148, technological revolution. had 
made a fortune. Today the largest companies in the USA stock market 
are those related to the TIC revolution. Given uncertainty people have to 
create stories, but they do it based in the best available information they 
got, which is always insufficient and requires intuition and risk taking – 
risk in a non probability sense. Manias do extend market prices away 
from what pure fundamentals can justify, but not irrationally - people do 
their best guess using both their emotions and their reason. Manias are 
not due to irrationality, but to uncertainty.
In the 2000s prices in real state in USA went up because there had been 
a long economic boom which had increased substantially the consumer´s 
wealth and stock prices have become expensive while real estate was still 
reasonably priced149. Thus, fundamentals did indicate buying real estate. 
The 2008 crisis was not the consequence of the crash in real estate. Two 
facts strongly reinforce this view: 1) real state prices in Europe have in-
creased much more than in USA, and the crisis did not happen initially 
in Europe, it happened in USA; and 2) a careful analysis of real estate 
indexes, reveals that real estate prices did collapse in USA only after 
the banking crisis had increase dramatically the interest rates. Therefore, 
148 It is denominated TIC, because it had been a revolution in: Information (the I), Com-
munications (the C) and work place technology (the T).
149 Obregón 2011 and 2018b.
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the 2008 crisis happened the other way around. The real estate crash 
did not produce the banking crisis; the banking crisis produced the real 
estate crash. The only crash that occurred before the banking crisis was 
the variable rate subprime real estate crash. The reason for the variable 
rate subprime real estate crash was the rapid upward movement in the 
Federal Reserve rate. There is a clear fundamental reason that explains 
why the boom happened in the variable rate subprime real estate market 
in USA and why the crash occurred: the rapid downward and upward 
movement in the Federal Reserve rate. Why did the crash in variable rate 
subprime real estate produce the banking crisis? Because subprime loans 
have been integrated into sophisticated securities that included mortgage 
loans of higher quality, the so called MBS (mortgage back securities); the 
reason to do this was to get an optimal mix of risk and return. The MBS 
became very popular because they gave a higher yield at a time when the 
Federal Reserve interest rate was very low. The MBS were so attractive, 
that banks kept 75% of the MBS held in private hands. The variable 
rate subprime crash had the consequence that it became almost impos-
sible to value the sophisticated MBS that contained the variable rate sub-
prime loans; and because banks held the MBS in such great amounts, 
they became concern with the financial health of each other and they 
raised the LIBOR rate (the rate at which banks lend to each other). The 
consequence was a generalized increase in interest rates, that eventually 
caused both the real estate and the stock market crashes. Thus, there are 
clear fundamental causes of the 2008 crisis, which by the way explain why it 
did happen initially in USA and not in Europe150. 
The crisis was not contained on time, because inadequate institutional 
policies were implemented, based in a market free ideology of no interven-
tion. Financial authorities have become believers that risk was probabilistic 
and that markets could manage it very well; and therefore, that the markets 
were going to be very efficient in getting rid of the variable rate subprime 
crash. The authorities were wrong, uncertainty as to the unknown future 
is not probabilistic risk. And, as Knight and Keynes had already warned 
us: the markets could not manage this type of uncertainty. Credit confi-
dence in a credit economy is the key for economic transactions. The only 
one that could have had prevented the credit deterioration that happened 
was the government, by taking out the subprime variable rate loans out 
of the bank´s books (which in the beginning was not an expensive policy 
to take, and would of have been the easiest and most efficient way to pro-
150 For a more detailed explanation of the 2008 crisis, see Obregón 2018b chapter three.
1353) the nudge, behavioral macroeconomics and behavioral finance
ceed). Because the government did not do it, the vertebral axis of the credit 
economy – the banks remain in trouble; and the economy entered a credit 
crisis. The LIBOR rate was raise, therefore interest rates in general in the 
economy also went up, and they caused the real estate and stock market 
crashes, which left the balance sheets of all market participants in disarray; 
and the economy entered a full-blown credit crisis. The credit crisis had real 
fundamentals – the economic agents´ balance sheets had in fact deteriorate. 
The 2008 crisis was not a psychological crisis, of generalized mistrust 
because the boom in real estate had been overextended. Booms do relate 
to stories about the uncertain future, and when they are wrong they do 
correct themselves, and there are manias and contagious effects in these 
processes. Market volatility is in fact explained by the uncertainty of the 
future. But a major collapse like 2008, always have in addition serious 
institutional fundamental mistakes. The recovery was slow because the 
economic agents´ confidence has been shaken. But it was not an irrational 
deterioration of confidence - that we do not know where came from, nei-
ther that we cannot understand how can it be recover. The confidence of 
the agents has to do specifically with the authorities´ capability to handle 
the unknown future through the proper Institutional Arrangement; when 
institutions notoriously fail, of course confidence is shaken.
In all the process of the 2008 crisis there was no money illusion, buy-
ers read the newspapers and consulted specialists and they knew houses 
had become expensive; that however did not help them to predict when 
the boom was going to end, that is why they continued buying. Corrup-
tion did happen, but was not the cause of the crisis; it happened after – in 
the middle of the banking crisis. Some people have argued that the credit 
agencies were either irresponsible or corrupt and that the banks were 
greedy and abusive; but that story cannot be sustained in view of the fact 
that banks kept in their books 75% of the MBS held in private hands. 
Nobody shots himself in the foot. It is also argued that mortgages were 
offered with irresponsible schemes. This happened to some extent, but 
it did with ALT A loans and after the subprime variable rate loans crisis 
had already started and had already produced the banking crisis and the 
rise in interest rates. In fact, the rise in interest rates explains the mortgage 
flexible schemes. Thus, as we see neither irrational mistrust, nor money 
illusion, nor corruption, nor stories or fairness can explain the 2008 crisis. 
It was not produced by irrational animal spirits. But, by institutional mis-
takes that improperly managed the uncertainty as to the future. There are 
fundamental mistakes and errors that explain the dimensions of the crisis. 
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The view of the world of the strong proponents of free markets was 
shown to be wrong in the 2008 crisis. Risk is not just probability – risk, 
is also uncertainty as to the unknown future. Markets may manage well 
probability, but they cannot manage uncertainty. As we saw in the first 
chapter, the intent to show that markets operate freely by themselves can 
be counted as a failure in each one of the theoretical attempts; whether 
its is Welfare Economics, General equilibrium Theory, or Rational Ex-
pectations. There is future uncertainty, information is insufficient, and 
markets to operate need an adequate Institutional Arrangement. Thus, 
there are clear limits in the real world to the strong version of the rational 
economic man. Therefore, the strong version of the rational economic 
man has to be left to what it is. It is a very interesting theoretical frame-
work of analysis to understand some key economic problems, like price 
determination and allocation of resources; and one that also provides an 
anchor against which other theories can be better understood. But to use 
the strong version of the rational economic man to understand major 
macroeconomic crises is clearly a mistake. 
The fact however, that a strong version of the rational economic 
man cannot explain major macroeconomic crises; does not mean how-
ever, that such events are better explained by irrationality. Once we in-
troduce uncertainty as to the unknown future, even if economic agents 
were to behave as a model of rational expectations indicates, we would 
still have major economic crises. What explains why we have major 
economic crises like 2008, and also frequent fluctuations in asset prices, 
is not that the economic agent is irrational but the presence of uncer-
tainty as to the unknown future. Understanding these was the genius´ 
contribution of Keynes. In the following chapter we will get to the ques-
tion of How rational are we? And we will argue that we are not as 
rational as rational expectations assumes, but neither we are irrational 
as Akerlof and Shiler argue. 
In the postscript of The Nudge Thaler argues that the 2008 crisis was 
partially due to: 1) extreme complexity in products offered to investors 
and in the extreme diversity and complexity of mortgages offered in the 
borrower´s side; 2) lack of self control by refinancing the mortgage in 
instead of paying it; 3) the social contagion in the real estate bubble – he 
cites Shiller. Nudges he argues, if implemented would make a crisis like 
this less likely to occur. Is he right? As we had seen, he is not correct; 
none of the elements mentioned by him caused the crisis. Nudges would 
not have had help.
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Then, What could of help? To prevent the crisis as we had argued 
the government would of have had to take out the infected assets (the 
variable rate subprime loans) from the banks. Because it did not do it, 
the economy entered a banking crisis that culminated in an international 
credit crisis of huge dimensions. In a credit crisis the monetary policy 
does not longer work, because when the Central Bank lowers its interest 
rate it does not impact the private bank´s lending rate, which remains high 
due to the deterioration in the balance sheets of the potential borrowers. 
That is why the Federal Reserve had, for the first time in history, to enter 
the credit market directly, buying huge amounts of private assets. This 
wise move from the Federal Reserve, single handed, prevented the global 
economy from entering a depression like the 30´s.
Keynes had two channels through which uncertainty affected the 
macro-economy: the liquidity preference and the marginal efficiency of 
capital. When confidence deteriorates the liquidity preference increases 
and the marginal efficiency of capital goes also up. The increase in the 
liquidity preference can be expressed in a credit economy by a larger 
spread between the private bank´s lending rate and the Central Bank rate 
– which means that money supply increases do not flow into the real 
economy – do not translate into loans and higher aggregate demand – 
they remain only as increased liquidity. The deterioration in the liquid-
ity preference can be better seen in a Minsky´s model of the economy, 
which was latter used by Kindleberger in his book Manias, Panics and 
Crises. The Federal Reserve move to aggressively buy private assets – i.e. 
increase lending; clearly was a heterodox policy, that implicitly assumed 
that Keynes liquidity preference was right. As for the marginal efficiency 
of capital, the confidence deterioration will be reflected in an increase in 
the discount rate of the future flows expected from a particular invest-
ment. In theory, just as the Central Bank did provide credit directly, the 
government should spend more directly and it certainly did – again an 
implicit recognition that Keynes´ marginal efficiency of capital was right. 
But in our opinion, there was still more measures that could of had 
been taken. Once it was understood that confidence has deteriorated, 
rebuilding it was the major goal. Interventions to rebuild the balance 
sheets of the economic agents should of have been from the beginning 
the main policy. As we argued if the balance sheets of the banks had been 
clear from the beginning, by taking out the infected assets, we would not 
have had the crisis. But all along policy mistakes were made, by focusing 
first in bank´s liquidity and latter on in bank´s capitalization. None of these 
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policies made sense, because they did not clean the balance sheets of the 
banks. All along, what was needed was to removed the infected assets. 
Because they were not removed, the infection did spread through the 
credit system. Greater government expenditures were of course needed, 
this was the right policy, and it was done; but a further effort should of 
had been done to recover more directly the marginal efficiency of capital, 
by focusing government expenditures in areas where there could be co-
investments with the private sector or where there was a clearly identifi-
able impact in the real demand that the private sector faced.    
Consumption and Saving
Behavioral Economics introduces three psychological concepts into the 
theory of the consumption function: 1) mental accounting, 2) self control 
and 3) inconsistent time preferences. Inconsistent preferences mean that 
the discount rate varies through time. Animals in the laboratory are time 
inconsistent. And children capacity for postponing reward gratification 
varies among children and depends also upon environmental conditions. 
And because Kahneman´s system 1, inconsistent preferences always in-
volve a present bias. In mathematical terms, in instead of exponential 
discounting the individual will use hyperbolic discounting. Due to the 
present bias individual´s consumption in these models track income more 
closely. Hyperbolic discounting can explain the empirical fact that indi-
viduals do under-save for retirement and that there is a sharp drop in 
consumption at retirement. 
To introduce self control in models with inconsistent preferences an 
individual is assumed to have two selves a planer and the doer. The doer 
is always under the emotional influence of Kahneman´s system 1. Self 
control means that the planer creates situations that will make difficult for 
the doer to deviate in the future from the previously design plan. Mental 
accounting is one of such strategies of the planner. Mental accounting in 
these models can explain the empirical fact that the marginal propensity 
to consume from retirement accounts is very low, but the marginal pro-
pensity to consume from an unexpected job related bonus is very high. It 
can also explain why individuals hold simultaneously both illiquid assets 
and credit cards. And it has been argued that the expansion of efficient 
credit markets that allow to borrow against illiquid assets deteriorates 
the self control function, and may explain the empirical fact that national 
saving rates had been declining in the developed countries since the 70s.
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Due to the present bias in these models, investment goods price is 
below its marginal cost and the converse is true for leisure goods. Firms 
learn to implement a pricing policy that takes into consideration the 
consumer´s preference present bias. The notion of present bias has been 
applied to many other microeconomic consumption individual problems. 
For example, it has been shown that consumers buy single cigarette 
packs, or small packages of chip cookies or potato chips as a self control 
method despite the fact of their higher per unit price. In general, present 
bias models´ results will be sensitive to whether the consumer is aware, 
partial aware or not aware of his inconsistent preferences151.
Comment 
Savings in the neoclassical model are a function of the interest rate. And 
despite Sraffa´s and other´s criticisms, the neoclassical theory of capital 
can be reconstructed to show that for the general case there is an inverse 
relationship between interest rate (or profit rate) and the amount of capi-
tal. This reconstruction however does not close the model, changes in 
the interest rate (or profit) come from outside. Therefore, there is not an 
endogenous determination of the quantity of capital. As we saw in the 
first chapter, there is no way to have an endogenous optimal solution for 
the neoclassical model, therefore institutional choices are always relevant. 
Saving is nor only an individual choice, it is also a social institutional 
choice, this can hardly be denied when one sees cases like Singapore 
or China. The long run savings of a given economy have to do with 
economic growth policies and with the long term borrowing capacity of 
a given particular country. Therefore, any explanations of countries na-
tional savings differences, that are only based in individuals’ consump-
tion choices are in general or insufficient or mistaken 
There are however critical determinants of individual savings, that do 
define consumption patterns, which are key for macroeconomic stability. 
In fact, Keynes key contribution in the general theory, as Patinkin had 
argued, was his Consumption Function. Keynes made consumption a 
function of income and that allow him to understand and establish unem-
ployment equilibrium. 
However, in Keynes consumption was a function of present income 
and that left unexplained two critical empirical facts that were to be known 
151 For a good summary of the implications of Behavioral Economics for the Consumption 
Function, see Dhami 2016.
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after Second World War. First consumption increased substantially after 
the war, second Kuznets found that in time series the average propensity 
to consume was stable, that is it did not respond as much to present 
income as Keynes thought. Friedman´s Permanent Income Hypothesis 
and Modigliani´s Life Cycle Theory did accommodate the empirical facts. 
Modigliani in addition provided a theory that explained cross country 
data as a function of how old was the average population. 
Recently, some new empirical data has shown the existence of an 
important inter-generational transmission of wealth, to be imputed to 
motives that are exogenous to the life-cycle model. Pensioners save a 
very high proportion of their income; young families, at least in West-
ern Europe and Japan, save a positive and increasing proportion of their 
income; and the rich continue to save more than the less fortunate. This 
bequest motive for saving can be better understood in rational expecta-
tions models which calculate savings taking into account consumption 
needs of future generations. These rational expectations models, Barro´s 
for example, will make consumption more reactive to actual income – 
because a non anticipated change in income is not associated with past 
income through adaptive expectations, in instead it is read as a change in 
permanent income.
Each one of these consumption function theories is particularly useful 
to explain different historical data: Keynes´ for large depressions, Per-
manent Income Hypothesis and Life Cycle Theory for post war data in 
which the economy was near full employment equilibrium, and Rational 
Expectations for explaining the bequest motive. 
Keynes was concerned with big depressions and in them consumption 
is in fact mainly a function of present income. One could argue that in 
2008 there was nor only a higher marginal efficiency of capital – a higher 
discount to future investment returns, but also a higher marginal effi-
ciency of consumption – that is a higher discount rate to future personal 
income. The drastic fall in income in 2008 deteriorated the consumer 
expectations substantially, and this can be seen either as: 1) a higher re-
sponse of the consumption function to present income, as Keynes did; or 
2) a drastic fall in permanent income – which cannot be explained; or 3) 
a higher discount rate of the future personal income. In any case, in any 
of the three options, the point to emphasize is that consumption - in major 
economic crises - goes drastically down and it does not recover quickly. 
The Life Cycle Theory was very useful to explain post war data. 
With an economy near equilibrium, the view of the long run was es-
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tablished and people then reacted much less at income variations in the 
short term. To be near equilibrium allows people to plan their savings in 
a longer horizon. 
Rational expectations go even further away in the time horizon and 
have been useful to explain the recent data in terms of a bequest motive. 
Behavioral Economics has shown that it is useful to explain other 
microeconomic consumption data such as under-saving for retirement, 
why individuals hold simultaneously both illiquid assets and credit cards, 
and that the marginal propensity to consume from retirement accounts 
is very low, but the marginal propensity to consume from an unexpected 
job related bonus is very high. 
Neither the Permanent Income Hypothesis, nor the Life Cycle The-
ory, nor Rational Expectations, nor Behavioral Economics can explain 
why consumption – in major economic crises - goes drastically down and 
it does not recover quickly. For this explanation we need Keynes´ theory.
Behavioral consumption models are generally very sensitive to the 
assumptions made, for example whether customers are sophisticated or 
naïve about their future preferences. If they are sophisticated the planer 
also has a very long vision into the future. The sophisticated planner is 
no one else than the rational economic man just that he is aware that in 
the future he might behave as a doer. 
Behavioral Economics has proven its usefulness to explain key mi-
croeconomic behavior and it is natural to continue along these lines of 
research. Where will it go or how successful will it be? We do not know. 
The only thing which is true is that the framework of analysis used sus-
tains itself in traditional economics, therefore it does not represent a new 
paradigm; and as of today it has not yet gain the popularity which the 
more traditional approaches enjoy. 
An interesting mostly unexplored alternative to some of the Behav-
ioral Economics explanations is uncertainty in Keynes sense. Given un-
certainty as to how long one will live and as to what the future conditions 
might be, it makes sense for a reasonable man to be present bias and to 
under-save for retirement which will explain a sharp drop in consump-
tion at retirement. Mental accounting then can be understood just as rea-
sonable insurance - i.e. to buy illiquid assets is an insurance for the future 
and credit cards the consequence of present bias. With future uncertainty 
it is also understandable that the marginal propensity to consume from 
retirement accounts is very low but the marginal propensity to consume 
from an unexpected job related bonus is very high. The point to stress is 
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that given non probabilistic uncertainty, to explain many micro-empirical facts, we may 
not require any longer the assumption of the doer or of hyperbolic discounting. This 
unexplored alternative deserves further research. 
behavioral finance
Thaler (2015) argues that the area in which Behavioral Economics has 
been more successful is Behavioral Finance152. As we will show, he is only 
partially right.
Before discussing the controversy between the Efficient Market Hy-
pothesis (EMH) and Behavioral Finance, it is necessary to review how 
the notion of risk as probability developed in economics – and What it 
means? Since the EMH is a consequence of such notion.
The Three Great Contributions of Defining Volatility as Risk 
Keynes and Knight’s view of uncertainty as that which is unknown was 
replaced by postwar economists with the notion of a probabilistic risk 
based on information of what is known. This transformation had great 
consequences in the history of macroeconomics and finances. It is ini-
tially due to the 1981 Nobel Prize winner, James Tobin. In his initial 
contribution to the theory of the portfolio in 1956, Tobin argues that the 
reason people diversify their portfolio between bonds and cash, although 
the cash does not have any return, is because there is uncertainty in rela-
tion to the future rate of interest. Cash is a way to protect yourself in the 
event that interest rates rise and the bond position becomes a loser. To 
measure this future uncertainty, Tobin uses a probability function. 
Thus, curiously enough, in an article in which it appears that Tobin 
is enriching Keynes’s theory, he actually disappears Keynes’ uncertainty 
theory from contemporary discussion. Tobin was successful, to the point 
that the great majority of the postwar economists have not read thor-
oughly Keynes’ General Theory. 
From the point of view of finances, Tobin’s conception of risk had great 
consequences. Tobin’s notion joined that of Harry Markowitz, who had al-
ready written that investment portfolios had to be diversified, and that the 
risk of the total portfolio could be measured through the co-variances of the 
152 For good reviews in Behavioral Finance, see Thaler 1993 and 2005.
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shares it contains. Tobin suggested that the decision between risk-free and 
risky assets could be done with his portfolio theory, and that risky assets 
could be selected using the Markowitz methodology that maximized per-
formance for a given risk level. Markowitz’s efficient frontier is the set of all 
portfolios that will deliver the highest expected return for each given level 
of risk. These concepts of efficiency are essential for the development of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) model, developed later on by William 
Sharpe, a student of Markowitz’s, who shared the Nobel Prize with him in 
1990. CAPM proposes a systematic methodology to maximize return, mini-
mizing total portfolio risk. It is based on the co-variances between the assets. 
Sharpe proved that the most efficient portfolio of all, the one optimiz-
ing risk-return, is the portfolio that buys the entire market. Sharpe’s result 
forever changed the professional investment fund management industry. 
Pension investment funds increasingly acquired the total stock market index. This was 
the first great contribution of the definition of volatility as risk. 
Franco Modigliani (Nobel 1985) and Merton Miller (Nobel 1990), would 
also use the efficiency of the markets to show their theorem — that estab-
lishes that the value of a company is independent of its capital structure, i.e. 
it is independent of whether the company uses capital from its shareholders 
or market debt. The Modigliani-Milller theorem is the basis for modern thinking about 
capital structure. This is the second critical contribution of volatility as risk. 
Fischer Black and Myron Scholes (Nobel 1997) would also use the 
markets’ efficiency to show that the price of a derivative is independent 
of the price of the underlying asset, and depends only on the underlying 
asset’s volatility. All things being equal, the theoretical value of an option 
is a monotonous increasing function of implied volatility. The derivative 
market changed forever the practice of finance. This is the third enormously important 
contribution of defining volatility as risk. 
The Problems of Defining Risk as Volatility 
Measuring volatility requires historical observations, therefore depends 
on the specific historical period used. To minimize this bias, analysts typi-
cally use a reference period as long as possible —though this does not take 
away its historical dependence. 
One of the recent failures in the use of this type of risk estimates was 
the famous Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) fund that had the 
advice of Nobel Prize winners in economics, and the financing by the big 
USA banks. The LTCM fund developed risk models to invest in Russia. 
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Nevertheless, the Russian crisis of 1998 brought great losses to the LTCM 
fund. Why? Because the crisis did not behave like the historical past. There 
is really no way to know the future through probability models. 
The basic reason for Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy was that the vola-
tility of the markets did not behave like anything they had seen in recent 
history. Lehman’s risk models failed, and Lehman broke eventually. The 
risk ultimately turned out to be something different, something more 
than just volatility. Volatility risk as defined by the various Nobel Prizes 
that studied it (such as Tobin, Markowitz, Sharpe, and others) cannot 
explain the 2008 crisis. Knight and Keynes were right after all. Unfortu-
nately, their thinking was not followed by the main tradition because the 
economy of the developed countries took, after the 30s, eighty years to 
register a new global financial crisis. 
The Derivatives Market and The 2008 Crisis 
The CDS (Credit Default Swaps) are a form of credit payment insur-
ance. In particular, some CDS insure the payment of CMOs (Collater-
alized Mortgage Obligation). In the 2008 crisis once the banking crisis 
happened and the interest rates rise a lot, the risk of no payment of the 
CMOs increased immensely – the volatility increased a lot. Therefore, 
the gross market value of the CDS went to the roof. In 2007, before the 
crisis, the gross market value of the global derivatives market (excluding 
interest rate swaps) was 8.6 trillion dollars —around 5% of the total value 
of all financial assets worldwide. Of the 8.6 trillion, the CDS represented 
2 trillion - including those securing the payment of mortgage loan pack-
ages- CMOs. In 2008, the CDS went up to 5.1 trillion. Why did they go 
up so much? Because of systemic risk, when it occurs, risk changes are 
parametric. This is what drove AIG (the most important insurer in the 
United States) into bankruptcy. 
Derivatives are the price of volatility, therefore, if volatility gets out 
of its historical trend and increases a lot, the derivatives price can move 
sharply. The gross market value of the CDS in 2007 did not include the 
systemic risk that materialized in 2008. Here we have a clear example of 
the two type of risks we have been discussing. What was in the value in 
2007 was historical volatility risk; the value in 2008 was historical volatil-
ity risk plus systemic risk —institutional risk reflected in additional volatil-
ity, the risk of the unknown future, people did not know what was going 
to happen, that is why the CDS value moved so sharply. 
1453) the nudge, behavioral macroeconomics and behavioral finance
What is Risk? 
Who is right, Tobin or Keynes? Is it okay to use volatility as a measure of 
risk? Why did the value-at-risk models based on volatility (VAR) failed? 
Is it possible that so many Nobel Prizes are wrong? 
There are clearly two very different visions about what is risk: 1) for 
Knight and Keynes, risk was uncertainty related to the unknown; and 
2) for the postwar economist of the main tradition, risk was volatility. 
The two visions belong to two different conceptions of the economic 
world, constructed to explain different real economic situations. Keynes 
was concerned about explaining how situations such as The Great De-
pression and the Great Contraction of 2008 can arise. Postwar theorists 
were concerned about understanding the near-equilibrium economy that 
was experienced in the second half of the twentieth century. It is not the 
case that one vision of risk is correct and the other is wrong. In fact, they 
complement each other and are useful to explain distinct circumstances 
of the economic reality. 
The notion of equilibrium is necessary to obtain contemporary fi-
nance theories’ results. If the economy is close to equilibrium, historical 
volatility is a good indicator. Consequently, the three great contributions 
of risk as volatility do hold up. Derivatives markets work well, investing 
in the market as a whole is a good advice, and it does not really matter 
whether a company is financed with equity or not. However, if we move 
away from the equilibrium, the results of finance theories no longer hold 
up because historic volatility is no longer a good indicator. This is what 
happened with the LTCM fund or with Lehman Brothers. 
Neither of the two visions is wrong, they just explain distinct realities. 
Depending on the type of problem we are going to solve, one vision or the 
other may be more appropriate. Both visions could be complementary. 
But what is certain is that postwar economist and regulators had totally 
disregarded the Knight-Keynes vision. The consequence was that in the 
2008 crisis the market participants’ conception of risk and of the regulators 
was only based on the vision of risk as volatility. Therefore, when the 2008 
credit crisis occurred and produced unusual large volatilities —for historical 
standards— the financial market collapsed, because the risk models used 
could not contemplate volatilities so distant from the historical ranges. 
The concept of risk as volatility is only sustainable in an economy 
close to equilibrium in which the future does not differ substantially from 
the past. The basic concept of VAR models is that the value at risk is 
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related to the historical volatility of the investments made, particular to 
their co-variances. When there is a generalized collapse of confidence, we 
move from the world of equilibrium to the world of Knight and Keynes 
and historical volatility ceases to function properly as a guide for the fu-
ture —this is what happened in 2008. 
The Controversy Between EMH and Behavioral Finance
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) argues that share prices reflect all 
information and consistent alpha generation is impossible. Neither techni-
cal nor fundamental analysis can produce risk-adjusted excess returns, or 
alpha, consistently. According to the EMH, stocks always trade at their 
fair value on stock exchanges, making it impossible for investors to either 
purchase undervalued stocks or sell stocks for inflated prices. As such, it 
should be impossible to outperform the overall market through expert stock 
selection or market timing, and the only way an investor can possibly obtain 
higher returns is by purchasing riskier investments. Data seems to confirm 
the EMH, since Jensen´s PHD thesis it has consistently been shown that pro-
fessional money managers do not do better than simple market averages. 
The basic assumption in the EMH is that any asset price will be equal to its 
future risk adjusted returns; which means that risk and return are related 
due to the definition of risk of Tobin, Markowitz, Sharpe and others. 
Behavioral Finance has produced many results that seem to contradict 
the EMH. The following, even though is not exhaustive, is a list of such 
results: 1) De Bondt and Thaler (1985) have shown that Beta risk adjusted 
losers outperform winners; 2) it has been argued that value investing rec-
ommendations by Graham and others only work if understood as market 
price violations of EMH153; 3) it has also been shown that Beta risk ad-
justed value stocks with either low price earnings ratios or low ratios of the 
stock price to its book value of assets outperform growth stocks (Lakon-
ishok, et al. 1994)154; 4)  Shiller 1981, has shown that the price fluctuates 
more than the ex-post known discounted dividends;  5) Lee, Shleifer and 
Thaler (1991) have shown that the average discount in close end funds 
was correlated with the difference in returns between small and large com-
panies and both were driven according to them by small investors senti-
ment. Thaler argues that the price in close end funds violates the law of 
one price; 6) Shleifer 1986, and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) , argue 
153  Thaler 2015, p. 221.
154 See also, Thaler 2015, p. 227.
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that the price of newly introduced securities into the S&P 500 index im-
mediately jumps upwards despite the fact that there is no new information 
and that market crashes ocurr withouth any new information about the 
fundamental values; 7) Froot and Dabora 1999, shows that Siamese-twin 
companies merge on a x:y basis continue trading separately in different 
markets at trade prices distinct from the x:y ratio; 8) Debondt and Thaler 
1985, argue that winner stocks over a long horizon give lower subsequent 
returns and losers give higher subsequent returns; 9) Jegadeesh and Tit-
man 1993, argue that there is a momentum effect – recent stocks market 
performance can carry over to the future; 10) De Giorgi and Legg 2012, 
argue that the overweight of the downside probability explains the equity 
premium; 11) Loss aversion is argued by Benartzi and Thaler 1995, ex-
plains the equity premium; 12) Odean 1998, maintains that loss aversion 
explains the disposition effect which may prevent people to selling stock 
below its purchase price; Bernard and Thomas 1989, and Michaely et al 
1995 argue that there is a post-earnings dfrift.      
All of these Behavioral Finance results, were however, not accepted 
by EMH defendants as a proof that the EMH does not work. The EMH 
defendants started to look for other definitions of risk under which many 
of the previous results do not longer hold. The debate in the EMH hy-
pothesis continues to go on. 
As a normative model Thaler thinks that the EMH is right, as a descrip-
tive model he argues that it does not work. He argues that prices are often 
wrong – that the intrinsic value is only a normative value. But he recognizes 
that the second proposition, that there is no way to beat the market is true. 
Comment 
The EMH has similar problems to the economic cycle theory of rational 
expectations. None of the two can really explain the fluctuations in the 
economic/and or the stock market world unless we introduce Keynes´ 
assumption of uncertainty as to the unknown future. Economic cycles 
cannot be really explained with rational expectations. The Phelps´islands 
that do not share information are required in Rational Expectations Models 
to explain economic cycles. But such islands do not make sense in a world 
of full information and rational expectations. Contractual theory and other 
rigidities introduced by contemporary post Keynesians are also difficult 
to defend and at most can explain short term economic cycles, but never 
great recessions. 
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We can hardly understand economic cycles and particularly big reces-
sions, unless we take seriously the proposal that the future is uncertain and 
that the economic agents are always trying to guess how it will be (within 
a given Institutional Arrangement). Economic cycles are the consequence 
of changes in guessing the future. Major crises are due to institutional mis-
takes that jeopardize people´s confidence in the institutions to provide fu-
ture stability at the ever moving economic process of guessing the future. 
Asset price fluctuations are related to economic cycles; they fluctuate 
with stories about the future; stories that will always be there because of 
the uncertainty about the future. Shiller finding, that the fluctuations in 
asset prices cannot be explain by dividends because the latter fluctuate 
much less, is the natural consequence of the uncertainty about the future. 
The fact that ex-ante prices are wrong in relationship to future ex-post 
dividends, do not mean that the prices are irrational – i.e. defined by 
psychological factors. Prices are the best reasonable guess ex-ante of such 
future ex-post presently unknown dividends; but, given uncertainty they 
will always be wrong, and will fluctuate more than ex-post dividends.
The stock market is the most liquid market in the economy, therefore 
is like a thermometer of what is expected in the future. While risk prob-
ability models link the past with the future, uncertainty as to the future 
remind us that it is not known and that parametric changes occur all the 
time, particularly at the level of each firm or organization. The market 
is always assessing these parametric changes in future expected returns 
and adjusting the prices accordingly. Therefore, given uncertainty in the 
Keynes- Knight sense, minor news may produce large asset prices moves. 
And there is a contagion effect, which we could observe clearly, for ex-
ample, in the Asian financial crisis in the 90s. Where a sharp downward 
movement in the stock prices of an economy in macro-financial problems 
– Thailand – cause also a sharp downward movement in other Asian 
countries stock prices, even though their macro-financials were healthy. 
Eventually however, this contagious effects vanish as investors under-
stand better what is really happening. The contagious effect can be either 
positive or negative; this is what Kindleberger denominated manias and 
panics. Therefore, uncertainty explains why even if we have rational eco-
nomic agents analyzing the stocks and defining their intrinsic value, there 
will be significant volatility in the prices. Given uncertainty the stock 
market behavior is not smooth as one will expect from the EMH.
There is an unresolved tension in Thaler´s views; because, if prices 
are wrong and can be identified ex-ante as wrong, then it must be pos-
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sible to beat the market – which empirically does not happen. If they 
cannot be ex-ante identified as wrong and can only be argued as wrong 
ex-post, then the meaning of wrong is just the consequence of the fact 
that any measure of probability risk is an inadequate measure of future 
uncertainty-the future ends up being different than what the probabilities 
of the past indicated. 
There is overall uncertainty as to the future and investors, as we said, 
are trying to read the future, and get optimistic or pessimistic, guided by 
news and institutional choices which are never very clear to read, and 
people follow others because nobody is sure of how the future is going to 
look like. But people guesses embodied in the price is the best that can be 
done ex-ante giving the future uncertainty. That is why the market can-
not be beaten. The experiment of the Long Term Capital Fund managed 
by Nobel Prizes, among others, clearly show that probability risk models 
are not a good hedge against the future unknowns.  
There may even be consensus upon the fact that houses are unusu-
ally expensive related to its replacement costs or that stocks prices are 
too high related to book values or to earnings – but that does not tell 
the investor what to do, because the length of the bubble is not known. 
They may remain expensive for a very - very long period. That is why 
you cannot beat the market. Uncertainty ex-ante cannot be reduced by 
ex-post information. Shiller results on ex-post dividends are not relevant 
as determinants of ex-ante prices. 
Thaler shows that the surplus produced ex-post by football players do 
not correspond with the ex-ante price paid to acquire them. That means 
that to the EMH we need to add future uncertainty. Given uncertainty, 
nobody knows the future and therefore ex-ante prices and ex-post results 
should diverge.  But the fact that there is uncertainty as to the unknown 
future, does not mean that people do not take into account all the fun-
damentals when they invest. The fact that there is uncertainty, does not 
mean that markets do not work, or that agents are not rational. The two 
points must not be confused.
Analyzing a gambling television game, Thaler points out that gamblers 
are not very risk averse, which for him puts some doubts into the tradi-
tional explanation that the high equity premium is explained by extreme 
risk averse behavior. The analysis also showed strong support for path 
dependence “Contestants clearly reacted not just to the gambles they were 
facing, but also to the gains and looses along the way”155. The results were 
155 p. 300
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replicated with students. A particular benefit of the TV game was that the 
stakes were pretty high. Benartzi and Thaler (1995), explains the equity 
premium by the fact that people look at their financial statement too often, 
and therefore they penalize the long term benefits of investing in stocks.
Thaler cannot have it both ways, either there is path dependence and 
future markets prices are forecastable in which case professional portfolio 
managers should be able to beat the market, or there is no path depen-
dence because any available information is already in the price and that 
is why portfolio managers cannot beat the market.
People are not that irrational as to penalize the long term benefits just 
by looking to often in their statements. People is uncertainty averse. Real 
markets are not a game with known probabilities and infinite repetitions. 
Individual living time is a real constraint. An individuals live in an ever 
changing world in which the future is not known. Under these conditions 
to be highly uncertainty averse is an evolutionary survival trait. That is 
what explains the equity premium. 
To take into account the uncertainty as to the unknown future 
does not mean that the behavior is irrational or mainly motivated by 
Kahneman´s famous system 1. 
Behavioral finance has been successful in showing that the strong ver-
sion of the EMH cannot explain the high volatility in asset prices, nor 
other facts like: why ex-ante beta risk adjusted losers outperform win-
ners, why ex-ante beta risk adjusted value stocks with either low price 
earnings ratios or low ratios of the stock price to its book value of assets 
outperform growth stocks, why value investing recommendations seem 
to work, why the average discount in close end funds is correlated with 
the difference in returns between small and large companies, why the 
closed end funds violate the one price law. However, all these results 
of Behavioral Finance are due to mixing ex-ante measures of risk and 
ex-post returns or ex-ante asset prices and ex-post dividends. All these 
measures cross the line of time between today and tomorrow - and they 
are a clear violation of uncertainty in the Knight-Keynes sense.
It is very important to emphasize what does it mean that the market 
cannot be consistently beaten. It means that there are no ex-ante rules 
that can be found to outperform the market. And this is theoretically a 
very strong proposition. Because if such rules could be found, the best 
business in the world will be to sale them, and as everybody learn to use 
such rules they would no longer work. The future cannot be known. If it 
could be known, it would be already the present. The great philosopher 
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of science Popper was once asked What did he thought that innova-
tion was? He answered: Innovation, innovation is about what we do not 
know. This is what uncertainty is. 
Uncertainty explains the high volatility in asset prices ex-ante versus 
ex-post dividends.  And it also explains why ex-ante beta risk (or other 
ex-ante probabilistic measures of risk) is not correlated with ex-post re-
turns.  It just means that ex-ante probabilistic risk just does not fully 
express the true ex-ante uncertainty. There may be other probability risk 
that works better than beta, but none will work perfect because the ex-
ante risk is not probabilistic, it is uncertainty as to the unknown. 
Closed end funds do not violate the law of one price, they just have 
less liquidity and more uncertainty. Close end funds discounts are cor-
related with the difference between large and small stocks. because small 
stocks are less liquid than large stocks, small stocks are more uncertain. 
Losers must out perform winners because they are more uncertain, the 
fact that risk adjusted they continue to outperform means that the prob-
ability risk measure is not an adequate measure of uncertainty. Growth 
stocks are less uncertain therefore they should be outperformed by low 
P/E stocks or low P/Book Value stocks; and again the fact that even after 
risk adjusting they continue to be outperform just means that the risk 
measure is underestimating uncertainty. 
The search for the correct risk probability measure will be unsuc-
cessful and will give room to an endless discussion between the EHM 
defenders and the Behavioral Finance ones. However, if we are willing to 
accept uncertainty the name of the game changes. Any ex-ante measure 
has to be unsuccessful related to any ex-post measure. And in general, 
measures that combine ex-ante data with ex-post data are not very useful 
to understand the behavior of asset prices in a world of uncertainty. 
Behavioral economist had been very successful in showing that the 
stock market does not behave as smooth as one would expect with the 
EMH, but it is not due to irrationality as Behavioral Economics argues, 
but to uncertainty. The main limitation of the EMH is that risk is uncer-
tainty and not probabilistic.
Uncertainty explains why any measure of ex-ante risk will fail to cor-
relate with ex-post returns, why risk adjusted prices will not behave ac-
cording to the rationality of the EMH. Thus, clearly something is fun-
damentally wrong with the EMH – risk is not only probabilistic, it is 
also uncertainty. Behavioral finance has been able to show some of the 
limitations of EMH. However, it has not been successful in showing that 
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market asset prices are defined by irrational psychological factors. Given 
future uncertainty, asset prices are as reasonable as they can be.
Because there is uncertainty people is always trying to guess the future 
and position against it. And the only way to do it is by stories that link the 
past with the future. Now, due to uncertainty those stories are always chang-
ing and there is at times more optimism and at times less. Since any asset is 
nothing else that the present discounted value of a future stream of returns, 
as the view of the future changes it necessary produce asset price fluctuations. 
Such fluctuations are related to economic cycles with increased or lowered 
investment. The optimistic stories do create manias and disappointments may 
produce panics which if not well manage by the financial authorities may 
conduce to crises. Thus, there was a lot of true in Kindleberger´s book. But it 
is important to point out that Kindleberger taught that financial crises were 
a thing of the past in the developed world, because in his opinion the Insti-
tutional Arrangement had learn to manage panics and prevent them from 
becoming crises. He was wrong, as 2008 have shown us. 
Are there psychological factors in the manias, yes they are; are there 
psychological factors in the panics, yes they are; do herding explain to 
some extent both phenomenon; yes, it does. But all of this do not mean 
that economic agents are irrational. It is not irrational to follow group 
behavior when there is uncertainty. And the group is not irrational ei-
ther, there are always some facts that change the story. Yes, they may 
be an overreaction, because as we will see in the following chapter even 
though economic agents are not irrational they are neither as rational as 
the strong version of rationality would assume. In a world of uncertainty 
and with highly uncertainty averse economic agents, small new news 
may produce large price fluctuations. 
Behavioral Economics do have an important point, markets do not 
behave like they would of behave if the strong rationality assumed by the 
free market defenders and by the EMH were correct – and this is a very 
relevant contribution. But, the fact that the strong rationality assumption 
does not hold, does not mean that economic agents or group behavior 
is irrational. Given uncertainty, high uncertainty aversion is a superior 
evolutionary trait (a point we will further explain in the following chap-
ter); and therefore we should expect large equity premiums. And given 
uncertainty aversion there are also quick and large reactions to small 
news, thus we should expect large asset price fluctuations. 
The point that we would like to highlight is that fluctuations create manias 
and panics; but they do not produce crises unless institutions fail in the policies they 
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implement. This is particular true in big depressions. The idea that markets 
by themselves should maintain equilibrium has over and over proven 
wrong, the attack of Behavioral Economics to EMH is just one more 
of these instances. A more general and relevant notion is that markets 
do not exist ever by themselves, they are always within an Institutional 
Arrangement. The Institutional Arrangement might be more or less ad-
equate for specific social or economic goals, but in general its purpose 
is to guarantee group survival. Survival however does not require for 
institutional crises not to happen. Minor financial crises are a natural con-
sequence of the Institutional Arrangement´s natural process of learning 
under uncertainty. A major global crisis, however, always implies serious 
institutional failures.       
[154]
BEYOND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
Behavioral Economics was built mainly as a critique of the strong rational 
economic man of contemporary Neoclassical Economics, particularly in 
its free markets version. As we argued in Chapter one such free market 
version is unsustainable theoretically due to the failure of Welfare Eco-
nomics, General Equilibrium Theory and Rational Expectation Theory; 
and is indefensible in practice due to three historical events: 1) the 2008 
crisis; 2) despite the free markets ideology - governments grew in the de-
veloped economies in the 20th century from 10% of GDP to 40%; 3) the 
failure of the Washington consensus to achieve economic growth on the 
economies that followed the recommended policies. 
However, despite the previous failures, the fact remains that the fast 
economic growth in Capitalism versus previous modes of production has 
to be explained; and so the allocation of resources through prices in large 
markets. We had been arguing that the economic growth of Capitalism is 
to a large extent satisfactorily explained by a soft version of the rational 
economic man, like the one introduced by Smith; and that despite their 
theoretical failure, Welfare Economics and General Equilibrium Theory 
continue to be the best explanation that we have as to how resources are 
allocated in large markets through the price mechanism.
The humans of Behavioral Economics are defined as non rational, al-
truistic and social cooperative individuals. But humans defined this way 
cannot explain several empirical realities such as. 1) Why individuals do 
behave selfish in large markets, despite the fact that they display altruistic 
and cooperative behavior in laboratory settings or small groups - even in 
monetary transactions. 2) Why individuals can display altruistic and co-
operative social behavior in some cases, like the dictator´s game in labora-
tory setting or the high social expenditures in developed economies; and 
not do so in other cases, like the extreme low international aid (which is 
nothing else than a global Dictator´s Game in real life). 3) Why in some 
cases individuals can display very aggressive behavior, particularly to 
“other” individuals not belonging to the in-group to which the individual 
belongs. 4) Why the companies with more global success are the ones 
which introduce new options to the customer and new ways to process 
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information in a more rational way. 5) Why despite the presumed indi-
vidual non rationality markets work so well both to allocate resources 
and to promote economic growth. To explain these realities, we need to 
go beyond Behavioral Economics.
Behavioral Economics points out the need to integrate economics 
with other social sciences like psychology and sociology and argues that 
we are humans and nor econs; and that we will better understand economic 
behavior by focusing in humans in instead of econs. But Behavioral Eco-
nomics has a methodological problem that does not allow it to explain 
the empirical facts described in the previous paragraph. Just like the free 
market ideology that it criticizes, Behavioral Economics starts its analy-
sis form the characteristics of the individual human nature. The whole 
discussion is around whether individuals are selfish or not and whether 
they are rational or not. But there is not a careful description of the social 
group, the institutions and the historical values of the culture of refer-
ence. This methodology to describe social dynamics starting with the 
individual characteristics is limited to three schools in economics: The 
free market ideology of contemporary Neoclassical Economics, Behav-
ioral Economics and Sen´s economics. Even the contemporary Keynesian 
Neoclassical School, that did not defend the free market ideology – like 
Samuelson, Solow and many others, only used the characteristics of the 
individual to conceptualize the functioning of large economic markets; 
but, clearly understood and accepted that economic dynamics went be-
yond the markets and that government intervention was required. All 
the other New Schools of economic thought, mentioned in chapter one, 
understood and emphasized the need of institutions in the determination 
both of the economic equilibrium and the economic growth path.
Focusing on the individual to explain social dynamics and economic 
relations is the wrong methodological approach, which for the free mar-
ket defenders ended up in their proposals that economic markets can 
almost do it all. Behavioral Economics rebels against this conclusion, but 
by maintaining the same methodological approach it ended up with the 
conclusion that humans display altruistic and cooperative behavior even 
in monetary transactions; but could not explain why in some cases they 
do and in others they do not. And it could not explain in which cases 
individual selfishness is welcome and in which it is not. And it could not 
understand the relationship between the individual selfish behavior in 
large markets, the efficient allocation of resources and the Capitalism´s 
faster economic growth. Social dynamics goes well beyond economics, 
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and we do need to integrate other social sciences, but we should not and 
cannot do it using only the methodology of analyzing the characteristics 
of the individuals; because social dynamics goes, as we will see, well be-
yond the individuals. 
Introducing psychology, allowed Behavioral Economics to describe 
a non rational individual incapable to know in many occasions what are 
his true economic preferences. But then, how do markets work so well 
to allocate resources and governments do so poorly? Why the USSR 
failed and the Western economies succeeded? These questions cannot be 
answered with Behavioral Economics. We need to go beyond.
A critical empirical Study is the Robbers Cave experiment made by 
Sherif and Harvey, described previously already. The results on this key 
study cannot be explained neither with Behavioral Economics nor with 
its extension into identity economics. Individuals were socially coopera-
tive, but only within the in-group, and they became selfish and aggressive 
to the individuals belonging to the out-group. Thus, individuals are nei-
ther altruistic and cooperative nor selfish and aggressive – they behave 
different in distinct situations. And to understand these results, it is not 
enough to internalize in the individual´s utility function the social norms 
as identity economics do. Because, if the individuals had internalized the 
humanistic values of their large society, they would not had become so 
aggressive to the other students group, which after all in reality were part 
of the same large society to which they belonged. What the study basi-
cally showed, is that there are not very relevant individual preferences, 
that they can be changed with the influence of the group, actually in a 
record time of less than a week.
Sherif and Harvey were trying to show precisely that, as Gestalt Psy-
chology had argued before, group behavior emerges which is distinct to 
the sum of the separate behavior of the individuals involved. They were 
successful. The new values of the in-group became to be very aggressive 
towards the out-group to the point that the experiment had to be inter-
rupted. This happened, despite the fact that all the students belonged 
to the same large society, and therefore none of the individuals isolated 
would of by himself had behaved so aggressively. The group behavior 
that emerged was different than the sum of the behavior of the isolated 
individuals that constituted the group.
To understand why the group is so decisive in defining the individual´s 
behavior, and to explain the five empirical realities mentioned above, we 
have to go beyond Behavioral Economics into a deeper integration of 
4) beyond behavioral economics 157
economics with other sciences. This is the purpose of this chapter. We 
will follow an evolutionary approach, and it may seem at times to the 
reader that we are digressing from the main topic. But, please hold on. 
At the end, we will show how this approach: 1) allow us to understand 
the primacy of the group over the individual; 2) explains the five empiri-
cal realities mentioned above; and 2) permits the understanding of the 
contributions and limitations of the diverse schools of economic thought. 
existence: synchrony and diachrony
There is a universal synchrony156. A harmonious universe that follows 
physical laws. One in which everything that exists is related to everything 
else. In physics, both Newtonian gravity and General Relativity express 
formally this synchrony. As I am sitting in here, writing this book, I am 
connected to the whole universe and its physical laws. If it was not for 
gravity, I could not remain here where I am. And since I am made of or-
gans with tissue and cells made of atoms. It means that my existence links 
from the smallest particle in an atom to the whole universe of existence. 
But at the same time each existent particular has its own diachrony – giv-
ing by its own arrow of time. The universe of energy is permanent –it 
always exits, but existent particulars happen to appear and disappear. 
Whether it is the material universe, earth, live or each one of us, particu-
lars have its own dyachrony. I was born and I will die. 
The universe follows physical laws and can be understood in its syn-
chronicity either with causality (classical physics) or probabilistic (quan-
tum physics) methodologies. But there are no laws that can explain the 
diachronic existence of a particular. We know for example that starts do 
collapse into black holes and understand the physics as to how it hap-
pens, but we cannot forecast which star will collapse. Thus, the universe 
that looks synchronic from the point of view of the relations between all 
of the particulars, is diachronic from the point of view of each particular. 
Humans are the only living animal, that as Heidegger emphasized, is 
aware of his own diachronic arrow of time – we are the only ones which 
abstract thought allows for the understanding of an extended time. So we 
are the only existent particular that is anxious about its possible disap-
pearance. This particular anxiety of man is mitigated to a large extent 
156 Please see, Obregón, 2014b.
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due to his belonging to a social group. The social group and its institu-
tions provide the individual man with a more forecastable known en-
vironment. That is why any fear that the institutions of the group will 
not work, translate into a profound sense of mistrust of the future, this 
is what is behind Keynes and Knight definition of uncertainty as to the 
unknown future. If the institutions behave normal as always, the past and 
the present knowledge are good indications of the future, the economy 
is near equilibrium and risk can be calculated in a probabilistic manner. 
However, when institutions seem unable to do their normal tasks, the 
individuals´ confidence in the system goes down abruptly and the future 
becomes unknown.  
adaptation and evolution
The universe is defined by energy which transforms itself in matter, life 
is just one expression of matter. The material universe in its actual form 
is much older than life, fourteen billion years versus less than four. Live 
is an accident of matter; the DNA, that characterizes life, is but a minor 
chemical alteration of the RNA, that defines matter.  The material universe 
is expanding an ever changing. Particulars appear and disappear. The exis-
tence of life is not guarantee; life may disappear in the future and nothing 
will happen to the material universe. Nor only life is significantly younger 
that the material universe, but it is also insignificant in relation to the size 
of the material universe. Life disappearance may be caused by small, today 
unknown, future small change in the material universe. Life disappearance 
would not be a significant event in the existence of the material universe. 
Since the material universe and earth are changing, to survive life has 
to adapt to such changes. And since the future changes are unknown, 
life must diversify as much as possible its genetic pool. More diversifica-
tion means better survival chances. This diversification happens both, 
by diversifying the species, and by diversifying the genetic pool in each 
specie, by given different individuals distinct genetic pools157. Adaptation 
157 The two main themes of evolution are natural selection and random genetic drift. Indi-
vidual genetic variance (due to random mutation, recombination - sexed reproduction or 
migration - gene flow), sexual reproduction, inheritance and natural selection allow the ad-
aptation of the species to environmental changes. Random genetic drift allows the random 
genetic variability of the species, regardless of environmental changes. These two processes 
operate concomitantly. 
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and evolution mean that, once there is a significant change in the mate-
rial universe, some species will disappear, like the dinosaurs, and others 
will survive. Of those species that survive, some individuals will disap-
pear and others will not. The individuals that survive are those better 
fit genetically to the new material world brought about by the material 
changes previously referred. But those individuals surviving the material 
changes, will have to die eventually. Because, they have to inherit their 
superior genetic pool (only superior in relationship to the particular spe-
cific new material world), in order for new generations to be better adapt 
and to increase the survival chances of the whole specie. We are individu-
als, and we are born and we die, because that optimize the human specie 
chances of survival. 
our evolutionary self
At one point in time, likely seven million years ago, we had a common 
ancestor with the Chimpanzee. An accident taught us to use the sharp 
edges of a broken rock for productive reasons; and as the rock technol-
ogy progressed it produced an economic surplus, that allowed to feed 
larger social groups. Both the new rock technology, and the more intense 
social life, produced evolutionary changes that finally ended up with the 
Homo Sapiens. The brain grew in size; technology became more ad-
vanced; social life in larger groups; more sophisticated language; we learn 
to read other people minds and to express and control our emotions; a 
more erected body position that free the hands for productive purposes 
and permitted a larger phonetic capacity. Chimpanzees can learn in the 
laboratory the rock technology belonging to 3.5 billion years ago, but 
they cannot learn the one of 2.4 billion years ago158. Thus, somewhere in 
this period we became significantly different.
The point to emphasize is that man in evolutionary terms already 
comes from an ancestor that lived in groups. And that the evolutionary 
changes that ended up with the Homo Sapiens were concomitant with a 
larger group and a more intense social life. If anything distinguishes us 
from the animals is our syntactic language, which is due to more intense 
social life. To be human meant from the beginning to live in a group. 
Individual´s survival depends upon his belongings’ to a group.     
158 Obregón 2014b
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Thus, we have two key evolutionary characteristics: we are individuals, 
genetically differentiated from others, who born and die; and we belong 
to a social group. In order to maximize our survival chances, evolution 
gave us two instincts: selfishness and belonging. Selfishness, to guarantee 
that each individual looks up to his own survival. Belonging to guarantee 
that the individual is related to a group, because that increases his survival 
chances. And because group and species survival is evolutionarily more 
relevant than the specific survival of any individual; the belonging instinct 
was evolutionarily designed to guide and redefine the selfishness instinct.
group formation- our belonging self
Our belonging instinct has been carefully documented by the Psychol-
ogy of Attachment159. Psychological and neurobiological studies done in 
more than twenty countries have shown that we are born with a belong-
ing instinct. Infants recognize their mother voice immediately after they 
are born. They can imitate an adult face 40 minutes after being born. 
The child´s brain takes years to develop, and thus requires the mother 
attention and care. The relationship with the mother or care giver during 
the first twelve months defines in most cases the adult´s personality. In 
extreme cases even the neurobiological development of the child´s brain 
is at risk. We are social animals; whose survival requires the social group.
The belonging relation with the mother or take giver the first twelve 
months is emotional. The mother teaches the child not to be aggressive 
and socializes him; among other things she teaches the child to speak. 
Language, careful teaching from the mother, and the maturity of the 
child´s brain develops the child´s capacity to reason; thus, the belonging 
relation becomes also based on reason.
The belonging relation is nor only social, but also chemical. When 
we share time with others we love we produce dopamine and oxytocin, 
drugs that eliminate stress and foster a better functioning of our defense 
mechanism. Loneliness, or being subject to social abuse, produces corti-
sol, which in extreme cases destroys our cells and neurons. 
Thus, belonging to a group is the most human characteristic that we 
have, we actually became humans due to the enlargement of the social group. 
Now, evolution, according to our brain size, prepare us to live in groups of 
159 See Obregón 2009, 2013a y 2017.
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around one hundred participants160. In groups of this size our emotional and 
chemical belonging works properly. However, as technology developed, the 
economic surplus grew and fostered the enlargement of the group signifi-
cantly above its originally designated evolutionary size. As a consequence, 
emotional and chemical belonging were not longer possible. Therefore, so-
cial belonging became more and more a conceptual – rational - relation.
Belonging is always both an emotional and a rational relation, be-
cause the brain is only one. However, there is a spectrum. With those 
more near to us with whom we have the possibility to look mutually at 
each other eyes, to eat together and eventually to touch each other, the 
relationship is more emotional. With those with whom we cannot, the 
relationship is more conceptual and rational. To distinguish them, I have 
called the first type Love and the second one Social Significance – because 
the individual gets meaning – significance through social belonging.  
In Addition to Love and Social Significance, the individual also has an 
instinctive belonging relationship with the biological and material universe, 
also needed for survival – which I have called Existential Significance. That 
is why we get amuse and relax when we: listen to the wind or to the ocean 
waves or to a bird singing; look at a beautiful valley or a dolphin swimming 
in the ocean; contemplate the moon or the sun or the stars; and so many 
other ways. Existential Significance is expressed in many forms of religious 
and spiritual life, which in many societies is also a social event that strength-
ens the relation of the individual with the society.   
In primary societies, Love and Social Significance were/are both with 
the social group; and Existential Significance is also largely obtained 
through the social group. In traditional societies, love was/is mainly with 
the extended family, and Social Significance with the social group; Ex-
istential Significance may or not be obtained through the social group. 
In contemporary Western societies, Love is mainly with the unicellular 
family and Social Significance is with the social group161. Existential Sig-
160 Obregón 2014b
161 The primary, the traditional and the Western societies are abstract categories of analysis 
used in previous works. They are defined as follows. Primary society: the individual is not 
differentiated from the society. The society, in turn, is not differentiated from the existential 
universe. Traditional society: the individual is differentiated from society in terms of his 
responsibilities, but not in terms of his rights. The society may or may not be differentiated 
from existential universe. Western society: the individual is differentiated, in addition to 
his responsibilities, by his rights. The individual exercise his rights of: expression; politi-
cal participation and voting freedom; economic freedom and property; and to pursue his 
individual economic interests. The society is differentiated from the existential universe.
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nificance, through Protestantism, has become related to working for the 
well being of the social group. Since, we are evolutionarily prepared for 
having an emotional and chemical belonging tie, Love is central for and 
adequate individual belonging; that is why the disappearance of the uni-
cellular family in Western societies is a serious threat to the psychological 
stability of the individual. 
Moreover, in contemporary Western societies the individual is fully 
differentiated and for the first time becomes responsible of his belonging re-
lationships through the three routes. Love – who to marry for example - in 
primary and traditional societies was decided by the group or the extended 
family. And Social Significance was automatically obtained because by be-
ing born in such a society the individual had already a well defined social 
role; whether it was to be a fisherman or a carpenter or a king. And Social 
Existence was obtained from the group or was quite accessible. In Western 
contemporary societies, love – who to marry – is decided by the individual, 
his Social Significance is obtained by merits which given the predominant 
role of the Economic and Exchange System in most cases require nor only 
social success but also monetary success (although inheriting name and 
money still helps a lot), and he is also responsible of his Existential Signifi-
cance – he can decide whether be a religious man or not. This new freedom 
present great opportunities for the individual, but has the disadvantage that 
when he fails, he is left with no belonging relationship to recur to. That 
is why: while Freudian neurosis was the most common mental illness in 
traditional societies, because they refrained the natural satisfaction of selfish 
instincts; in the contemporary Western societies, the most common mental 
problem is personality disorders, due to social isolation.   
What we would like to point out in here is: that the individual needs 
the group, nor only for his economic survival, but also for his psychologi-
cal well being. Extreme cases of loneliness produce uncontrolled aggres-
siveness or auto- destruction. Monkeys that are grown isolated mutilate 
themselves, and are never any longer capable to establish social relations 
with other monkeys. Drug abuse is in fact one way to compensate for the 
lack of dopamine and oxytocin, consequence of inadequate emotional 
belongings in our contemporary societies162. 
We already have in here an initial explanation of why social expen-
ditures over GDP in Western countries are between 20 and 30%, but 
international financial aid over world´s GDP is only 0.2%. Individuals 
belong to a given country, but not to a world community. 
162 Obregón 2009.
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our selfish self
Freud wrote that we had two critical instincts sex (life) and aggression (death). 
Lorenz in his book On Aggression identifies four fundamental instincts: hun-
ger, reproduction, fear and aggression. Aggression in the animal kingdom 
serves specific survival needs, such as: dividing the territory, insure that the 
stronger one receives social advantages, and establish basis for hierarchy and 
leadership. Our Selfish self is needed to optimize individual survival. It has 
been shown that new babies are born aggressive and that is the mother the 
one that teaches them not to be aggressive163. The selfish instinct cohabitates 
with the belonging instinct both in animals and in humans. Lorenz, and others 
after him, have shown that several animals follow the first being that they 
see when they are born – they attach. And attachment (belonging) together 
with aggression orders the social animal world. Think, for example, in the 
male lion defending the territory and the group and in the female taking care 
of reproduction, feeding and belonging. Belonging in humans has evolve in a 
complex social life, which suppress to a large extent aggression within the in-
group, between us. Although, aggression continues defining to a large extent 
the social order between out-groups, between them and us. This hindsight’s 
already an explanation of the results in the Robbers Cave Experiment. 
Since, from the evolutionary survival point of view the group is more 
relevant than the individual, the belonging instinct always guides and 
redirects our selfish instinct. But, our aggressive self is always there, and 
failures on family or social belonging bring it to the forefront. 
Freud read Darwin, and saw the catholic society of his time as a repres-
sor of the basic instincts of sex and aggression, which for him was the main 
cause of neurosis164. And to a large extent he was right. But, what he did 
not anticipate properly was the importance of the belonging instinct, which 
was the main concern of Bowlby. Belonging establish the instinctual link 
that guarantees that the individual will socialize, therefore belonging guides 
and redirects the selfish instinct. And the socialization process implies a de-
velopment of the Ego (which Freud also underestimates), which learns to 
mediate between the ID and the external social pressures of the Super Ego. 
But when belonging fails, the sexual aggressive intelligent individual, which 
the human being is, becomes a first class predator. In this, Freud was right.
The great contribution of Smith is that he understood that England 
163 Obregón 2009.
164 Obregón 2015a.
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by institutionalizing economic freedom in large markets had liberated the 
selfish instinct of man in such a way that, in instead of producing social 
damage, it would produce social well being. Thus, economic markets 
presented a solution for Smith´s previous work in Ethics. Markets allow 
for individual selfishness to become an ethical conduct. But remember, 
that according to the Theory of Moral Sentiments, it is only so, if both in 
the eyes of the society and in those of the individual, the activity in the 
markets can be proven that does not damage the society.
Now, we must be very careful not to confuse our selfish instinct with 
the selfishness of the economic man in large markets. The selfish instinct is 
an evolutionary characteristic of man which is a constant in all societies, but 
in many of them social belonging did not allow for any social expression 
of this individual selfish instinct, at least for the majority of the individuals. 
It is the particular case of modern Western societies that the expression of 
the selfish instinct is allowed, to most of the individuals, through the large 
markets165. Therefore, the selfish economic man, as we had been argued all 
along this manuscript, is an institutional characteristic of a specific society. 
learning from the out-there
As Kant anticipated us, we never really get to know the out-there. We encoun-
ter reality through our senses, and the beats and pieces received through them 
are put together by our brain as images. These images are decomposed and 
store, and when needed they are recall. In fact, our imagination is nothing else 
than recombining the images that we had stored previously. This process, up 
to here, is identical to the one that evolved mammals follow to get to know 
the out-there. The only distinction is that we have a syntactic language, one 
in which the meaning of each word is contextual. Our more sophisticated lan-
guage allows for more combinatory possibilities of images; thus, as far as we 
know, we are the only animal with an extended notion of time. We are the 
only one aware that will die in a defined range of future time166.
Since we cannot get to know the out-there by any other method, that sci-
ence recognizes, it means that scientifically speaking man is unable to have 
access to universal ethical values, whether they represent a full blown ethical 
165 Poverty may not allow some individuals to express their selfish interest through the market.
166 Obregón 2014b.
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system of just partial orderings as Sen affirms. Therefore, altruism and social 
collaboration have to come either from natural sentiments or from social learn-
ing. Since evolutionarily we know that the instinct of belonging relates only to 
a small group with which we have visual and other contacts. It follows that we 
do not have universal moral sentiments. And since there is not an established 
international society. It is easy to understand why international aid is so low.  
the conceptual system and  
the institutional arrangement
What is an institution? In other works, I have defined an institution as the 
sum of the Conceptual System and its corresponding Institutional Arrange-
ment167. The definition sounds somewhat tautological, but it is not. It is 
meant to indicate that the actual physical institution that we see in a society 
actually always have a corresponding Conceptual System attach. Think for 
example in the institution of the parliament in England, it has its members, 
they are elected and they discuss in a specific building and so forth – but 
they also represent a Conceptual System –i.e. the constitution, the laws and 
so on. The Conceptual System is defined as a mixture of knowledge, beliefs 
and habits that comprehensively explains social and physical reality, which 
guides and directs social and individual behavior. An Institutional Arrange-
ment is the set of institutions that make the Conceptual System operable.
The Conceptual System has a specific historical culture in a given so-
ciety and so does its corresponding Institutional Arrangement. Therefore, 
social decisions nor only correspond to today´s democratic choices but also 
to the historical institutions. Whether we talk about representative democ-
racy or participative democracy through direct voting; democracy always 
operates in a given Institutional Arrangement and its corresponding Con-
ceptual System, which do change through democratic decisions, but slowly.
the three social systems
The basic social system of any society is the Integrative System. The 
Integrative System consists in the traditions and customs; socially estab-
167 Obregón 2008b.
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lished obligations - established norms, the law; values, and social beliefs 
in general; ethical principles; the religion; benevolence, and commitments 
acquired individually but socially sanctioned. This system holds society 
together, and it is the base that defines the main relationship between the 
individual and the society. The Power System refers to the use of public 
force. The use of force is usually only allowed to the state; individuals are 
forbidden to use any sort of force against other individuals of the same 
in-group, although they may be allowed to use it against other members 
of the society which are conceived like out-group members, i.e. slaves. 
The Power System usually governs, to a large extent, the relationship 
between groups. The Economic and Exchange System is the production 
and distribution of economic goods, and the selfish relations of exchange 
in general, including economic exchange.
In the primary society the Integrative System and the Power Systems 
are more relevant, but as societies evolved the Economic and Exchange 
System gains importance until it gets to the Western society in which it 
is a rival of the Integrative System as to define the main relationship be-
tween the individual and the society. 
social change 
Kenneth E Boulding use to say that the main problem of the social sci-
ences was the relationship between the individual and the society. Table 4.1 
presents the main elements of such relation. Individuality is defined by the 
specific individual genetics which combined with survival instincts gives 
rise to our individual self. Self preservation is closely watch by our selfish 
survival instinct. But since individual survival requires the group, the indi-
vidual also has a belonging instinct, to the people very near to him - Love; 
to the society - Social Significance; and the the biological and material uni-
verse - Existential Significance. The social significance is expressed through 
the three social systems: The Integrative System, The Power System, and 
the Economic and Exchange System. Society is defined by its Conceptual 
System and its corresponding Institutional Arrangement.
There are many theories of social change. We shall mention four of 
them. The classics Stationary State, Marx´s, Veblen´s and North´s. 
At the bottom of the table we find the Economic and Exchange 
System, which for Marx explained social and institutional change. For 
4) beyond behavioral economics 167
him the changes in the relationship of man with the material universe 
define the changes in the social universe. For him history is a teleo-
logical process which at the end will bring about the humanitarian 
communist society, in which the human needs of the individual will 
be satisfied. Veblen agreed with Marx in many ways, but he points 
out that the social institutions created by the previous technological 
process will enter in conflict with the new institutions consequence of 
the new – most recent – technological process. And that, the result of 
this conflict varies from society to society and it is distinct in diverse 
historical times-therefore it is not, as in Marx a teleological process. 
According to him we can study the historical past, and he did, but we 
cannot forecast the future. 
In North, social change happens in any of the categories in the 
table except those defining individuality, which may change geneti-
cally but is a much slower process than the rest. For him individual 
creativity nor only changes the technological process of production, 
but also the social process by which individuals interact. There is a 
permanent questioning and redefining of the Conceptual System and 
its corresponding Institutional Arrangement, which in turn modifies 
the three belonging relationships. And since it modifies Social Signifi-
cance, it also changes the three social systems. But change can start 
at any of the instances of the table, individual creativity may modify 
the Integrative System which then will have repercussions in the other 
two systems, in the Social Significance and in the Conceptual System 
and its corresponding Institutional Arrangement. North point is that 
social creativity occurs at any social instance, and nor only in the tech-
nological process of economic production.  
Table 4.1 Relationship: Individual – Society 
Individuality  Belonging  Institution
Individual genetics Individual Love Society Conceptual System
Survival instincts  Social Significance  Institutional Arrangement 
  Existential Significance
  Social Significance:
  Integrative System
  Power System
  Economic and Exchange System
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North, however warn us as Veblen did that old institutions are resilient 
and difficult to change. This is how he explains why exporting Western 
institutions to developing countries has been so difficult and unsuccessful.
Finally, the classical economics stationary state argued that as the popu-
lation grows less productive land is used, therefore the cost of producing 
food goes up, the salaries go up, rent of the land goes up (because its defined 
by the less productive land) and profits go to zero. Different economists 
design distinct ways to escape the stationary state fatality; Malthus recom-
mended policies to maintain population growth under control (which are 
still critical for many developing economies), Ricardo recommended im-
porting food (which is also useful for developing economies). But the true 
way out of the stationary state is technological development. Technology 
in food production and in other goods increases productivity and allow for 
both salaries and profits to go up. That is why technology was for Smith so 
crucial in his thinking. And What does technology depend on? Mainly on 
mass production allowed by the enlargement of the markets. The positive 
cycle of economic development implied in the West is as follows: 1) inter-
national trade increased due to both, gold from the Americas and species 
from the east; international trade meant already access to cheaper imported 
food. 2) countries that were not involved neither in gold or species had to 
developed mass production. 3) which implied that the Burgos-cities grew; 
and this, by the way, was the best possible policy to reduce population 
growth, because having children in cities became more expensive and dif-
ficult. 4) as cities grew the middle class grows, democracy comes along 
and the consumption of the middle class provides a new substantial and 
decisive enlargement of the markets. In all this process the enlargement of 
the markets allowed for the mass production, which fostered technological 
development both in food production as well as in other goods. Smith´s 
main contribution is to have understood the relationship between large 
markets and technological development.
There are only two groups of countries that had developed, a group of 
Western countries and a group of Asian countries. We already explained 
how the first group developed, the second group development have been 
due to what I have been calling The Asian Development Model168. This 
model is dependent upon the West, because it maintains its technological 
development at the world´s frontier by heavily exporting at the middle class 
of the Western countries. But it has special features of its own. 1) It has  a 
very high internal saving rate, which reduces the dependence on foreign 
168 Obregón 2018b.
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capital, allows for a stable undervalue exchange rate and  provides enough 
resources for investing in local companies that may become worldwide 
export leaders; 2) It has an industrial policy aim at: a) integrating other 
companies as providers to the exporting companies, b) reduce imports, 
through the undervalue exchange rate, and using import substitution poli-
cies, among which there are all sort of administrative tricks – fostering the 
growth of local companies in the local market, c) promote the development 
of local productive chains of economic value added, like the construction 
sector – which is also possible because the high internal savings. The huge 
internal savings and the appropriate industrial policy has made it possible 
for a group of Asian countries to become developed economies.
But we must emphasize that a critical key feature of the Asian De-
velopment Model is that it exports to the West and maintains first class 
global technology. Why is this so crucial? Because if a country devel-
ops with obsolete technology whenever it opens up its industries are not 
competitive and they just disappear as the consequence of the confronta-
tion with a superior technology. This explains why, for example: 1) East 
Germany became so small after joining West Germany, and 2) Russia 
collapsed when it opened up to the West169.         
The two critical points to understand about social change are. 1) that 
although it occurs as North argues at any place in the social system, its 
main determinant is technological development, and 2) that by its very 
nature social change is slow, particularly due to the opposition of the old 
institutions. Once we understand that institutions are not only physical 
arrangements of actual institutions, but also the Conceptual Systems that 
they represent, we can see why social change is so difficult, values and 
concepts remain attach to societies for centuries. The Western Capitalism 
and the Asian Capitalism had been exceptions, and even in them social 
change is slower than may seem. In some other regions like the Arab 
countries, South Asia, and large parts of Africa and India the Conceptual 
Systems have prevailed and social change has been very slow.
Social change is the consequence of old institutions, technological de-
velopment and individual creativity all through the social system. Notice 
that democracy and individual voting is only one of the components in all 
of this process. Can we change our social world, in any desired direction? 
Yes. But at a slower pace that we may wish. Democratic choices have to 
cope with the fast social change produced by technological development 
which has a dynamic of its own, and are embedded in old institutions – 
169 Obregón 2018b.
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many of which clearly delimit how far democratic choices can go. Our 
societies are the reflection of their own history strongly embedded in values 
and institutions that necessarily constrain today´s social democratic choices. 
social conflict
A society´s life is defined by its Conceptual System and the corresponding 
Institutional Arrangement that reflect its own cultural history. This Con-
ceptual System defines the three belonging routes: Love; Social Signifi-
cance; and Existential Significance. And Social Significance is expressed 
in the three social systems: The Integrative System, The Power System 
and the Economic and Exchange System. In the Integrative System reside 
the values and Institutional Arrangements that hold together the society, 
it is the fundamental system of society. Love and Existential belonging 
are usually key components in social bonding, and thus to a large extent 
they are also part of the Integrative System, but they have a life of their 
own. The family, for example, performs a critical function in social bond-
ing, but it also has expressions of its own. Religious beliefs are also key 
for social bonding, but they may also have a sphere of their own – think 
in private meditations or in isolated monks.
If the three belonging routes are satisfied the individual selfish instinct 
is guided and redirect to an adequate social life. However, if there are 
belonging failures in Love – family ties, in Social Significance – social 
roles, or in Existential significance – perceived sinful status; the individ-
ual becomes isolated and, dominated by his selfish instincts, it becomes 
aggressive and destructive nor only of others but even of himself. Thus, 
there is a very fine equilibrium between belonging and selfishness, which 
normally works well, but in occasions may go wrong and social conflict is 
produced. Social conflict is produced once the Integrative System is bro-
ken – or do not exists – and there is reason to distinguish between Us or 
I and Them. Isolated killers shooting at masses are usually the outcome of 
severe belonging failures (often associated with genetic problems), which 
end up in a sharp distinction between I and Them.   
The Power System in most societies is not allowed between individual 
members – unless some of the members are Them, like slaves. The Power 
System, the use of force is reserved to the state or its representatives; and 
its is only a complement to the Integrative System to preserve social order. 
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No society could be established only by the use of force, the main com-
ponent of social bonding is the values of the Integrative System that are 
educated in the child by the mother, it is this socialization process the one 
which produce a social individual that only in occasions has to be control 
by force. Huge social repressions occur mainly, when the state is unable to 
allow the individuals to obtain the basic things needed to satisfy their sur-
viving individual needs; such cases, often end up with mass rebellion, and 
often with the substitution of the state. In addition to its subsidiary role of 
helping the Integrative System to maintain social order, the key function 
of the Power System is to defend/expand the interest of the in-group in re-
lationship to the out-groups. This explains nor only the Robbers Cave and 
the Stanford Prison experiments, but also why military conflicts had hap-
pened so often in human history. And why, even today, global military 
expenditures are eleven times higher than the value of international aid. 
The Economic and Exchange System is in most societies, to a large 
extent, subsidiary of the Integrative System – which defines both who 
does what and who gets what; it is not until the Western contemporary 
societies, that it gets a critical role in the social production and distribu-
tion of resources and goods. Economic freedom is one of the key com-
ponents of the rapid economic growth of Capitalism. As we have been 
explaining the enlargement of the markets due to the expansion of the 
middle class is the main engine of technological development. But eco-
nomic freedom is not a natural human right, it is an institutional devel-
opment of a particular group of Western societies. Economic freedom 
is allowed by the Integrative System of these societies. One of the great 
discoveries of Smith was that large markets liberated in a positive social 
way the individual selfish instinct, i.e. that economic freedom promotes 
economic development. And therefore he convincingly argued, that eco-
nomic freedom should be allowed by the Integrative System. 
The Economic and Exchange System has acquired a dynamic of its 
own, and it is today critical to understand social change. And despite its 
virtues, however, it does produce social problems. The Economic and Ex-
change System is not an Integrative System - individual relations are basi-
cally competitive. In developed economies, The Economic and Exchange 
System´s success has been companion with a rapid expansion of the Inte-
grative System – the participation of the governments in the economy has 
grown very fast. But the Economic and Exchange System tends to globalize 
itself rapidly; and it has not been followed by the expansion of the global 
Integrative System. The consequence has been a rapid deterioration of the 
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income distribution between countries that belong to the global process of 
production and countries that do not. While it is true that the global income 
distribution between countries have been improving in the last years, it only 
does so because of China and India which do participate in the global pro-
cess of production due to the TIC revolution. If we exclude these countries 
the income distribution between countries have been deteriorating.
Numbers are very clear as to the irrelevance of the Integrative System 
at the global level. International aid over global GDP is only 0.2% (com-
pared with 25% social expenditures as percentage of GDP in developed 
economies). While the global Economic and Exchange System is large, 
global trade over global GDP is 52.3% (which means that international 
aid over global trade is only 0.4%). Since the global Economic and Ex-
change System is not supported by a global Integrative System, it has to 
be based in a strong Power System and it is, global military expenditures 
as percentage of global GDP are 2.2% (or 4.3% of global trade)170.       . 
Since the main characteristic of the Economic and Exchange System 
is that it is competitive and based upon the individual´s selfish instinct, it 
does not have any component of belonging. In developed economies the 
growth of the Economic and Exchange System has been companion, as 
we said, by a rapid expansion of the Integrative System and this has miti-
gated the potential psychological damage of the individual isolation that 
the Economic and Exchange System produces. However, the Integrative 
System has been contaminated by the Economic and Exchange System, 
social status is more and more related to economic success; and the prob-
lem is that the individual may fail in obtaining the desired socio-economic 
status.  Moreover, the need of individual displacement for economic pro-
ductive purposes has produced a rapid disappearance of the unicellular 
family: between 1960 and 2000 the divorce rate doubled, babies of un-
married parents sextupled and cohabitation without marriage increased 
sevenfold. The disappearance of the unicellular family is particularly 
trouble some because the Social Significance of the Integrative System 
cannot substitute efficiently the more emotional and chemical belonging 
that the Love of the family provides. Failures to obtain the desired socio-
economic status, the disappearance of the family and the increasing weak-
ness of the Existential Significance – which has become also an individual 
responsibility, have created significant socio-psychological problems. A 
rapid increase in psychological patients that exhibit personality disorders. 
Clinical depression more than tripled in the last three generations in the 
170 All data come from World Bank 2018, consulted in the Web in September 18, 2018.
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United States. And between 1960 and 2000 the teen suicide rate tripled, 
crime rate quadrupled and prison population quintupled. 
emotions versus reason
Emotions are inherited evolutionary traits of successful patterns or re-
sponse to environmental cues. As we have said before, to survive life has 
to adapt to the environment; thus, even the most simple of the unicellular 
being has patterns of response to the environment171. Reptiles do not 
have emotions as such, but they do have inherited patterns of response 
to the environment which manifest themselves in two main kinds of sur-
vival instincts: aggression and attachment. In mammals, emotions started 
as the brain developed areas capable to sustain those feelings; but emo-
tions in mammals, despite the self feelings associated, are only surviving 
patterns inherited from earliest and simplest forms of life. In humans, at-
tachment becomes belonging, which nor only has an emotional basis but 
also involves reason. But, the critical point to emphasize is that emotions are 
our most fundamental inherit way to interact with the environment.
Emotions actually help us to preselect what is relevant in the environ-
ment, to be store as images in the brain. What is emotionally irrelevant 
we simple do not store. Wherever you are standing, if it is not at home, 
ask yourself what do you have behind, and you will discover that you do 
not know. Emotionally irrelevant cues are just not storage. And actually, 
events that may be too emotional intense and that put at risk our psycho-
logical stability may not be store either; very young kids that have been 
raped, often do not remember the event (or events). Because emotions 
preselect what we store, they are always involve in any relationship with 
the out-there. We just cannot be pure rational beings. 
But at the same time what distinguish us from other animals is, that 
due to our syntactic language, we can process more images in more com-
binations, and we have therefore the notion of an extended time. We are 
the only animal capable to visualize itself in extended time. Reason de-
veloped, as a part of a larger brain, concomitant with more social life and 
more sophisticated language. Reason is part of our evolutionary brain, 
and our brain is unique and works like a unified system. Therefore, while 
we cannot be purely rational, we cannot be either purely emotional. 
171 Obregón 2014b.
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Despite the fact that they may be some innate responses that are pure-
ly emotional – we dislike snakes for example, they mainly only dominate 
early stages of life. As the child´s brain matures and the mother teaches 
him to talk and to control his aggressive instinct – the child uses his rea-
son. In adult life, we do have instances in which emotions may be very 
intensive and may dominate us; but in most normal circumstances, ac-
tions in the human beings always involved the use of reason.
Emotions are not opposing reason; reason was built to complement 
emotions. They work together to optimize surviving possibilities. It does 
not make sense from an evolutionary point of view to conceptualize a 
weak rational man that does not use his reason efficiently, survival does 
not work that way.
Let us just take one classical conformity experiment in psychology 
labs. An individual is ask the length of a light lane in a dark room, and 
it is shown that he is influenced by a professor whom he knows is in the 
next room, who´s guess happened to be wrong ( the trick is the student 
listens by a planned accident the professor´s intentional wrong answer)172. 
Does it mean that system 1, which connects emotionally the student with 
the professor, dominates system 2? Or just simply means that an evolu-
tionary trait is to follow the group, and since the student is not so sure, 
he does what is rational, follow the leader who suppose to know better. 
Following the group is evolutionarily the right rational decision. What 
goes wrong in this experiment is that evolution did not prepare us for the 
group to lie to us, as the professor did. Evolution could not had prepared 
us to misread the environmental cues, emotions and group belonging in 
fact augment and not diminish our capacity to read the external cues. 
System 1 prepares us for a better usage of system 2, system 1 is not op-
pose to system 2.
The strong rational economic man does not adequately picture us as 
humans, but the emotional man dominated by the system 1 of Behavioral 
Economics is neither a good description of the economic man. Because 
while emotions enter everything that human beings do and there is no 
action that does not involve them, they are not evolutionarily designed 
for us not to appreciate reality correctly – it is just the other way around 
they help us to improve such appreciation. A being which cannot decide 
what is best for him would not survive. Thus, due to very fundamental 
reasons, Behavioral Economics cases in which system 1 make us fail have 
to a reduced set. 
172 There had been several versions of this study, the first ones were made by Asch in the 1950s. 
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There is a confusion which has to be clarify, the soft rational eco-
nomic man is an abstraction related to the behavior of individuals in large 
markets, but it does not imply that man is rational in the sense that his 
emotions do not count or that he can control them. When preferences 
are expressed in the market they involve emotions. In fact, one of the 
virtues of the economic markets is that they allow for the expression of 
individual´s emotions. Both economic markets and democracy surge as a 
consequence of the demise of rationalism, understood as the philosophy 
that argues that everything can be understood with our reason. If reason 
could be used to order the social world, then the most intelligent should 
guide society – like in Plato – and they must decide what to do both 
socially and economically, they must decide who does what and who 
gets what – there is no need for the markets nor for democracy. In the 
markets the individual selfish instinct express itself and it is of course 
dominated by passions and emotions, which does not imply that the rea-
son is nor also involve.
The strong rational economic man of the contemporary Neoclassi-
cal School is a rational calculator that in some-ways represents a come 
back of Rationalism. Because reason in each individual imposes itself 
upon emotions and orders the individual preferences with such clarity 
that they can be aggregated and provide a new form of rationality to the 
whole social economic system. In this view, particularly in the case of 
the market defendants of the contemporary Monetarist-Rational Expecta-
tions Neoclassical School, markets establish a unique, maximum welfare, 
stable equilibrium, and maintain economies near full employment. Thus, 
individual rationality provides order to the economic world. Further-
more, since non-economic motives are introduced in the individual´s util-
ity function, markets nor only organize the production and distribution 
of economic goods but also solve other non-economic problems like for 
example social discrimination. This view of the markets, as we had been 
showing since the first chapter, was unsuccessful. Thus, we can not give or-
der to the social economic world only by assuming individual rationality; 
we need institutions, values, history and so on. 
The strong rational economic man does imply a form of rational-
ism that does not correspond to our evolutionary traits in which emotions 
are crucial. But, refusing the characterization of man of the strong rational 
economic man does not mean that we have to move into an alternative in 
which emotions make us fail as to the adequate appreciation of the external 
world. Emotions are actually a key feature for us to appreciate correctly 
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reality. And being emotional does not imply that reason is not being used. 
The soft rational economic man is fully compatible with our evolutionary 
traits and expresses his preferences in the market using both his emotions 
and his reason, and the social economic world is nor order only by individ-
ual preferences but also by the Conceptual System and the corresponding 
Institutional Arrangement. But the soft economic man does not fail in appreciating 
what he really wants of what is really convenient for him, at least does not fail usually-
otherwise it could not be a survivor. Thus, if he fails it has to be in particular 
cases, and finding these particular cases is actually the contribution of Be-
havioral Economics. But it must be understood that these particular cases, 
described by Behavioral Economics, are not the general case.
When an individual is in a market place there are four main kind of 
economic transactions that occur, and in all the cases emotions may play 
an important role: 1) there are many products which are bought without 
much thinking, remember yourself in a super market. But many of those 
are decided this way, because their price is low and it is not reasonable 
to spend time researching on them – the search cost is too high related 
to the price. But the buyer is conscious of what he is doing. And what is 
good for him is not to incur in the search cost. 2) repetitive transactions 
in which the buyer may initially decide without much thinking, but then 
goes home and uses the product and decides again, after few repetitions 
the buyer knows what is good for him. 3) relevant unique decisions in 
which the buyer invest enough time and effort finding information and 
external advice to decide what to do. After this process the buyer knows 
what is good for him. 4) economic decisions in which system 1 dominates 
and the buyer does not know what is good for him.
Notice that due to informational, educational and knowledge insuf-
ficiencies in 1), 2) and 3) there may be market failures and the buyer may 
end up deciding something which is not good for him and government 
and non-market institutions intervention may be required. But 4) is a 
distinct case, it is assumed that even with education, information and ade-
quate knowledge, system 1 dominates and a market failure occurs. While 
possible, 4) is not very common, and as we had been arguing many of the 
Nudges are really due to lack of information, education and knowledge.  
Therefore, there are only few economic transactions in which system 
1 dominates the scene and the individual really does not know what is 
good for him. Such cases do exist and it has been the contribution of Be-
havioral Economics to find them. And it has been shown that Behavioral 
Economics is useful in particular cases like individual saving decisions 
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and organ donations. But the point that we want to stress is: that Behav-
ioral Economics refers itself to a particular case, in which system 1 dominates, so that 
due to our emotions we do not appreciate reality in a proper way, and that is why we 
do not know what is best for us. 
our human psychology
We are evolutionarily built to belong, because belonging is key to survival. 
Belonging guides and redirects our selfish instinct. Contrary to popular be-
lief there is no contradiction between belonging and selfishness. Belonging 
does not reduce freedom, it increases it. Adequate belonging is key for a 
healthy individual psychology – one capable to make economic choices. Be-
longing failures create stress and in this intense emotional periods the areas 
of the brain required to reason do not work properly173. An adequate emo-
tional development increased the possibility of the adequate use of reason. 
An emotional balance person is ideally prepared to take rational decisions.
Mclean for descriptive purposes have divided the human brain in three: 
the reptilian brain, the limbic brain and the cortical brain. As an analytical 
count of brain functioning Mclean classification is wrong, because the brain 
is only one integrated system. However, it has the virtue that it emphasizes 
our evolutionary heritage. The reptilian brain coordinates the autonomous 
functioning of our body, the limbic brain the emotions and the cortical 
brain the reason. The freedom to choose basically consists in our ability 
to use properly our cortical brain. But to be able to do that, we need to be 
healthy and emotionally balanced. In other works, I have described the 
road to freedom as consisting of six steps174. The first one is to satisfy our 
evolutionary need of free movement, which is basic to remain healthy and 
to maintain alert our capacity to learn from the environment. The second 
is to satisfy our basic selfish instincts guided by our belonging instinct. The 
third one is to establish adequate belonging through the three previously 
mentioned routes: Love, Social Significance and Existential Significance. 
The fourth one is an adequate emotional development. The fifth is to be 
conscious of our self and our belonging surroundings. And the sixth is 
mentalizing, which implies to look with flexibility and perspective our past 
173 Obregón 2013a.
174 Obregón 2013a.
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and our future alternatives. The key message is that to get to the sixth 
step we need to properly satisfy the first five. In other words, the rational 
economic man only exists, if he is healthy psychologically, and that means 
mainly emotional development through adequate belonging.
The notion that the individual always know what is best for him is 
obviously wrong, think in someone buying a shot gun to kill many oth-
ers and then to suicide himself, clearly he does not know what is best 
for him. But, if there is psychological freedom due to good emotional 
balance obtained through proper belonging, the individual in most of the 
cases will be able to know what is good for him175. He will not satisfy the 
conditions of the strong rational man of contemporary Neoclassical Eco-
nomics, but he will clearly satisfy the ones of the soft rational economic 
man of Smith. He will able to express his preferences through the market.
A healthy psychological individual does not jump the gun, and he 
is not dominated by Kahneman´s system one. He has learned to use his 
system two, and to use all help that he can acquire from the social group 
through: 1) market participants like firms selling information and analysis 
or giving it for free (examples: the Mayo Clinic web or the World Bank 
web, among many others); 2) non market participants like friends or non 
profit oriented organizations; and 3) the government. We live in a world 
of abundant information and analysis. As we had argued in the last chap-
ter many of the examples used by Behavioral Economics involve lack of 
time to take the decision, non repetitive decisions, un-aid decisions and 
so on. But in real markets these conditions do not happen. For example, 
people always can ask somebody who can help them to calculate prob-
abilities. Lack of knowledge does not mean to be dominated by system 1. 
175 The individual always knows what he wants, the discussion is about whether What he 
wants is what he needs? Behavioral Economics argues that in many cases it is not. But, 
needs imply a normative dimension which relate to values in the Integrative System and 
in the Conceptual System (there is not an absolute rational external standard that defines 
needs).Values which the individual learns through social belonging, which implies informa-
tion, education and knowledge. If there is a failure in here, is a belonging social failure, 
not due to the individual´s psychological characteristics, and must be corrected and social 
intervention is adequate by the democratic means chosen. The contribution of Behavioral 
Economics in these terms could be seen as the proposal that due to the individual´s psycho-
logical characteristics these types of failures happened more often in certain cases that could 
be identified studying these psychological characteristics. But, Behavioral Economics goes 
beyond this, and argues that due to its psychological characteristics the individual even 
with knowledge, information and education, in many cases, does not know what he needs 
because due to system 1 he jumps to conclusions. Such cases, as we had argued, should 
not be very frequent, because evolutionarily our emotions are designed to help us read the 
external environment and not to misread it.   
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Emotions do not jeopardize rational decisions, they help them to be 
better, because they provide additional useful information and a connec-
tion with the group which can help the individual to be more rational. 
The only emotions that do jeopardize rational decisions are those due to 
belonging failures. That is why a society has to develop a proper social 
Integrative System that permits adequate belonging for the three routes.
That we are emotional when making decisions is an inherited evolu-
tionary trait, but that does not mean that we are being non rational or 
irrational. Even buying a convertible car that we do not need and that 
we will use only once a month may be a very pleasant decision. To be 
rational does not mean not to be emotional.  
Markets do not work isolated; they need a proper Institutional Ar-
rangement. Including an adequate Integrative System. Proper social anal-
ysis has to be done also at the institutional level, and not only at the level 
of which are the universal characteristics of individuals. Because the only 
individual universal characteristics are evolutionary traits, which expres-
sion varies in function of the institutional conditions.
The weak rational individual of Behavioral Economics is dominated 
in many instances by his emotions and therefore is unable to understand 
his true preferences, and is altruistic and socially cooperative. Our criti-
cism is not that this is not a good description of humans, but that any de-
scription will always be wrong. Humans can be under some circumstances 
altruistic and cooperative, in other situations they can be tuff economic 
competitors that show no mercy for their competitors, and in certain cas-
es can be aggressive selfish predators that do not respect any law or social 
limit. In fact, the same human person may display all of these behaviors 
at a given time:  he may be a selfish competitor in large markets – the 
soft rational economic man that Smith proposed, and at the same time 
being an altruistic social cooperative individual through the Integrative 
System of his in-group, and an aggressive predator towards others in the 
out-group. Think for example in a pilot of the USA forces dropping bombs 
in the out-group, belonging to a church given charity and displaying selfish 
rational behavior in large markets. 
The main problem of Behavioral Economics is that it took the wrong 
route of criticizing the strong rational economic man abstract character-
istics by describing experiments that show oppose characteristics; but by 
doing so, they built another abstraction of human nature which also has 
many shortcomings. There is not a fix human nature, there are only gen-
eral evolutionary characteristics. 
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the economic man
The economic man – the econ - is not a description of our human nature. 
It is an abstraction of human behavior in large economic markets. The 
soft version of Smith is quite compatible with the evolutionary psycho-
logical characteristics of the human beings. Under normal social circum-
stances psychological individuals will be able to express their prefer-
ences through the markets. The soft rational economic man is a useful 
abstraction to explain the rapid growth of capitalist economies. The 
strong rational economic man proposes a rationality that goes beyond 
the evolutionary psychological characteristics of human beings. But, de-
spite its inconveniences, it has been useful to build mathematical models 
that up to today are the best explanation of the allocation of resources 
through the price mechanism in large markets.
The humans of Behavioral Economics are not useful to explain many 
of the most fundamental economic phenomenon such as economic 
growth or the allocation of resources, in that sense it is not an abstrac-
tion that can substitute the econs.
The humans of Behavioral Economics are neither a good descrip-
tion of our evolutionary human characteristics. Its main problem is that 
methodologically it focuses only in the individual, and not in the indi-
vidual relations with the social group and the environment which are 
the basis of the evolutionary traits of the human beings. Behavioral 
Economics loses sight of how institutions can influence human behav-
ior to the point that it does not make sense to describe how humans 
are. Moreover, by loosing sight of institutions, Behavioral Economics 
was unable to understand that in the main tradition econs were just an 
abstraction of the behavior of individuals in large markets, which no 
doubt is selfish and for which the experiments of Behavioral Economics 
are only of a secondary relevance.
Despite its limitations, Behavioral Economics has had relevant 
contributions, mainly pointing out some of the instances - due to the 
psychological characteristics of individuals - under which there can be 
market failures. And therefore, institutions – mainly the government - 
needs to provide help to the individual, for him to be able to process his 
choices in a rational way.  
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a final note in neuroeconomics   
The main contribution of neurobiology has been to show that our genet-
ics, while highly influential, is not necessarily decisive in defining human 
behavior. Our genetics do not define a unique development path, on the 
contrary is quite flexible and functions in accordance with the social envi-
ronment. Even the adult brain, although already developed, shows signif-
icant degrees of plasticity. The study of the interaction between genetics 
and environment, has taught us: that a proper genetically development 
only happens if the social environment is adequate176. We were evolu-
tionarily design to be social beings and our genetics assumes that we will 
have in our development proper social and environmental conditions. 
Several experiments have shown that our genetics does not evolve 
adequately under the wrong environmental and social conditions. New 
born kitties, if they are intentional blinded since they are born; even after 
they are release from the experiment, never developed the visual area 
in the brain. Human kids heavily mistreated, developed a smaller brain 
than normal. Monkeys growing in isolation mutilate themselves. Several 
neurobiological experiments have shown that proper brain development 
require emotional eye contact with other human beings; we learn to ex-
press our own emotions as a reflection of our emotional interaction with 
others. Thus, we are only the way we are because we are social beings. This rein-
forces the view that we have been defending, that there is not a unique-
ly genetically define human nature, we are plastic beings. Genetics do 
not define a unique pattern of behavior. A genetically deficient monkey 
which is born with abnormal highly aggressive tendencies, when edu-
cated by a proven warm mother learns to control his aggression. Which 
shows, as we have been argued, the importance of the proper belonging 
institutional environment177. 
Neuroeconomics is a booming discipline that has had already signifi-
cant contributions178. There are two branches in neuroeconomics. The 
first one uses the abstraction of the econs to solve traditional neurobio-
logical problems. The second gives neurobiological support to the empiri-
cal findings presented by Behavioral Economics. The results in the first 
branch shows that we were evolutionarily made to optimize our relation 
176 Obregón 2013a.
177  For references to all the experiments mentioned in this paragraph, see Obregón 2013a.
178 See Reuter and Montag, 2016; and Glimcher and Ferh, 2014.
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with the environment, there is no room in evolution for designs of beings 
which do not optimize survival. That is why even the adult brain remains 
with a high degree of plasticity. The second branch reinforces the find-
ings in Behavioral Economics in the sense that when an emotional, altru-
istic or social cooperative behavior happens in fact the areas of the brain 
that theoretically should be involved in such tasks do participate. But 
such neurobiological support has also been found for other schools such 
as the Psychology of Attachment, Freudian Psychology, Budist Psychol-
ogy, Language Psychology and so on. We defend the need to open the 
scope of neuroeconomics to include all this other relevant neurobiologi-
cal results, to foster an integrated view.
[183]
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